La tesis homicídica

When it comes to understanding how PV might be created, Moore’s (1995) triangle is perhaps the most famous framework for understanding PV creation (Williams and Shearer, 2011). Many other studies base their PV theory on the strategic triangle (e.g.

Benington, 2011; Bannister and Connolly, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015).

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Moore’s idea of PV was an attempt to address gaps in strategic management research (Williams and Shearer, 2011). Moore found that the existing strategic management research was highly influenced by private sector concepts such as customer orientation and the use of private sector performance measurement frameworks (Moore, 1995).

Thus, Moore (1995) positioned PV as a strategic management concept. The strategic PV triangle explains how decision-making processes in the public sector can facilitate the creation of PV through the interaction of three dimensions: the authorising environment, the operational capabilities, and the PV outcomes (Benington and Moore, 2011). The triangle is developed to ensure that decision-makers can answer three key questions relating to public service initiatives: 1) is it legitimate and politically acceptable?, 2) is it operationally feasible?, and, perhaps most importantly, 3) is its purpose publicly valuable?

In so doing, the framework helps to ensure that the lines of accountability between all stakeholders are understood: “upwards through institutional and political structures, downwards through management and operational lines, and outwards to the public”

(Williams and Shearer, 2011, p. 1372). The framework should support public managers in assessing their strategies for the creation of PV from the three dimensions described below:

1- Legitimacy and Support: The strategy should consider sourcing the legitimacy and support primarily from individuals and groups involved in the formal decision making (politician, senior public manger and the electorate who represent society in democratic states).

2- Operational Capability: describes the means that the organisation can provide to achieve and enhance public values.

3- Public Value: The strategy should aim to achieve values which are considered valuable by the citizens and society in general and not only the organisation.

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If, as argued earlier, the aim of PV is “providing services directed towards the public good”

(Rose et al. 2014, p. 539), then a fundamental question to be asked is who should be the judge and arbiter of what services the public need (Williams and Shearer, 2011). In his initial analysis, Moore (1995) argued that public service managers are the judge for PV because they are responsible for the provision of the services. He reasoned this to the fact that “political decision-making is vulnerable to many different kinds of corruption”

(Moore, 1995, p. 54). This is criticised for casting the public managers as the “platonic guardians and arbiters of the public interest” (Rhodes and Wanna, 2007, p. 412), and thus it disturbs the norms of democratic societies (Rhodes and Wanna, 2009). They criticise Moore’s framework for inventing roles for public servants for which they are not appointed, are ill-suited, inadequately prepared and, more importantly, not protected if things go wrong” (Rhodes and Wanna, 2009, p. 161). In a later work, Moore admitted that

“the proper arbiter of public value is society” (Benington and Moore, 2011, p. 10). Moore also recognises that it was inappropriate for public services providers to make assumptions, on behalf of the citizens, about the PV inherent in the services that they receive (Moore, 2014). Consequently, Moore (2014, p. 465) argues the best adjudicator of the success of this endeavour is the collective public who are the multitude of individuals who constitute society, and in democratic societies, the electorate.

The key arbiter of PV creation critique is about administration and politics dichotomy and specifically, public managers’ involvement in politics (Dahl et al., 2014; Hartley et al., 2015). Dahl et al. (2014) believe that Moore and others were right to give accountability to public managers because the creation of PV depends on how they engage the political process. Moreover, Hartley et al. (2015, p. 195) concluded from their empirical research

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in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK that political astuteness is a required characteristic for public service managers to be able to create PV because they need to “maintain allegiance to democratic principles.” That is, public service managers need political astuteness to be able to influence external decision-makers, shape key priorities within the organisation, influence politicians, allocate required resources, and manage risks.

Thus, these authors see assigning the accountability of creating PV to public managers as an opportunity “to be doubly adept in dealing with their political environment engaging in politics, but simultaneously not crossing the line too far into overtly partisan behaviour”

(Hartley et al., 2015, p. 209). A recent publication also sided with the critics highlighting that using the term public as a whole is wrong and does not advance the theory of PV because of two concerns: 1) “introduces a mysterious and incoherent basis for public decision making”, and 2) “forecloses exploration of the limits to policy that arise from the reactions of a heterogeneous public” (Prebble, 2018, p. 104).

Moore’s framework has been criticised for being abstract and unclear. Rhodes and Wanna (2007) pointed out the issue of diverse interpretation within PV; normative or an empirical theory. Meynhardt (2009, p. 195) argued that “Moore is unclear whether he offers a theoretical framework, a concept, a heuristic device, or an operational tool of management”. Alford and O’Flynn (2009, p. 175) noted that “Moore has never focused on just being empirical or just being normative: he has clearly stated that he is attempting to do both.” Moore’s strategic triangle was aimed at public managers and was not meant to be for academic researchers (Alford and O’Flynn, 2009). Colebatch (2010) also argues that Moore’s definition of public servants did not necessarily refer to the public managers.

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Moreover, Moore’s approach has been criticised for its unsuitability in a parliamentary system. Rhodes and Wanna (2007) argue that Moore’s framework could work in an American government but not in other political systems which have dominant hierarchies of control. They argue that the framework is “less relevant in parliamentary systems with dominant hierarchies of control, the stronger role of ministers and tight authorising regimes underpinned by the disciplined two-party system (Rhodes and Wanna 2007, p.

407). Interestingly, Moore’s PV approach was mostly seen as a success in Australia, New Zealand and the UK than in the US (O’Flynn, 2007; Alford and O’Flynn, 2009). These findings are in line with Smith’s argument that Moore’s framework “could apply in Westminster as well as Washington” (Smith, 2004, p.79). Colebatch (2010) argues that Rhodes and Wanna criticisms are centred around their misunderstanding of Moore’s framework and were influenced by their argument about public service managers playing the role of platonic guardians of PV. However, Jacobs (2014) finds this too idealistic in the US context; he argues that PV is not adequate in the context of the US where achieving legitimacy and support is challenged by competition for political power. In his defence, he reasoned that challenges to the organised groups and government fragmentation favour narrow interests and discourage the social benefits expected by Moore. He also argues that the multiple and competing opinions and beliefs disrupt the societal consensus around PVs.

Lastly, the framework is considered a significant contribution to the theory of management (Grimsley and Meehan, 2007; O’Flynn, 2007; Alford and O’Flynn, 2009; Colebatch, 2010;

Williams and Shearer, 2011; Bryson et al., 2017). Bryson et al. (2017) argue that the strategic triangle has proven to be effective and useful as a heuristic guide to highlight

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the missing part of value generation and refocusing on public benefits and interest in both the public and business sectors. However, few empirical studies have been conducted on its accuracy and effectiveness in practice (Williams and Shearer, 2011; Hartley et al., 2015; Bryson et al., 2017).