In trying to understand Foucault’s conception of subjectivity in the context of his rejection of the Cartesian account of the self 5, it is helpful examine the work of Merleau-
Ponty. Merleau-Ponty accepts the relationship between knowledge and the existence of a conscious subject, but rejects the Cartesian understanding of subjectivity whereby
consciousness is the ground of all knowledge, including knowledge of the outside world (Matthews, 2002: 89-90). Merleau-Ponty argues that human self-consciousness is a bodily experience in that as human beings in a world we inhabit, “live” or “enact” our bodies (Carman, in Crowell, 2012: 274-275). The subjective experience of my embodied self gives me knowledge of the world in which I act, and I cannot acquire knowledge through separating myself from my bodily experiences (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 75). Merleau-Ponty states:
Our body, to the extent that it moves itself about, that is, to the extent that it is inseparable from a view of the world and is that view itself brought into existence, is the condition of possibility, not only of the geometrical synthesis, but of all expressive
operations and all acquired views which constitute the cultural world. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 388)
While Foucault’s approach to understanding the complexity of the relationship between human beings and the world was influenced by the phenomenological approach represented by Merleau-Ponty, his concern was to “…question the category of the subject, its supremacy, its foundational function.” (Foucault, 2002: 247). In this context, the problem that I will explore from within a Foucauldian framework is how individuals who are shaped by power, still retain their agency. Foucault states:
…I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject to be found everywhere. I am very skeptical of this view of the subject and very hostile to it. I believe, on the contrary, that the subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment. (Foucault, 1988: 50-51)
individuals and the divisive effects of isolating practices, mediate human subjectivity (Foucault, Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 208). Because power structures possible and actual actions, it presupposes the existence of acting agents whose subjective interaction has a degree of freedom (Foucault, 2002: 340). Remembering that as beings-in-the-world, every human being is caught up within the web of power, it is a feature of the way we experience the world. However, those within every power relationship are also acting agents who are always already situated within a space or domain of action and possibility constituted by power (Foucault, 2002: 341). In other words, power produces acting subjects who can choose from various alternatives and create possibilities within a world that is structured by power, struggle, resistance and freedom (Foucault, 2002: 340-342). According to Allen (2001) Foucault’s analyses of power as constitutive of human subjective experience provides an account of the manner in which subjectivity is shaped within a social, historical and cultural framework, providing insights into the
“…conditions of possibility for subjectivity and agency in modern, Western, industrialized societies.” (Allen, 2001: 136).
AGENCY
For Foucault, relations of power are underpinned by two necessary conditions; that on each side of the power relationship there is recognition of the human capacity for action, and that relations of power ensure that this capacity for action can be actualized (Foucault, 2002: 341-342). Foucault argues that power relationships must not only
recognize human agency but must also preserve the agency of those upon whom power is exercised and this is achieved through the way that power acts not upon human beings but “upon their actions” (Foucault, 2002: 340). Foucault distinguishes between the nature of power which recognizes and preserves human agency and violence which acts upon human beings themselves and in its implementation fails to preserve human agency. According to Foucault violence in its direct and physical action upon human beings works to close off possibilities for further action or response, while power relationships are dependent upon a realm of possibility inscribed by human action (Foucault, 2002: 340-341).
Power is imbued within society and is intricately and dynamically inter-twined with other forms of human relations in multiple ways which support many forms of strategic domination, both at the local level and in more institutionalized and systematic forms (Foucault, 1980: 142). The dominating effects of power operate through forms of consolidation that are rendered as painless as possible for individuals. This is the case
regulative and organizational capacities are able to intervene very efficiently in the realm of everyday life (Foucault, 2003b: 242-243). While there is no escape from a power which is “always already there” this does not entail that power is totally dominating (Foucault, 1980 :141-142).
For Foucault, human subjects are constituted through their social situatedness, yet they retain their agency through acting, making choices and adopting attitudes towards their experience within this framework (Bevir, 1999: 67). This is important for
understanding that although the socially situated character of human life shapes our subjective experiences, this does not necessarily undermine the possibility of meaningful acts of resistance. As Foucault argues, in relating to ourselves, to society and to others in a way that embodies a spirit of questioning and resistance, we adopt a critical attitude that is “akin to virtue” (Foucault, 1997b: 24-25). By “virtue” Foucault draws attention to the role of critique which is one of supporting “desubjugation” in the context of our
willingness to question the power that has shaped us (Foucault, 1997b: 32).
Amy Allen (2011: 47) argues that Foucault’s critique of Kantian transcendental subjectivity provides a clue as to how Foucault theorizes the possibility of a meaningful subjectivity constituted though power. Consider the following statement:
Far from a blanket rejection of the very possibility of a subject capable of agency, autonomy, or self-reflexivity,
interrogation and transformation of the particular conception of transcendental subjectivity that was first formulated by Kant and later taken up by phenomenology. (Allen, 2011: 47-48)
Allen argues that Foucault inverts the Kantian account of autonomy – free commitment to a universal morality – to an understanding of autonomy that embodies the notion of a “free questioning of what appears to be necessary”, whereby individuals demonstrate and achieve their autonomy through opening spaces of resistance. (Allen, 2011: 50-51). On Allen’s interpretation, there is a particular kind of autonomy that is compatible with our constitution as subjects through power that involves our ability to reflect in a critical way on our situation and to purposely transform ourselves (Allen, 2011: 51). Foucault’s notion of autonomy reveals the contingent character of
knowledge and the impossibility of engaging in acts of self-transformation and critical questioning outside the influence of power (Allen, 2011: 51).
The impossibility of achieving autonomy (in the sense that Allen identifies) outside of relations of power is brought out particularly well in Foucault’s analysis of the historical deployment of sexuality. Foucault claims that our conceptions of sexuality are constituted by power, thus in trying to “liberate” our sexuality we are really only
relationship between power and sex is only characterized by repression and that discourse about sex is a way to resist or transform the prohibitions that power appears to have forced upon us (Foucault, 2008: 6). The central point that Foucault wishes to make is that despite our predisposition to think of power as repressing sex, the relationship between power and sex produces a flourishing discourse on sexuality (Sheridan, 1980: 165-166). In order to make this point, Foucault questions the historical and conceptual validity of what he terms the “repressive hypothesis (Foucault, 2008: 10). The repressive hypothesis is based on the view that power is ultimately repressive by nature and Foucault raises three reservations about the repressive nature of power in its connection with sexuality: the idea that sexuality was repressed historically; the notion that repression represents the full range of power’s techniques; and the neutrality of the discourse aimed at overcoming repression itself (Foucault, 2008: 9-11).
The main concern for Foucault is to elaborate the ways in which sex is connected to power in our society and the effects this has on our lived experience in the context of the possibilities associated with power’s intensely productive nature. Repression can be understood as merely one element among many multiple and diverse strategies of power, to produce silences, discourses, prohibitions and forms of knowledge concerned with central aspects of human life (Sheridan, 1981: 170). Foucault promotes an account of human subjectivity that emphases the importance of self-creation (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 237).
Foucault connects the notion of self-creation with a capacity to engage in a refusal of who we are: a refusal that grounds attempts to resist forms of individuality forced upon us in modern society (Foucault, 2002: 336). This relates directly to the account of
autonomy outlined above by Allen (2011: 51), in that our attempts at self-creation
through resisting socially constituted forms of individuality or self-understandings can be understood as a demonstration of individual autonomy. To fully understand the politically creative possibilities for Foucault’s subjects it is necessary to explore the intricacies of the relationship that Foucault theorizes between power and freedom.