• No se han encontrado resultados

Guba and Lincoln (1981) and Patton’s (2002) analyses of the qualities in quantitative and qualitative research paradigms can be summarised thus: Quantitative Research is a deductive approach based on traditional scientific criteria which is positivist, realist and objective. Quantitative research has strong claims to validity of data because it is systematically rigorous in dissemination and supported by triangulated evidence. And quantitative research can be deemed generalisable, as it seeks to test a theory or a hypothesis. Qualitative Research, on the other hand, is inductive, based on a

social constructivist criterion which is naturalistic, interpretive and idealist - because there is no external reality beyond the human construct. However, if the research is based on reflexivity and rigorously triangulated construction, qualitative research can be deemed trustworthy and authentic - particularly when doing justice to the uniqueness of case studies. Qualitative research contributes to an ongoing dialogue as it develops theory.

Morgan (2007) wrote in Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained, that these dominant methodologies - positivism and constructionism - have now been expanded to embrace critical theory, post-positivist and participatory research. Paradigms have grown from being ‘abstract entities with timeless characteristics’, to becoming enmeshed in an ‘ongoing struggles between competing interest groups’ (p.61). And Kincheloe and Berry (2004) enter this debate by noting that theory, as an enduring epistemological system of belief within a community of scholars, calls into question the ability of paradigms to impose order on the practices of research through an a priori system. Arguably, if more and more researchers are calling on different philosophical stances in order to find the answers to their research questions, the theory that methodology will dictate methods becomes eroded - as Morgan (2007) asks: ‘What difference does it make using system A over method B?’ (p.68)

Morgan’s question brings to the fore three important questions worthy of reflection:

Q1: For whom is this research being generated? And my answer is: for the examiners, peer review, and for all ‘the contributors’ (Stringer, 2007, p.97) within the host school.

And with the latter in mind, should I seek feedback from those contributors on the action research in Chapter 4, and the case studies in Chapter 5?

Q2: Can researchers, whether they use either quantitative or qualitative methodologies, ever be objective? Is it impossible to remove the researcher from reportage because, as Law (2007) writes, ‘there is no reality independent of the apparatus that produced reports of reality’ (p.31)?’ Answer: this is the foremost challenge for the researcher (Macintyre, 2000), and one I addressed in 1.2 when I acknowledged the obstacles to my being a wholly objective researcher.

Q3: Can knowledge ever be certain - or should research now move from ‘an epistemological to a praxiographic appreciation of reality’ (Mol, 2002, pp.53-4) - one which allows us to investigate the uncertain and complex lives of informers in a world where there is no closure, where realities overlap and collide in a complex way?

And I answer that question by asking yet another one: ‘Could there be a research ‘assemblage’ (Law, 2007, pp.40, 41) which goes beyond quantitative and qualitative methods, in order to construct ‘partial connections’ (Strathern, 1991 cited in Law, 2007, p.15) between research action and informer development?’ Such an approach would be a holistic, humanist dissemination of the archive, one in which ‘the individual is included in the collective, and the collective is included in the individual but neither is reducible to the other’ (Haraway, 1991, p.149). And, could such an approach be deemed ‘trustworthy’ (Stringer, 2007, p.57) within the research community?

Mansell (2007) argues that the trustworthiness of quantitative research is manifestly visible in the precise, rigorous formulation of technical achievements in the modern world. The miracles of construction, manufacture, communication and transport are testament to the knowledge derived from ‘Rigour and Complexity’ (Kincheloe and Berry, 2004, title) in quantitative research. Quantitative research can precisely describe the number of people involved in a setting and how they are distributed geographically, organisationally and ethnographically. Such research can also enumerate the number and proportion of unemployed people, the number and types of dwellings, the age distribution of the population and numerical relationships that exist between such features as gender, social class, race, employment, poverty and educational attainment (Mansell, 2007).

