Wiener (1948) 8 Ibid., p 6.

During World War II (in the U.S.S.R. it was called The Great Patriotic War) many Evangelicals found themselves in an insidious situation. On one hand, they loved their

138

motherland but, on the other hand, many of them acknowledged that among Germans were some of their brothers and sisters that shared with them common beliefs (Sawatsky, 1981, pp. 112-120).58

Mikhail Petrov stated that during World War II, as the German Army was occupying Soviet territory, a number of Russian Orthodox and Evangelical churches, previously closed by the Soviets, were re-opened. Thus, some Evangelicals found themselves in a situation where they could have been called collaborators with the Nazis (Petrov). At the same time, when the Red Army was retreating under the German military assault, Joseph Stalin appealed for help to the Russian Orthodox Church. Leaders of Evangelicals likewise were called to appeal to their fellow brothers and sisters for defence of the motherland (Petrov).

Yakov Zhidkov, who was in GULAG camp on Kolyma for 'counter revolutionary activities,' together with some other leaders, issued a letter on 28 June 1941 to all Evangelicals. In this document, he called on believers to fully support the Soviet government in the war with Nazi Germany. Zhidkov called the Evangelicals to join the underground movement of Partisans to help the Red Army in fighting the Germans (Zhidkov, 1941). The letter also stated multiple arguments in favour of military service of believers (Petrov).

Mikhail Orlov (Orloff), one of the Evangelical leaders, travelled all over the country trying to explain the position of Soviet Evangelicals to the local authorities (Sawatsky, 1981, p. 40). The Central Moscow Baptist Church, which experienced extreme pressure from the atheistic state before the war, suddenly was allowed to hold prayer services in support of the Red Army. Between 1943–44, Evangelicals donated considerable amounts of money to the military and support of disabled soldiers – members of families of Christians (Sawatsky, 1981, pp. 52-62).

After World War II, the state no longer needed the help of Evangelicals. Therefore, their role in the victory over Nazism was diminished (Sawatsky, 1981, pp. 62-64). Their participation in the common cause was almost never mentioned in the press. In spite of this attitude from the Soviet State, members of Evangelical churches continued to serve in the military (Sawatsky, 1981, p. 113). AUCECB encouraged them to do so. In AUCECB churches, young people had ‘send off parties’ for military conscripts, during which they admonished the young soldiers to hold to biblical values and stay faithful to Christ.

Although members of unregistered CCECB churches opposed the atheistic state and its practices of persecution of believers, their young men could not avoid the compulsory

58

Dr. Walter Sawatsky provides an excellent review of the attitude of Soviet Evangelicals toward the concept of

Rodina (Motherland) and military service. See SAWATSKY, W. 1981. Soviet Evangelicals since World War II,

military service. Many Russian Protestants who were called to military service could be identified as conscientious objectors. A number of Baptist young men refused to pledge allegiance to the Soviet State and bear arms. Because of this, they were exposed to mocking, harassment and severe persecution from their peers as well as from Zampolity (Officers responsible for political education of conscripts). Many were sent to Stroybaty (Special Military Construction Battalions) (Sawatsky, 1981). Sawatsky remarked, ‘Since 1976 the Council of Prisoners Relatives (CPR), began to treat those Evangelical young men that refused to serve in the military as “prisoners of conscience”. The list compiled by CPR, included thirteen names’ (Sawatsky, 1981, p. 115).

The Moldovian soldier, Ivan Moyiseev (1952–1972), was beaten to death in the Crimea while serving in the military (Klippenstein, 2003). He was tortured for his faith and then, while still alive, drowned in the Black Sea. His story became well known because his death received some publicity in the West.

At the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union entered a period of stagnation as Leonid Brezhnev’s eighteen-year rule over the country was coming to its end. With the exception of Moscow and the major cities, the Soviet economy showed signs of crisis. Ideologically on the personal level things were not looking up. In many instances, instructors of atheism were doing their job more out of obligation than out of conviction including in the military. Soviet citizens that managed to travel abroad under strict KGB surveillance came back reporting of the wonders of life in the West and the abundance of consumer goods that were scarce in the U.S.S.R. (Tompson, 2003, p. 111).

In spite of some setbacks, the state atheistic machine was still powerful and influential. Evangelical youth, together with other high school students, went through the Elementary Military Preparation Course (Rus. Kurs nachal’noy voennoy podgotovki) that was obligatory for everyone in Soviet public schools (Kutepov, 2010, pp. 53-54). The state did everything to convince the young people that serving in the military was a noble thing because one was called to 'defend his motherland.' During the Cold War, young men were encouraged to be strong and ready to stand up to the West in case of a nuclear conflict (Kutepov, 2010, pp. 53- 55). At the age of sixteen, boys were required to have physical examinations at the local office of the Military Commissioner (Rus. Voennyi komissariat). At 18, they were called to active military duty. Exceptions to this were those young men who were studying in the

Instituty (Institutes) and universities.

