Villa El Salvador: un distrito industrial, un cluster multiproductivo

Given the diffusion of power away from the old paradigm of top-down, command and control state-led approaches, there has been a proliferation of new forms of governance and associated policy instruments. Starting at the departure point in the IR/IP analysis of the shift in global environmental politics away from intergovernmental, state-based relations, it is now possible to discern a historical trajectory towards alternative forms of governance. This is a development most analysts no longer deny.83 _{These have been characterised by their “network-like} arrangements of public and private actors” and include such arrangements as business-driven self-regulation, and public/private or civic/private partnerships.84

This development has been interpreted as being closely related to economic globalisation and the concurrent restructuring of the functions of the state.

Although corporations, for example, continue to lobby governments through traditional processes based around multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), they are also dealing with each other and other non-state actors as well as the state. Such efforts amongst private actors, civil society and the state have given rise to private and civic governance arrangements that resemble the public governing functions of states and intergovernmental institutions. Relations are of a permanent and institutionalised nature and should be distinguished from simple cooperation, which is ad hoc and short-lived.85

Such private and civic initiatives are categorised in a number of ways. Haufler refers to them as instances of self-regulation, representing a new form of global governance, defined as “mechanisms to reach collective decisions about transnational problems with or without government participation.”86 Interestingly, the move to private sector governance has been given a boost as a result of the international institutions that have either arisen within the UN, such as the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), or via UN-sponsored initiatives, such as the voluntary Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.87 _{Ironically, it is} globalisation, and its hallmark reduction in state power that has contributed to this growth, as well as the weakness of global governance at intergovernmental levels.88_{UNEP notwithstanding, such failings are particularly evident within the} UN system itself, which has been criticised as being neither effective in the assessment, review and monitoring of the measures it prescribes, nor in ensuring compliance.89

The move to self-regulation is interpreted as not simply due to industry opportunism seeking to undermine regulatory systems to the lowest common denominator. Many companies are in fact developing international standards that

exceed the requirements of national legislation.90 Instead, self-regulation is seen as further evidence of the changing nature of global governance, particularly, as noted before, in the increasing use of collective mechanisms addressing issues of policy.91 Three discrete self-regulatory models have been described, centred upon civil-society-based monitoring and advocacy initiatives, industry-driven standard setting, and traditional government-led regulation (albeit functioning at local, national and regional levels). All three models are in addition to the various international institutions created to deal with common problems among countries.92 Although self-regulation is seen as having the potential to encourage significant improvements, Haufler still sees the necessity of acting in cooperation with traditional political approaches. 93

Another perspective attributes more importance to direct civil society pressure, forcing companies and business associations to take on responsibilities within their business domains and society at large, resulting in a further interpretation of private and civic governance as a voluntary initiative.94 Here, the three types of regulation discussed immediately above are seen rather as three phases of regulatory development. An initial wave consisted of largely unilateral company codes, designed to demonstrate good conduct and not generally for public disclosure but intended to address the concerns of consumers in industrialised countries (such as child labour) while ignoring more entrenched problems, such as freedom of association. This was followed by a further development comprising a combination of social and financial reporting to demonstrate a company’s commitment to social responsibility to its shareholders.95 The third, most ambitious, and, as demonstrated by its commitment to transparency, most socially responsible, was the creation of sector-wide arrangements, involving several

businesses and/or associations, and including civil society participants.96 All three waves in this analysis are collectively referred to as certification institutions.97 While the resultant institutions that have arisen do not and cannot replace nation- states, however; but they have introduced new elements and dynamics into the processes of global governance.98 Cashore, Meidinger and others have commented at length on forest certification, which is discussed along with the forestry literature in the following chapter.99

There is recognition elsewhere of the important role of non-state actors in their own right, most particularly in the evolution of global environmental governance. New sub-political arrangements are emerging that are institutionalising non-state interests in the economic domain, especially when governments fail to act, or when intergovernmental agreements and institutions prove inadequate. Market- based mechanisms are making an increasingly significant contribution to global reform. But other economic interests and political agendas can also threaten such emergent transformations. Constant effort is therefore required by interested parties to maintain the relevance and momentum of these new forms of environmental governance, and to extend their effectiveness.100

Other commentators prefer to describe non-state global governance as one comprised of transnational collectivities interacting either in competition or cooperation with state interests in a globalised space.101 This transition of power and authority away from states should not be seen as occurring only in transnational processes, however, as there has been a growth of new governance institutions at all levels.102

Comparative politics/public policy scholars identify an inter-play between governance and government, reflecting the nature of the changing roles of state

and societal actors, in a period termed as governance transition, and encompassing alternative policy instruments.103 There are a range of types and sub-types of policy instruments, including benchmarking, co-regulation, negotiated agreements and voluntary codes of conduct. In the literature covering environmental policy instruments particularly, a trend away from the traditional regulatory approach dating back to the late 1960s towards new environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) has been noted. In the environmental context four sub-types have been identified: market-based instruments, eco-labels, environmental management systems and voluntary agreements. Older policy instruments continue to compete with NEPIs, which are themselves competing with each other. Hybrid forms of regulation, with strong features of governance such as self-monitoring and societal organisation are also appearing. Some analysts consequently prefer to interpret governance and government not as fixed entities, but rather as representing a continuum of different governing types on two heuristic ‘poles’. On balance, though, jurisdictions have nevertheless shifted from a position of government to governance with regard to their use of newer instruments.104