The argument against quantitative research originated in late-nineteenth century discourse on the reduction of mankind by ‘science’s mechanistic and reductionist view of nature [which] exclude notions of choice, freedom, individuality, and moral responsibility’ (Cohen et al., 2006, p.17. my brackets). Qualitative researchers now became focused on the systematic analysis of social episodes and development in context - though researchers had to acknowledge that the unpredictability and individuality of persons adds weight to the difficulty in inferring ‘causes from behaviour’ (Chomsky, 1959 cited in Cohen et al., 2006, p.19) - or of making generalisable claims. And even as Stringer (2007) defends the case for qualitative methodologies in social and behavioural research, he has to acknowledge that numbers (in quantitative findings) do not inform us, ‘what the information “means”, or suggest actions to be taken’ (p.203). And both Cohen

et al. (2006) and Stringer (2007) observed that the ‘findings of positivistic social science are often said to be so banal and trivial’ (Cohen et al., 2006, p.17) that they have been deemed, ‘only marginally relevant (to) teachers, health workers, and human service practitioners’ (Stringer, 2007, p.5. my brackets) in their daily lives.

There are core differences between the ‘scientific’ and the ‘naturalistic’ paradigms: rigour vs. grounded, propositional vs. intuitive, controlled experiment vs. holistic, verification vs. discovery, preordinate vs. emergent - and in analysis: variables vs. patterns (adapted from Guba and Lincoln, 1981 cited in Spencer et al., 2003, p.48). However, Spencer (2003) counters this analysis by noting that it is unsatisfactory to make crude comparisons between quantitative and qualitative research, because both borrow from each other’s paradigms. For example, quantitative and qualitative surveys generate open ended questions, both can analysis and report data numerically and both research methodologies make judgements and interpret data patterns. What Spencer (2003) argues for is that ‘what is important is the methods fit the question’ (Spencer et al., 2003, pp.47, 60) - not that a method makes a superior claim to ‘quality’ over another (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.278).

Bearing in mind that the ‘holy trinity’ of ‘validity, reliability and objectivity’ (Spencer et al., 2003, p.59) is the governing criterion, and bearing in mind the ‘myriad of ways in which these concepts have been conceptualised and redefined’ (Ibid.), justifying one data collecting method over another is no easy task (Trafford and Leshem, 2002) and, as Denzin (1997) writes, the idea that a methodology can dictate a method is now being

eroded. For example, when conducting social scientific research there is a need to be ‘flexible rather than scientific and seek less didactic methodological approaches’ (Mouly, 1978 cited in Cohen et al., 2006, p.10) especially when dealing with the unpredictability of ‘high horsepower, low steering’ students (OECD/CERI, 2007, p.6; 2.3).

The arguments over the rigour and complexity of quantitative and qualitative methodologies range between the polarities of the Via Regia in quantitative research from standardisation of the research situation underpinned by choosing a sample size ‘that will accurately represent the population being targeted’ (Cohen et al., 2006, p.93), to a celebration of the messiness and unpredictability of qualitative research when exploring a unique person in a real life situation. Arguably, as an example of systemic rigour and complexity in a quantitative inquiry, the ‘IEA, International Civic and Citizenship Education Study’ (1999) would be deemed to be exemplary and meet all sampling criteria. This study explored the conceptual understanding and competencies in citizenry education in 27 countries - and four thousand (9-14 year old) contributors per country were interviewed using a standardised questionnaire (Creswell and Clark, 2007). However, as Flick (2007) argues, such quantitative results show the ‘how many’ - but not necessarily ‘the why’ of the research questions and attempts to standardise the research situation are unstable when exploring situations that are living and capricious. As Law (2007) writes, the world is ‘slippery, indistinct, elusive, complex, messy, vague, confused, disordered, emotional, pleasurable, lost, horrific, visionary’ (p.6) - and discussions on reliability and validity of data and procedures (Kvale, 2007) are less than useful for assessing the quality of quantitative or qualitative data in a social science context.