Rarely did AUCECB churches discourage their younger members from serving in the military (Prokhorov, 2013, p. 263). Most church leaders themselves served in the Soviet Army, and the compulsory military service by the 1980s seemed to be just another step in

140

one’s life education. Military service was seen as a test of one’s faith because believers serving in the army had to prove their faith with their actions and withstand temptations to give in to atheism under various kinds of threats. It was widely considered among AUCECB believers that after passing such a test, one was ready for baptism and a life-long commitment to God and the Church (Sawatsky, 1981, pp. 115-120).

Churches became so used to the environment of persecution that they lost track of the state’s methods to diminish the influence of Evangelicals in society. By 1991, it was so common for Evangelical men to have served in the military that those men that could not serve because of health reasons, were 'politely mocked' by those that served in the army. Military service was seen among AUCECB churchmen as an unavoidable and integral part of growth and development of any young man. By serving in the military, many young men felt like they had become a part of one big machine, which was called 'the Soviet state'. Though there are no firm statistics, some of the Evangelical young men were able to sustain atheistic pressure during the military service,59 while others succumbed to it and never returned to churches (Sawatsky, 1981, pp. 115-116).

Many of the Evangelicals were concerned about war in Afganistan and the possibility of killing people there as part of the duty. There were even special prayers for the young people not to be sent to Afganistan. Thompson, who studied the phenomenon of the collapse of the Soviet state, was of the opinion that the war in Afghanistan (1979–1989) contributed to the disillusionment of Soviet citizens with the Soviet Army and the state at large (Tompson, 2003, p. 57). By 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the CPSU, the disillusionment with the economic situation in the U.S.S.R., and particularly with the state of affairs in Afghanistan began to grow rapidly. Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov (1921–1989) was particularly vocal, voicing his protests against the Soviet military doctrine and involvement in the Afghan war (Bonner, 2011).

The more 'Black Tulip' (Rus. Chyornyi tyul’pan) planes flew back to the U.S.S.R. from Afghanistan carrying dozens of bodies of Soviet soldiers (including bodies of believers that served in the military at the time), the more Soviet citizens were convinced of the lack of necessity of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The death toll of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan was rising to 10,000.

With the economic crisis looming and improving relations with the United States, on 15 February 1989 Gorbachev ordered a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (Service,

59

The story of Ivan Moyiseev is the best-known example of a believer who did not succumb to pressure endured while he served in the Soviet Army. See Ivan Moyiseev (1952 - 1972) [Online]. Istselyon. Available:

2009a, p. 443). By that time, the death toll in the Soviet military rose to more than 13,000 soldiers with close to 50,000 injured (2009a).

Gorbachev’s policies of Perestroika and Glasnost’ fostered open discussion about the past, including revelations about Stalin’s purges (Rus. Chistki) of the 1930s. Brzezinski pointed out the areas of Soviet life that came to light during the period of Perestroika: (1) The launching of the GULAG in the early 1920s, including the decimation of the pre- revolutionary elite and its large-scale exodus from Russia; (2) industrialization and collectivization drives of the early and mid-1930s, which generated massive famines and millions of deaths in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan; (3) the Great Purges and Terror of the mid- late 1930s, with millions incarcerated in labour camps and upward of one million shot and several million dying from maltreatment; (4) World War II of 1941–1945, with its multiple millions of military and civilian casualties and vast economic devastation; (5) resumption of Stalinist terror in the late 1940s, large-scale arrests and frequent executions; (6) the forty- year-long arms race with the United States, lasting from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, with its socially impoverishing effects; (7) the economically exhausting efforts to project Soviet power into the Caribbean, Middle East, and Africa during the 1970s and 1980s; (8) the debilitating war in Afghanistan from 1979–1989 (Brzezinski, 1997, pp. 90–91).

The role of the military was re-evaluated by Soviet society, following new information of the Soviet Army’s involvement in putting down the anti-Communist uprisings in Hungary in 1956 (Turlac, 2009), Czechoslovakia in 1968 ('Prague Spring'), and Poland in 1981 (Kreis, 2004). For many Soviets, military service no longer represented an honour, but rather a burden and identification with the system in which they lost faith (Turlac, 1992, p. 8).

