2.2 BASES PEDAGÓGICAS
2.2.1 TEORÍA DEL PROCESAMIENTO DE LA INFORMACIÓN
Do university scientists freely set the courses of their own careers, or do outside forces lead them to enter particular subfields within their disciplines and to take up particular topics within those subfields? To ask the same question in a different way, how much freedom do those who fund scientific research give to those who do scientific research?
The federal government sponsors the bulk of the basic science research that goes on in U.S. universities.10 Most basic physics research at universities, for example, is sponsored by just four
government agencies—the Department of Energy (successor of the Atomic Energy Commission), the National Science Foundation, the Department of Defense (through the Army Research Office, the Office of Naval Research, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research and so on) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.11 Ninety-nine percent of the federal funding for
basic physics research at universities comes through these four agencies. In 1995 the federal government spent about $590 million on university physics research; about $455 million of that expenditure paid for research characterized as basic.12 At the University of California, Irvine, my
old school, physics professors in 1996 got $8.7 million of their $10.2 million in R&D money from the federal government.13
To what extent do the university pipers themselves call the tune when the government pays for their work? The government, like any sponsor, is keenly aware of its influence, and has known the answer to this question since the 1950s, when it began to dominate the funding of basic research in universities in the United States. In 1954, the president of the United States ordered the then four-year-old National Science Foundation to report the effect that federal research money has on educational institutions.14 The resulting NSF report to the president, Government-
University Relationships in Federally Sponsored Scientific Research and Development, addresses
ASSIGNABLE CURIOSITY 56
To what extent has the availability of funds from particular agencies given direction to research in the universities? . . . Has the type of work done been determined by the availability of extra-university funds for certain kinds of research?
NSF gives the answer to the president in scientistic language:
It would be unrealistic to claim that Federal contracts and grants for research at universities have exercised no influence over the types and fields of research undertaken by the institutions. For example, Agency X has funds for support of a given type of work. Professor A at University Y applies for funds to carry on a project in this area although he may be the only one in the school with interests in it, and these interests may have been furthered by the availability of the Federal funds. He employs several research assistants. They are paid for aiding Professor A on the project, and in the process obtain advanced degrees. One of the assistants is very capable. He is taken on the staff as an instructor or even assistant professor. He, too, applies for support for the same type of work and before long University Y has a strong department in the particular area. One cannot conclude that the influence of Agency X was detrimental, but one can say the Agency did influence the direction of research at University Y and perhaps the number of young scientists with the particular research interest.15
Clearly, the government understands not only that it influences the content of research at "University Y," but that it also programs new scientists with particular research interests. Of course, it is already obvious from common sense and simple logic that when a government agency pumps research money into universities for work in areas of its own interest, it affects the kind of research that goes on, so that somewhere university scientists must be taking up topics they would not otherwise investigate.
If, for example, a government agency makes $43.9 million available to universities for basic research in nuclear physics,16 then university physicists will do $43.9 million worth of basic
research in nuclear physics. The government agency, for all practical purposes, will have ordered university physicists to do $43.9 million worth of basic research in nuclear physics. Although this is not the kind of order that names specific researchers, it is an order that individual university professors do end up carrying out.
How aware are academics themselves of the outside influences on the topics that they take up? Are they as aware as their sponsors? As the discussion moves from "Agency X" and "Professor A" and gets closer to home, university scientists show less and less understanding of the influence that others have on the work that they do. They readily agree that the reason university science departments are bigger and do much more research than, say, university philosophy departments has more to do with the priorities of those who sponsor research than with the wishes of scientists and philosophers. With greater difficulty, the university scientist recognizes that much of the research in his or her own field and subfield owes its very existence to the priorities of the sponsors; somehow, the influence of sponsors is easier to recognize in fields and subfields other than ones own. Finally, by asking individual scientists the extent to which they decide for
themselves which topics to take up as their own, one often finds that the professors so savor the I- am-my-own-boss self-image that they are unwilling even to consider the possibility that they have less than total control, I have heard academics with defense agency funding put it like this: "I am doing my research because I am interested in it, not because the military directed me to do it. It just so happens that the Defense Department is paying for it."