Morgan (2007) notes that since the 1950s there has been a growing agreement amongst the community of research scholars that a new paradigm might go some way to resolving the issue of the suitability of research methods, through a more metaphysical approach to methodologies - one which opens up the possibility of becoming less didactic. And Morgan (2007) further notes that, despite initial resistance any ‘paradigm shift’ (p.56) meets, in time all paradigms become the norm and semi-fixed. When researchers realise that there is ‘something missing’ (Ibid.) in the analysis of either qualitative or quantitative methods, they rise to the challenge and re-examine old ways of thinking by acknowledging the successes of previous paradigms and move forward to more inclusive approaches. And the UN Convention (1990) stated that this is especially applicable where ‘children (are) active participants in the research process’ (cited in Christensen and Prout, 2002, p.481. my brackets).

However, despite tentative paradigm shifts, as far as the Executive are concerned, the dominant research methodology remains, ‘outcomes or impact’ based on ‘statistical information’ (Department for Education, 2010). The perceived advantage of quantitative analysis is that it is scientific and rooted on the principles of mathematical units and probability. Such analysis carries the gravitas of scientific respectability, in opposition to researcher evaluation in qualitative research (Denscombe, 2003). However, though ‘statistical tests of significance give researchers additional credibility in terms of the interpretations they make’, Denscombe (2003) notes that quantitative analysis is, ‘not as scientifically objective as it might seem on the surface’ - because data collected is only as

good as the impartiality of the researcher’s questions - ‘as with computers, it is a matter of ‘garbage in, garbage out’’ (p.264).

As necessary as it is to explore the appropriateness of the paradigm to be chosen, I am aware that what underlies this philosophical debate is whether this research project seeks ‘to test theory or develop and construct theory’ (Trafford and Lethem, 2008, p.97)? If it is the former, then the choice would lean towards a deductive approach; if the latter, an inductive one - irrespective of the validity one paradigm might claim over the other.

Or - is there a third way, one which uses a mixed method approach ‘in order to benefit from the methodological advantages of combining deductive and inductive’ paradigms (Ibid.)?

Arguably the discussions above on the strengths and weakness of qualitative and quantitative methodologies are irrelevant to the overarching question: ‘What, or who, are the beneficiaries of this research project - policy or participants?’ As there is a moral and legal duty (see below) to make young participants of prime import, then Mauthner’s et al. (2002) discussion on the need to humanise and contextualise ethical considerations comes to the fore. Mauthner et al. (Ibid.) argues that there is a call for, ‘a more reflexive model of ethics where the self is placed within ethical negotiations’ (p.6) which will ensure that both the contributors and the researcher are given equal status as they seek: communitarian moral ethics based on dialogue; ‘commitment to the common good’; ‘a stress on human dignity, care, justice, and interpersonal respect’ and ‘a belief that those

studied have the right to be active participants in a collaborative research process’ (Denzin, 1997, cited in Stringer, 2007, p.205). Both qualitative and quantitative paradigms need to factor into their methodology debate on engaging contributors as ‘co- researchers’ (Christensen and Prout, 2002, p.480).

3.3 Ethical issues

Christensen and James (2004) remind their readers of the story of The Little Prince which illustrates that ‘grown-ups cannot on their own understand the world from the child’s point of view and therefore they need children to explain it to them’ (p.7). And, if such thinking is incorporated into a debate on the ethics underpinning research methodology, then the contributors need to be involved with ‘actively interpreting and shaping the research process’ (p.5). The very act of participation, according to the DES (2003a) report, Building a Culture of Participation, was seen as leading young people to acquire opportunities to gain ‘increased responsibility within their lives’; ‘improve community relationships’ between peers and between young people and adults; and contribute to ‘personal development’ (p.13) - each of these opportunities going some way to fulfilling the obligation that adults have to empower the young to ‘develop the self- belief in their ability to influence outcomes’ (Shier, 2001, Article 1, UNCRC Children & Society - V.15 cited in DFES, 2003a, p.21).