being, eternity is asserted to be a feature of the same reality as transience. Nor are these two ‘features’ of the real reliant upon two entirely different ways of thinking – for example Spinoza’s
sub specie aeternitatis, which is reality as viewed from eternity
(i.e. as apprehended by God). Rather, N’s idea is that becoming and eternity are not incompatible, such that we would need some transcendent viewpoint to reconcile them. Moments of still beauty and perfection like Z3.3 and Z4.10 are not illusions; rather, the world in its eternity is also profoundly tranquil (and see TISkirmishes49). Likewise, in contrast to Goethe’s ‘eternal feminine’, N’s eternity is characterized by the repetition or cycle of types of becoming (see TIAncients4), and in particular an alternation of destruction and creation.
‘Repetition’, as used above, is obviously a different, wider notion than ‘recurrence’. Thus, although sometimes N seems to employ it to refer to eternal recurrence primarily, ‘eternity’ is likewise a wider concept. Metaphorically, at Z3.16, eternity is the object of longing, while recurrence is the ‘nuptial ring’. Thus, I affirm the whole of what is and was, and my position within that whole, but that which seals this bond – demonstrating the profundity of my affirmation – is eternal recurrence. See also Dionysus, wholeness,
amor fati.
Euripides
The last of the three great Greek tragedians, and the one whose changes to the form, style and content of tragedy N believed was the actual suicide of the art. He sees Euripides as heavily influenced by
Socratism, and simply unable to understand tragedy as previously
pursued by Aeschylus and Sophocles. In particular, according to N, Euripides made tragedy naturalistic (eliminating its symbolic power), and optimistic (knowledge and understanding of events is possible through reason) – see BT11–12.
Europe, Europeans
Very roughly speaking, the orbit of N’s historical thought is the European continent. In several contexts, N evidently believes that
there is sense in talking about Europe as a single entity, and the European as a single type (e.g. H3.215). (Also, for most purposes, the United States is considered to be an extension of Europe.) This is because of a shared set of language precursors as well as human sub-races, the cultural inheritance (e.g. in political institutions, modes of art or literature, etc.) of ancient Greece and Rome, and the broad Christianization of Europe (the influence of the ‘ascetic priest’ discussed at GM3.21). Other regions of human geography – India, Russia, China or Africa – are present in his writings either to talk about cultural cross-fertilization (thus also the figures of Zarathustra and Alexander), or for comparisons (Buddhism, or the Hindu caste system). So, when N discusses the history of the human, he is thinking mainly of Europe.
However, N does extensively treat of individual European nations or cultures – the distinction between South and North is common, as are character studies of the Germans, French, English, Italians and of course the Jews. From a European perspective, these are to be understood as the inevitable variety within the European type. This variation presents dangers – N is particularly concerned with the domination (whether political, military or cultural) by one variety. However, it also presents opportunities, with each variety contributing some piece of the overall puzzle that is an anticipated higher form of the European type (see for example H1.475, D272). On this basis, some individual figures are presented as ‘European events’ rather than national ones (GS357, TISkirmishes21). The ‘Good European’ is a familiar refrain in N. By this he means those who are unconcerned with national rivalries and, being ‘heirs to Europe’s longest and most courageous self-overcoming’ (GS357, 377), take upon themselves the task of preparing for a European future. These ideas are the overarching theme of chapter 8 of BGE, entitled ‘Peoples and Fatherlands’ (see especially BGE256). N even speaks of a kind of quasi-political organization of the Good Europeans, across nations (D96).
evil
See Good.
EvOluTION 123
evolution
N stands among a long line of philosophers and natural scientists who discuss in what way, and by way of what mechanisms, living creatures have developed. Hegel (see H1.238) and Schopenhauer – both of whom treat of the history of organic forms and the emergence of consciousness – are particularly important for N. Likewise, N was broadly familiar with the work of Charles Darwin and the British thinkers influenced by him such as Spencer. If any of these versions of human development is true, then many important consequences would follow: there was no (or no single) act of divine creation and in particular man is not made in the image of God; moreover the basic structures of cognition are not a priori (as per for example Kant); and it will be impossible to project backwards, anachronistically, onto history or prehistory the beliefs and values held today.
N’s particular focus is the evolution of human instincts pertaining to cognition (i.e. how the world and knowledge are constituted) and morality (i.e. valuing of certain aspects of the human, culture or world). This development he ascribes both to a prehistorical period, and to the operations of culture within the historical period. Because cultural forces (beliefs, laws, practices, institutions) affect the body and the body’s affects and health, the development of the human continues to be conditioned by cultural means. Thus it is not an entirely metaphorical usage when N claims that ‘The scientific man is the further evolution of the artistic’ (H1.222). For the most part, the development of the human has been a matter of accident. What modernity presents to us is an opportunity to take conscious control of the evolution of the human (UM3.6, H1.24, and see entry on responsibility). Although he was happy to use the term evolution, N refuses to be identified with Darwin (EHBooks1). Among the mechanisms N describes in his account of human development are ressentiment, internalization,
sublimation, form creation, incorporation and degeneration.
Most of N’s knowledge of Darwinism is second-hand, through German philosophers of biology. N objects to the Darwinian account on at least four points. (i) He argues that self-preservation (or adaptation) is not the dominant or most common of instincts; the basic will of all life is to express its power and form its
environment thereby; (ii) that life is not characterized by scarcity but by plenitude, and that therefore struggle for survival is not the rule; (iii) the ‘weak’ have more spirit (are more clever, more similar, cooperative) and thus are more likely to survive; (iv) that each stage of evolutionary development comprises its own unique value (of ‘happiness’), and thus one cannot get from evolution to the idea of
progress (one or more of these is found at H1.224, D108, BGE13,
GM2.12, TISkirmishes14).
exception
Ausnahme. The basic contrast here is between the rule – human
beings whose values, beliefs and other qualities are broadly average or shared (the herd) – and the exceptions – those who have different values, greater will to power, etc. Those who are noble are exceptions (e.g. GS3). The exceptions are thus more significant for the health and development of a culture and, although in themselves representatives of strength, are in need of defending against the rule (GS76). However, philosophically, the rule is of greater interest (H2.362, D442, BGE26). This may be because there is little to be learned from exceptions – each being a singular instance – and thus insight into human beings, their drives, and the mechanisms of development or expression of those drives, are only to be found in the rule. The exception will ‘overflow’ in communication, and rather than slander the rule, will become the ‘advocate of the rule’ (GS55, 1887.10.175) – this is what N elsewhere calls magnanimity, and at an even higher stage, amor fati. If the exception defines himself against the group, then he or she is only an individual – a higher stage is reached insofar as exceptions find each other, work out a system of justice or mutual respect, and become a ‘group’ (e.g. 1887.10.82; see genius).