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The cases surveyed above demonstrate that courts already provide ex- emptions in other First Amendment contexts, even in the context of generally

applicable laws.233 _{Thus, providing religious exemptions does not “elevate[]}

religious freedom to a preferred position among First Amendment rights.”234

But what of Justice Scalia’s concern that religious exemptions pose a special threat of a society “courting anarchy?” Is less protective treatment

229 _{See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 562 (Wash. 2017) (citing Emp’t}

Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)) (citing Smith as providing mere rational basis review for religious exercise, and deferring without question to the government’s abstract interest in combatting discrimination).

230 _{See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89}

(2012) (holding that that constitutional right under the religion clauses trumped the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act).

231 _{The Supreme Court has made clear that a government interest that is found lacking in one}

context does not transform into a compelling interest when it arises in the religious context. See

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 429–30 (holding that whether strict scrutiny is triggered by the Free Speech

Clause or RFRA, “the consequences are the same”).

232 _{Case, supra note 1, at 485.}

233 _{See supra notes 93–232 and accompanying text.} 234 _{LUPU &TUTTLE, supra note 55, at 11.}

of religious objections warranted based on something else problematic about religious objections compared to other First Amendment claims? Is there something about the infinite variety of practices of faiths that distin- guishes religion as giving rise to more voluminous risks than those posed by speech or association, particularly post Hobby Lobby’s heightened protec- tion for such rights? For example, as discussed above, critics such as Pro- fessor Case argue that Hobby Lobby creates a “risk of havoc” without any “stopping point . . . .”235 _{Further, Case suggests that Hobby Lobby has}

“open[ed] up the floodgates to a host of new potential claims for religious

exemption by a host of different kinds of service providers.”236 _Similarly,

Professor Corvino suggests that “many find Hobby Lobby worrisome” be- cause religious conduct that receives protection for “exemption and ac- commodation purposes” is “expansive and expanding,” and has a unique

“pervasiveness” with an “endless variety of religious scruples.”237 _Professor

Leslie Griffin argues that because of “Hobby Lobby,” the “broad reading of RFRA . . . will encourage many future lawsuits and undermine more civil

liberties.”238 _{She also asserted that “[a]lmost anything can be turned into a}

claim of ‘cooperation with evil’” and “all federal laws are now subject to challenge, with the possibility of every citizen becoming ‘a law unto him-

self’ until the rule of law is undermined.”239 _{Professor Elizabeth Sepper ar-}

gues that “[t]he Hobby Lobby decision throws open the courtroom door to corporations and hands them the now-powerful weapon of corporate con- science to fight off regulation that protects the full and equal citizenship of

the people.”240 _{And Professor Marshall asserts that “[t]he risk that Hobby}

Lobby invites flimsy but readily sustainable RFRA claims by entities en- gaged in commercial activity then should be apparent. A financial incentive

combined with a high likelihood of success is a dangerous mix.”241 _{This line}

of thinking, if true, counsels that a religious exemption regime, with “an

235 _{Case, supra note 1, at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).} 236 _{Id. at 487.}

237_{CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 38, 46, 47–50.} 238 _{Griffin, supra note 60, at 673.}

239 _{Id. at 687–88; see also Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 61, at 1133–34 (“This deci-}

sion will lead to much broader challenges. Christian Scientists, for example, will claim that they do not have to provide any health insurance to their employees.”); Garfield, supra note 61, at 825 (arguing that “[b]y tipping the scales so drastically in favor of religious objectors, Alito put out a welcome mat for religious objections by corporations”); Robertson, supra note 61, at 569 (arguing that “the ruling casts a shadow over all public health regulation, given that virtually any objector can cloak their objection in religious garb”); Stephens, supra note 61, at 4 (arguing that “[t]he Court’s significant expansion of religious liberty doctrine in [Burwell v. Hobby Lobby] invites businesses to seek exemptions from nondiscrimination laws such as Title VII, the Pregnancy Dis- crimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as other laws, which provide workplace protections to women, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act”).

240 _{Sepper, supra note 62, at 233.} 241 _{Marshall, supra note 8, at 120.}

endless chain of exemption demands,” is a distinct threat to the rule of law because it will result in a tidal wave of religious claimants striking down

government action at every turn.242

To examine this claim, we conducted a modest empirical analysis to assess (1) the likelihood that religious exemptions result in government ac- tion being struck down under RFRA, and how that rate has changed since

Hobby Lobby; and (2) the volume of religious objection cases being brought

compared to speech-based cases, and whether the volume of religious claims seem to have increased dramatically post Hobby Lobby. Notably, we provide the first nation-wide RFRA survey of its kind since Hobby Lobby.

Our findings contradict the notion that religious objections are much more likely to prompt a court to strike down government action under

RFRA after Hobby Lobby.243 _{Compared to previous scholarship assessing}

government win rates in this area, Hobby Lobby does not appear to have significantly changed the government’s win rate in the last three years. Our findings also indicate that cases dealing with religious objections to laws are less pervasive than cases dealing with other expressive First Amend-

ment claims.244 _{These findings apply to all federal cases, as well as the cas-}

es specifically at the Supreme Court level. The data also does not indicate a trend of dramatic growth in the volume of religious cases post Hobby Lob-

by. More time and data will be necessary to confirm these results. Addition-

ally, no statistical regression analysis has been performed to isolate the ef- fect of variables, and the findings in this Article are thus at best suggestive.