TARJETA DE PRUEBA

It is widely suggested that species classifications affect conservation effort. Taxonomic status of an entity influences funding for both further research and protection measures, as well as

classification under conservation legislation (Stokes 2004; Mace 2004; McNeely 2002; Gamauf et al. 2005). Mace contends, ‘[t]he label “species” can often determine whether or not conservation actions will be forthcoming. In national and international legislation, priorities are afforded to species over local populations or subspecies that are under threat’ (Mace 2004: 715). As David Stokes notes in his review of Davis and Renner’s (2003) book on penguins;

Of particular interest ... is the discussion of the disputed taxonomic status of putative species, such as the Royal (Eudyptes schlegeli) and White-flippered (Eudyptula albosignata) penguins. ... Although this may seem an academic dispute of little relevance, I would add emphasis to the authors’ statement that these matters have great practical importance, given the threatened status of many penguin species and the profound influence taxonomic status can have on allocation of conservation resources (Stokes 2004: 1294 my emphasis).

The ‘profound influence of taxonomic status’ on resource allocation thereby provides a potential incentive for conservationists and taxonomists to assert species status for threatened taxa that are only accorded subspecies status or less. Gamauf et al. (2005: 114) discuss this temptation to elevate subspecies to full species for conservation purposes, particularly those considered to be in the process of speciating, which they suggest could be termed the ‘conservation species concept’. They argue against such a practice, instead, suggesting that infra-specific taxonomic groups should be accorded conservation priority as ‘evolutionarily significant units’, along with the privilege accorded to ‘species’. One possible stumbling block to such recognition is the role of conservation legislation in various countries, while another is the effect of conservation status on the public willingness to pay for conservation.

There is debate about the influence of legislation on taxonomy, but the relationship between conservation funding and endangered status also potentially offers a reason to manipulate taxonomy. For instance, Penhallurick and Wink (2004) suggest that the main driving factor behind Robertson and Nunn’s (1998) splitting albatross species was that conservation legislation in many countries (where albatross occur) only considers species worthy of protection and not subspecies. However, Garnett and Christidis (2007) suggest that if Robertson and Nunn (1998) did split the albatrosses for conservation purposes they may have done so unnecessarily, because none of the international agreements or national legislation they surveyed stated ‘definitively that taxa below the level of species are to be ignored’ (Garnett and Christidis 2007: 189). While they

may not be ignored, being a rare subspecies of a more common species is not likely to attract the same attention as being an endangered ‘species’. This is because of the role that endangered status has on the potential to increase funding from the public. For instance, Gunnthorsdottir (2001) found that attractiveness of animal was perceived to increase, if it was framed as endangered. Similarly, using choice experiments, Clem Tisdell and others have shown that the public is more willing to increase donations with increasing knowledge about a species’ level of endangerment (Tisdell 2006; Tisdell, Nantha, and Wilson 2007). This suggests that exaggerating the level of endangerment of a species may an effective tactic to increase conservation funding, but Tisdell argues this is likely to be a short-sighted policy because

[i]t can spark off inflated claims of endangerment and result in discounting of accurate information by those who become aware of the exaggeration, and may draw conservation funds away from other threatened species, some of which may be more endangered than the favored species. It has little to recommend it (Tisdell 2006: 518).

Nevertheless, while subspecies may not be deliberately ignored in legislation, and exaggerating conservation status is recommended against, there are a number of cases where the potential for gerrymandering species delimitation to improve conservation effort have been alleged.

One such case, where taxonomic tampering is alleged, concerns the black turtle (Chelonia agassizii) of the Eastern Pacific, and its genetic similarity to the widespread green turtle (Chelonia mydas). The turtle biologists, Karl and Bowen (1999: 997) argue that there is a paradox among

conservationists who are only willing to accept favourable genetic evidence, suggesting that;

some conservationists who embraced the genetic findings for Kemp’s ridley turtle studiously ignored identical genetic assays for C. agassizii. Even more alarming [they suggest] are declarations that such information is a disservice to conservation.

Despite the lack of genetic separation the black turtle has retained species status for over a hundred years on the strength of shell colour and minor morphological differences, with the dire conservation status of the black turtle specifically invoked as an argument for preserving species status (Mrosovsky (1983) cited in Karl and Bowen 1999). Karl and Bowen (1999: 996) specifically suggest the label of ‘geopolitical species’ (GS) for;

taxonomic designations that persist, but for which there are essentially no supporting data. Geopolitical species are groups of individuals confined to geographically or politically defined areas and are accorded species status independent of morphological, genetic, and reproductive criteria. The [geopolitical species] is a pragmatic designation based not on science but on the recognition that some species names are perpetuated primarily on geographical, political or cultural grounds.

They go on to claim that most organismal biologists, once introduced to the concept, can readily provide examples from their own field, for instance sardines occurring in Japan, California, Chile, Australia and Southern Africa are almost indistinguishable morphologically, yet species names for regional forms have persisted for seven decades (Grant et al. 1998 cited in Karl and Bowen 1999). They also suggest that geopolitical species are the product of an earlier age of exploration

when ‘naturalists described the biota of a particular region without access to specimens from adjacent regions’ (Karl and Bowen 1999: 996). For Bowen and Karl (1999), this situation highlights extremely important underlying issues in conservation biology, in particular, they oppose the misuse of scientific findings to promote conservation goals, and ultimately the deeper tension between science and advocacy in conservation. They ask ‘should legitimate scientific results be withheld, modified, or ‘spun’ to serve conservation goals? Emphatically, we say no. Conservation goals will change with time, but scientific principles should not’ (Bowen and Karl 1999: 1015). From an ethical standpoint, in relation to the black turtle controversy Schrader- Frechette & McCoy (1999) argue that ‘even if there are some grounds for expanding

conservation biologists’ responsibilities for the common good … scientists are not ethically justified in using any means whatsoever to achieve desirable consequences’ (1999:1011). They also argue that conservation biologists do not appear to have the grounds for paternalism in the black turtle case because it involves value judgments (not merely professional expertise) about the importance of conservation and how to deal with uncertainty; and that there is also a ‘prudential reason for being truthful and unbiased: the public will find out, and the misrepresentations will not be successful anyway’ (1999:1012). Thus, such paternalism has the potential to undermine the public’s faith in conservation.

