Tipos de alimentos infantiles comerciales utilizados en la alimentación complementaria o Beikost

rather than supporting overall sector strategy implementation. The pre-agreed reform measures were ambitious, some unattainable in the time span given; they triggered regulatory, institutional and managerial changes but their effects upon service delivery remain unknown.

SBS implementation has had no effect upon budgetary processes and budget management, partly because Public Finance Managment (PFM) issues have only very recently been integrated into Commission’s SBS programmes in Egypt but mostly because the Egyptian Government used SBS funds like project funds. The compartmentalisation of budget programming in Egypt constrains the budget arbitration process, effectively weakening the links between policy priorities and resource allocation and, by isolating the funding of reform measures from the overall expenditure allocation processes, casting doubts on the Government’s political and strategic commitment to these reforms. (p55)

Implementation mechanisms have been found relevant to project objectives except in SAAP where the use of technical assistance might have been more appropriate to the beneficiary institutions’ objectives than twinning. (p67)

The choice of financing modalities has mostly been found appropriate except for the support used to strengthen CSO and NGOs (calls for proposals). (p67)

Interventions generally implemented their activities but the extent to which the produced deliverables contributed to the expected outcomes and impact was not monitored by the Commission which did not identify quantified targets to be reached by its interventions and focused its attention on the monitoring of project

and budget support activities and deliverables. (p87)

The efficiency of the Commission’s support has been hampered by several factors:

 Lead time from project identification and formulation to implementation;

 Overambitious objectives of some programmes;

 Complexity of procedures; and

 Weakness of human capacities and institutions. (p91)

When designing its sector budget support operations, the Commission has actively implicated the beneficiary institutions (even when there were many such as in the water sector) as well as other donors active in the sector in the discussion of the disbursement matrix. This proactive approach could be replicated when designing project interventions so that interventions can better respond to stakeholders concerns and needs about the sector’s context, and adapt accordingly the intervention’s objectives, achievable outcomes, time-frame of operations, implementable project modalities and appropriate institutional and human capacities for project implementation. (p101)

More efforts should be spent at the identification and formulation phases to determine the most appropriate implementation and financing modalities for each intervention such as to adapt to the context whilst giving the intervention the best chance of reaching its objectives by using the most appropriate intervention modalities. In this regard the analysis of sector’s institutional, operational, policy and budgeting frameworks are essential. (p102)

EIB IF/OR

(2010) n.a.

Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)

See J.C 2.5 and 2.6 that explain the synergies between Commission and EIB and show the value added in this respect.

CDE (2011) The CDE evaluation shows that efficiency was a major issue at the CDE, in terms of inadequate internal organization (Conclusion 6 ), inadequate management of human resources (C7), difficulties relating to the decentralization C8), and limitations in budget and accounting C9).

Those conclusions are summarised as follows:

“Though important improvements have taken place, the internal organisation of the CDE has remained insufficiently directed to the achievement of the goals of the mandate. Considerable efforts made by the CDE over the last years to overcome its deficiencies and improve its functioning namely, through increased focus on programme approach, the “four pillars” certification, and the improvement of operation and administrative rules. Notwithstanding these positive changes, the organisation of the CDE remained in many aspects rather bureaucratic and procedural in a way that it constituted an impediment to a swift and flexible cooperation with private sector organisations and SMEs. Even more important, it did not give enough room to the verification that the activities pursued achieve their intended results. The financial data, although compliant with the financial regulation and submitted to regular audits, did not provide the analytical information needed to monitor the strategy and to make quick decisions when revenues and expenditures deviated from the original plans.”

“The management of the human resources of the CDE has been too much oriented to a reduction of the ratio of operating costs to total costs rather than to adaptation of the internal organisation to the best way of fulfilling the mandate. Over the period of the evaluation the average ratio of operating costs to total costs

was 60.7%, leaving only 39.3% for operations (these figures are respectively 56% and 44% if one excludes the years 2007 and 2009). The reduction of this excessively high ratio has been a continuous concern to CDE management and the relative shares moved from 60.8% in 2005 to 48.4% in 2010 (see annex 2). The shift in the relative shares has been obtained by reallocation to operations of savings resulting from a drastic reduction in staff numbers. In purely arithmetical terms this has increased the productivity of the CDE. However, this policy raises two main concerns: (1) the willingness to save on labour costs resulted in under-execution of the budgetary resources allocated to operating costs and (2) the composition of the staff that resulted from the restructuring was unbalanced with a relatively large number of unfilled expert (coordinator) positions and an excess of assistant and technical staff in relation to the available positions.”

“Decentralisation has so far improved the CDE’s visibility and its proximity to the local stakeholders; however its full potential benefits have been hampered by the limited decision-making capacity of the RFOs and the difficulty of increasing their outreach in countries other than where they are located.” (see details under JC 3.3)

“The budget and the accounting did not provide a clear view of the resources and means of the CDE in such a way as to allow an understanding of the way in which resources have been used and thereby to provide guidance on reaching the objectives. The budgets of the CDE have complied with the financial regulation of the CDE but they have not been organised so as to provide clear information on how the resources have been allocated to achieve the objectives. Such limitations imply that it is difficult - including for the management of the CDE - to have a comprehensive view of the resources mobilised by the CDE and the different types of expenditure they allow. Such information would be necessary to guide an efficient allocation of resources and to understand the real leverage of its activities. As it is, the budget and accounts are satisfactory from a formal legal perspective but they do not constitute a useful instrument to follow up the overall activity of the CDE during the budget year.”

Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages iii to v)

With regard to synergies, as mentioned under JC 1.2, the CDE evaluation states that opportunities of synergies with the Commission remained underexploited (in the response to EQ 1):

“The CDE made policy commitments favouring synergies with Commission programmes with a view to achieving maximum coherent impact with its limited resources. Overall, its support was in line with the Commission private sector development policies but actual complementarities with Commission programmes have been rare. Contacts between the staff of the RFO [Regional Field Offices] and of the EUD varied according to the country and to timing, with a net improvement in 2010-2011.”

Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p22)

In terms of stakeholders’ perception of the (low) CDE value-added, see JC 3.1.

Banking Measures in the

Mediterranean area

No evidence of synergies. On the contrary, the report gave evidence of lack of communication between the EIB and the Commission, especially at EUD level which likely prevented potential synergies:

 “The Commission, and especially two of the EC delegations in the partner countries visited by the Court, were not sufficiently informed of EIB projects and was therefore not able to monitor or follow them. Furthermore, even when information had been transmitted by the EIB to the Commission’s central offices in Brussels, it had not always been shared with the delegations visited by the Court. The audits on the spot did, however, show that the

establishment of EIB representative offices had facilitated communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level. This was especially noted in Morocco, with the organisation of regular meetings.” (.14).

« In the case of Risk Capital Operations, the Report found that “The Commission did not set up controls in order to detect whether the same beneficiary was benefiting from different risk capital operations, either managed directly or through financial intermediaries. This was due to the absence of a central database at Commission level of all beneficiaries benefiting from risk capital operations.” (p.20). Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008 No information.

JC 3.5 Projects were implemented in line with planning, both in terms of