Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are “free”. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available”. “At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom”. (Foucault, 2002: 342)
In the argument presented above, Foucault clearly associates the notion of freedom with subjectivity and human possibility. Remembering that Foucault makes a clear distinction between power and violence, it is clear that without the prospect of some form of choice or alternative possibility for action, there is no relation of power for Foucault.
Foucault theorizes a dialectic relationship between power and freedom
emphasizing that power relationships are grounded upon an unyielding freedom that is the pre-condition for the exercise of power and which always supports the possibilities for resistance (Foucault, 2002: 342). The notion of a necessary freedom is suggested by Foucault’s account of power in that power relations cannot exist without individual who
existence of resistance and power and it is within this space that freedom creates the conditions for power and resistance to be meaningful (Ransom, 1997: 123-124). In order to fully elaborate the role that freedom plays in Foucault’s account of power, it is
necessary to explore the complex understanding of freedom that Foucault adopts within his account of power.
An analysis of Foucault’s account of freedom must account for how it is possible for freedom to underpin power’s existence and yet be produced and shaped by power. There is also the practical question concerning the way in which individuals experience power in everyday life. If freedom underpins power relations, then how can we account for the way in which we experience particular forms of oppression and subjection as undermining of our freedom? A close reading of Foucault’s writing reveals a highly complex relationship between power and freedom.
The literature reveals the intricacy of this relationship within Foucault’s work. Crucial to Foucault’s account of power is the role played by a necessary freedom or the “plebian element” for understanding of the ways in which individuals are never fully constituted through power (Ransom, 1997: 124-126). Ransom takes a Nietzschean approach to explaining the importance of this plebian aspect, arguing that while
disciplinary power constitutes us as subjects, there is a degree of selectivity whereby not all aspects of our individuality are shaped (Ransom, 1997: 118-120). However, in raising the notion of the plebian aspect of power relations, the importance of the “reversibility” of power and discourse is also important, particularly in the context of the “…plurality of
subjective forms present in each individual.” (Ransom, 1997: 121-122). Resistance is enabled by the way in which the plurality of subject positions I take up leads to tensions within my experiences: I reflect on the constraining aspects of my experiences in one role I play from the vantage point of other roles I take up (Ransom, 1997: 122). There is much more to Ransom’s discussion of this particular interpretation of freedom in Foucault’s writing and I will draw on his insights concerning Foucault’s account of power again in Chapter Four.
A different understanding of the role of freedom in Foucault’s account of power is put forward by Neve Gordon (1999) who argues for an ontological understanding of freedom as the condition of the possibility of power and subjectivity within Foucault’s work. Gordon emphasizes that Foucault conception of the subject as a “being-in-the- world” acknowledges Heidegger’s account of freedom where “man is the possibility of freedom” (Gordon, 1999: 405-406). As I discussed earlier in the introduction to my thesis, Heidegger articulates human being as Dasein; an entity for whom its being is a matter of concern for it (Heidegger, 1996, 4: 10). As Dasein’s being matters for it, Dasein gains self-understanding through the possibilities provided by the world as well as though particular situations Dasein finds itself in and though possibilities it has chosen for itself (Heidegger, 1996, 4: 10).
Heidegger states that: “Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost potentiality of being.” (Heidegger, 1996, 31: 135). In this statement, Heidegger
some opportunities pass and adopting others (Heidegger, 1996, 31: 135). For Foucault too, subjects are necessarily free in the sense that freedom is a condition of their
possibility and that their status as free beings is the condition for the operation of power (Gordon, 1999: 406). An important point to take from Gordon’s interpretation is that for Foucault, freedom is not merely an empirical characteristic of human individuals but a condition for human being.
Another sense of freedom can be drawn from Foucault’s work, that of freedom in its actualization in the world. This is a dimension of freedom explored by Thomas Dumm (1996) who emphasizes the way disciplinary power enables a space of freedom to
emerge. When attention is drawn to the conditions placed upon human freedom, it is in the context of practices of freedom in the world, where we are subject to constraints and limitations that shape the way we express our freedom (Dumm, 1996: 78).7 Foucault’s
writing suggests that freedom is more than the condition of human possibility; it is a way of life that must be actively practiced through conscious choice (Foucault, 1997a: 282- 284). Thus this dimension of freedom can be chosen or ignored. Indeed, Foucault
promotes freedom as an active self-constitution through situating freedom in the political
7 Gordon is critical of this kind of understanding of Foucauldian freedom in the sense that freedom is
realm; not as an empty and enclosed space separate to politics, but within its very domain (Dumm, 1996: 3-5).
Freedom in its actualization is an active questioning from within the disciplinary space, pushing at the boundaries to create new limits (Dumm, 1996: 117). Disciplinary power incites its own resistance because the institutions within which it operates are made up of disparate forces which are often in conflict (McHoul & Grace, 1993: 70). The normalizing techniques of power do not always produce homogenous subjects, but rather bring all the individual differences that it seeks to homogenize out in the open, making them visible and providing opportunities for resistance through the very activity of normalization (McHoul & Grace, 1993: 72). This emphasises a similarity with recent narrative theories such as that offered by Alasdair MacIntyre who talks about lived narratives in their unpredictability and their teleological character (MacIntyre, 1984: 215). The point is that our lives are characterized by a unity that comes from shared situations and projects and a disunity that comes from not being the author of one’s own life and being subject to constraints within which we live our lives (MacIntyre, 1984: 215) However, MacIntyre emphasises that there are many ways that human lives continue on within these constraints and that as a “story-telling animal”, human beings make choices within the story in which they are a part (MacIntyre, 1984: 216).
It is within the realm of possibility shaped by power where Foucauldian freedom is materially situated and actualized. Gordon argues that freedom understood
subject can never be completely constituted by power because freedom is a condition for the possibility of the subject (Gordon, 1999: 413-414). Thus (actualized) practices of freedom depend upon subjects whose freedom is a condition of their possibility (Gordon, 1999: 414).