The black turtle case raises the highly contentious issue of the appropriateness of conservation advocacy by scientists (Nelson and Vucetich 2009; Noss 2007). Among conservation biologists the issue of objectivity and specifically the line between science and values is hotly debated, and whether crossing this line is a problem (Shrader-Frechette 1996), and, if it is, how they might refrain from doing so (Lackey 2007 cited in Campbell 2011). Conversely, the conservation biologist Reed Noss (2007: 18) argues that ‘values are a good thing in conservation biology’, but believes it is crucial for conservation biologists to recognize the extent to which they are shaped by their preferences and experiences, but also to maintain their honesty;

Too few scientists openly acknowledge experiential and emotional factors that attracted them to their science in the first place. We are loathe to confess our biases. Personal bias will determine to a great extent what we choose to study, how we interpret the results, and to what extent we advocate particular policies or actions. If we allow our biases to get control of us, to the extent that we seek out data to support preconceived conclusions, selectively cite literature that agrees with our conclusions, ignores conflicting evidence, become dogmatic in our opinions and preferences, or – worst of all – fabricate or alter data to support our case, then we have gone too far, and deserve every bit of scorn and distrust our scientific colleagues and society at large may heap on us. Yet, if we can be inspired by our positive values – life, truth, fairness, and the standards and professional norms of science – then we can be honest advocates (Noss 2007: 18).

Alternatively, a science and technology studies approach proceeds from the assumption that the relationship between science and values are inseparable, and that attempts to distinguish between them ‘are examples of boundary work, or how scientists and institutions patrol and defend the

realm of what counts as science’ (Campbell 2011: 48). Disputes over species status have the potential to illustrate boundary work in action, especially when conservation priorities are involved.

The idea of boundary work is illustrated by the arguments of George and Mayden (2005: 397) (as well as those of Karl and Bowen), in their discussion of species concepts in relation to the US Endangered Species Act (1973). They use both the black turtle and seaside sparrow cases to critique the reliance on mitochondrial DNA for species delimitation, instead arguing that; ‘there are valid concerns that an analysis based solely on genetics will overlook some actual species and prevent effective management practices by not accurately revealing diversity’. The actual species discussed here are black turtles which, they argue, ‘have long been recognized as a different species based upon morphological differences. These consistent morphological differences are enough to differentiate the black turtle from the green turtle’ (George and Mayden 2005: 394), and the seaside sparrow which had a ‘consistently different shade and song characteristics when compared with other subspecies’ (George and Mayden 2005: 398). Again, this seems to highlight the contentiousness of species concepts in relation to conservation. For Cotterill (2003), the discovery of actual species required phylogenetic methods, while for George and Mayden (2005) those same methods potentially obscure actual species. It seems ironic that, while George and Mayden (2005: 406) recognise that ‘listing decisions are unavoidably political, [they argue that] such pressure must not affect the science involved in species identification ... it should be an objective process, supported by scientific data and structured by the correct understanding of the various species concepts’. Similarly, Morrison III et al. (2009: 3204), in their study of the impact of taxonomic change on conservation, regard the dusky seaside sparrow as an example where ‘taxonomy kills’, suggesting that removal of species status in 1973 contributed to decreased conservation effort and ultimately extinction, but they completely ignore Avise and Nelson’s (1989) genetic study showing that, phylogenetically, it was a poor candidate for species status. Both these sets of authors’ acceptance of the dusky seaside sparrow as a species seem to reflect the idea that species have a reality if they have been named as such, perhaps illustrating Mulvey and Lydeard’s (2000: 1924) contention that, ‘many people ... view named entities as unassailable, especially in the context of conservation’. They argue that, ‘[T]his position is indefensible and counterproductive’, which hints at the sometimes heated nature of the debates that revolve around the issue of scientists advocating for the recognition of ‘species’ for conservation purposes.

I would argue that coming to the ‘correct’ understanding of species concepts can indeed be a very political contest, supported by claims to the high moral ground of an ‘objective process’. It would

appear that Mace (2004), in her survey of the role of taxonomy in conservation, recognises precisely the potential for political decisions when she suggests that;

The credibility and consistency of species units will be greater if they are determined by experts independent of those with particular interests in the outcome of the assessment of taxonomic boundaries (Mace 2004: 717).

Thus, it appears that the understandable desire to save a particular taxonomic entity can lead to the temptation to manipulate taxonomic boundaries, especially if that entity has previously been accorded species status. This seems to stem, in part, from the strongly held belief that actual species are out there waiting to be identified, if only we could settle on the proper methods and correct species concept. Instead, in the next chapter, I suggest that different methods enact different realities, and the correct species concept is inevitably a political decision. This helps us to understand why there will always be disagreement between competent taxonomists. Another potential influence on taxonomy is the increasingly important links between conservation and ecotourism, where tourism is proposed as an important way of saving endangered species.