The National Science Foundation knows better than to believe such claims. It sees the need to look beyond the "usual statement" that university scientists make when they are asked about the origins of their work:
The distinction between choices made because of genuine interest and curiosity of the staff members and those made because funds were available for a particular field is not easily drawn. Although the usual statement of the research staff is that they are doing work of their choice, that statement is in part offset by the parallel reply to the following question: "If the same funds were available to a department without strings of any kind or interests of sponsoring agencies—except that the money be used for research—would the staff of the department be doing the same research?" The answers are often qualified.17
If academics lack a clear understanding of how they are directed toward particular topics, that is in part because they are directed in ways that allow them to see themselves as self-directed. One of the most important of these ways is funding via the "unsolicited proposal." University
professors build their careers on research, not teaching. Many professors get the money that they need to do research by writing an outline of the work they propose to do and submitting it to a federal agency that funds research. This is the unsolicited proposal, and using it as a mechanism for funding would seem to give control of research topics to individual scientists, not to sponsors. However, even though writing such a proposal requires a huge amount of time and effort, funding is by no means assured—the National Science Foundation rejects 2 out of 3 proposals, as does the National Institutes of Health—and so professors who want money to do research inevitably have funding agencies' interests in mind as they plan their work and write their proposals. Consciously or unconsciously, they tailor their own interests to match those of the sponsors.18
Hence, a scientists "unsolicited" request for money to work on a particular problem may represent the opposite of what it appears to represent. The scientists research proposal may actually be an expression of the sponsor's desire that the scientist attack the particular problem:
When academic staff members are asked if they initiated the research now done under contract, the usual answer is "yes." However, further discussion may show that the project arose as a result of conversations or consultations with agencies having specific problems associated with their particular programs and objectives. It is to be expected that an agency having particular interests would consult with scientists who have done work of interest to them, and this consultation may easily result in requests from the university staff members for support in their area of interest.19
The professor who is very good at coming up with proposals that get funded is sometimes called a "grantsman," particularly when the professor brings in enough money to hire a large staff of researchers. The name can be derogatory because it suggests a scientist who is concerned more with keeping the money flowing in and building an "empire" than with solving a particular research problem.
With the unsolicited proposal, even university scientists whose research is paid for by the Defense Department can believe they are self-directed and that military need does not determine the content of their work. Even if the military pays for all the research that is being done on a particular topic, it is still practically impossible to prove that the availability of military money is why a particular professor is doing research on that topic.
The federal governments great satisfaction with the work of scientists recruited into large-scale research and development projects during World War II laid the foundation for its heavy participation in basic research after the war. The government channeled much of its post-war financial support for basic science through the Office of Naval Research, which it established for that purpose in 1946.20 ONR, still very much in business, uses most of its money to back research
proposals that it receives unsolicited. This allows academics to decide like perfectly autonomous individuals the topics of the research work that they will do. The Navy need only provide the framework:
ASSIGNABLE CURIOSITY 58
Although these contracts are usually awarded in response to unsolicited proposals, ONR makes every effort to publicize its research needs so that its programs and interests can be taken into account by prospective contractors.21
Clearly, a professors insistence that her services were unsolicited should not lead one to conclude that her financial backers have given no direction to the content of her work.
Like ONR, other major research-funding agencies, such as the Army Research Office, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, the National Science Foundation and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, fulfill a lot of their research needs simply by making their interests known and backing unsolicited proposals. Thus the Army Research Office gives
professors hints as to where the money is—and thereby allows them to modify their interests accordingly—by publishing its research interests in great detail and quietly mentioning that "ARO receives approximately 700 proposals each year and historically funds approximately 200 new awards.”22 Agencies are often quite specific about their interests: "In Optical Physics, a
rapidly growing part of the program, specific current interests include the nonlinear response of isolated atoms to intense, ultrashort electromagnetic fields. . . ." That example is from the National Science Foundations Guide to Programs, which NSF describes as "a compilation of funding opportunities." The guide notes that NSF receives approximately 30,000 proposals each year and makes about 9,000 awards.23
Thus, funders find they can arouse the proper research interests in scientists without saying very much. Their money talks—and is brilliantly articulate. However, they choose not to depend completely on this impersonal mechanism. The Office of Naval Research, for example, has a "cadre of 130 Program Officers" who "maintain long-term relationships with investigators, giving ONR an invaluable ability to apply relatively small investments early in the conceptual stages of a project, with great influence on the focus of the work."24 Indeed, all the funding agencies
encourage professors to discuss their ideas with program officers before they submit their proposals. Through these discussions, which are strictly off-the-record, agencies help professors fine-tune their interests. At the Army Research Office, for example, "technical correspondence prior to submission of the proposal" is intended
to convey to a prospective offeror [one offering to do research] an understanding of the Army's mission and responsibilities relative to the type of effort contemplated. Such correspondence should be handled informally at the working level and is not binding on either party. This type of correspondence should not be referenced in the proposal and will not be considered during evaluation of the proposal nor included in any official contract file.25
The Air Force and Navy also use a habeas corpus technique to prime the pump of professorial research interest. Under its Summer Faculty Research Program, for example, the Air Force moves university professors to its laboratories for the summer, where it works quite openly "to develop the basis for continuing research of interest to the Air Force at the faculty members institution" and "to stimulate continuing relations among faculty members and their professional peers in the Air Force. "26 If by summers end the trick has been turned and the seed of an appropriate research
interest has been planted, then the scientist spreads the Air Forces research interest by carrying the seed back to the university—along with a little fertilizer to ensure its germination: "After completing this program, participants may submit a proposal for continuing research at their own facilities.”27
Military research agencies have a host of other programs that channel people into military- relevant science. The Air Forces University Resident Research Program, for example, keeps the professor for an entire year, not just for a summer. Its Graduate Student Research Program likewise works "to expose graduate students to potential thesis topics in areas of interest to the
Air Force. "28 The Army Research Offices Young Investigator Program aims "to attract to Army
research outstanding young university faculty members."29 The Office of Naval Research "fosters
continuing academic interest in naval relevant science from the high school through post-doctoral levels" and beyond.30 Separate ONR programs target high school students, graduate students,
black graduate students, postdocs, young faculty and faculty in general.31
At each funding agency, it is the job of the program officers to stay aware of the big picture in research and to make sure that those who receive research money actually do what they promised in their proposals. At the Office of Naval Research, for example, the program officers are active scientists and engineers in their fields. "It is their responsibility to maintain awareness of the progress, trends and accomplishments of science and technology in their particular fields and to maintain contact with potential investigators in those fields. They review proposals submitted by prospective contractors, select those most promising to their program and most relevant to anticipated Navy needs, and monitor progress of contracted work."32 At the National Science
Foundation, each "program director" handles research proposals and is responsible for monitoring the research work of a certain number of NSF grant recipients in a particular sub-field. The program directors are the agency's front-line professionals, who keep in close contact with those doing research with NSF grant money.
The much-touted "peer review" process does not usurp the power of the program directors to serve agency goals. Peer review is the process in which an agency asks outside scientists to give their opinions on the scientific feasibility of proposed research; the screening by outsiders leaves the agency with a long list of feasible projects from which it chooses those that best further its goals. Peer review does not reduce the program directors to nonprofessional poll takers: The program directors select the reviewers, decide whose advice to follow in light of the goals of the programs they manage, and monitor the work of the scientists they fund. The program directors are the gatekeepers at the money bin and therefore loom as important figures for researchers, who if not worried about getting a grant, are worried about renewing one. Physicists hoping for National Science Foundation support, for example, are told that "while the advice of all reviewers is taken quite seriously, the final decision for funding is made by the Director and Staff of the Physics Division."33
To illustrate how government agencies influence university scientists to take up certain topics in their research work, I have used military agencies as many of my examples. My point is not that military goals motivate most university research, for that is not the case. My point is simply that university scientists adjust their curiosities for their funders—military or civilian. The military agencies are just examples of funders for whom many professors adjust their research interests. I will argue, however, that military agencies arc more representative examples than they appear to be at first glance.