The role of the military in crushing popular uprisings in Tbilisi (Georgian S.S.R.) in 1989 and Vilnius (Lithuanian S.S.R.) in 1991 and its subsequent role in supporting the anti- Gorbachev coup of 1991 further contributed to the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., which formally took place in December 1991 (2008).

The Soviet Army disintegrated together with the unexpected collapse of the U.S.S.R. Brzezinski wrote, ‘The collapse of the Soviet Union produced monumental geopolitical confusion. In the course of a mere fortnight, Russians suddenly discovered they no longer were the masters of a transcontinental empire’ (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 88).

It took time for the newly formed countries – former Soviet republics – to form their own military structures. In the meantime, in the midst of post-Soviet economic and political chaos (Elliott, 1997), Evangelical young people received freedoms they never experienced before. In Moldovia, for example, young men who were born after 1975 were not drafted into the army at all because of political chaos and uncertainty. Many members of Evangelical

142

churches were able to opt out of military service for religious reasons by presenting written letters signed by the pastor and the church committee.

Reflecting on the situation in Eurasia after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Brzezinski wrote, ‘The collapse of the Russian Empire created a power void in the very heart of Eurasia. Not only was there weakness and confusion in the newly independent states, but in Russia itself. The upheaval produced a massive systemic crisis’ (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 89).

Chaos in regard to military service and conscientious objection reigned pretty much through the 1990s until Putin came to power. Katy Stinger and Mark Elliott wrote in the 2003 article published in the East-West Church and Ministry Report:

At present, chaos reigns in government policy towards conscientious objectors. The 1993 Constitution provides for 'alternative civil service' for COs. However, most courts have tried and sentenced objectors to prison in the absence of consistent implementing legislation. On the other hand, War Resisters' International reports that 'some individual judges have decided to use the provisions of the constitution directly and dismiss criminal charges brought against COs.' In 1996, the Russian Supreme Court ruled that 'refusal to perform military service for religious convictions does not constitute a crime'. But also in the 1990s, lower courts sentenced at least 700 COs to two years' imprisonment for refusal to bear arms. Most COs come from large cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg where NGOs such as Soldiers' Mothers and the Antimilitaristic Radical Association counsel conscripts and offer legal support in a climate of growing weariness of the war in Chechnya. WRI reports that in some cases, COs have been permitted to serve in unarmed military units even though, in the absence of implementing legislation, this is not an actual right. COs assigned to construction battalions find themselves serving alternative service under especially brutal conditions in units often led by persons with criminal records (Katy Morrow Stigers, 2003).

In the 1990s, in some churches that were led by ministers from the younger generation, the attitude toward military service changed dramatically. Military service was viewed as a form of one’s identity with the state, which no longer represented any value to Evangelicals. The state was identified with the Soviet past, and believers were not eager to join the newly formed military structures in the former Soviet republics. Rising nationalism contributed its share toward the refusal of Christian young people to serve in the military.

In other churches, led by ministers from the post-World War II generation, service in the military in the 1990s continued to some extent to be seen as an important step in the 'school of life and faith'. Experiential rather than academic understanding of Christian faith coupled together with the 'Theology of Suffering' from the Soviet era still moved some church leaders to recommend to Evangelical young men to join the military.

When interviewed on 25 August 2007, Victor Levashov, RUECB Senior Presbyter for Northern Caucasus, offered the following rationale in support of service in the military: ‘I teach the young men that it is wonderful to serve in the military and hold a weapon. I think that when our young men begin to adhere to a practice of avoiding military service, this sends a message to people that Evangelical believers are unpatriotic.’

Many of the young men opted to skip military service because they saw all the disorder and abuse that existed there. Parents were afraid to send their boys to the military. Many opted for the alternative military service. In addition, young people had poor health, which prevented them from serving in the military. Because of corruption, it was easy to pay a doctor and get a document that indicated that you had 'one hundred diseases', so to speak.

The unsuccessful First Chechen War (1994–1996) which resulted in heavy military casualties (4,103 killed and 19,794 wounded) and the unrest in the Caucasus region (Shmakova, 2009) contributed to the refusal of Evangelical members to serve in the military. A decline in morale in the military and an increase in cases of abuse of soldiers further discouraged service (Rus. Dedovshchina).

It is doubtful that Evangelical churches in the 1990s had a unified position on military service. Though Yuri Sipko, the former President of the RUECB, acknowledged that there were Evangelical believers that held to the opinion that a Christian should not serve in the military, he, nevertheless stated, ‘Our young men are drafted and continue to serve in the Russian military’ (Sipko, 2007). Sipko's stance on the issue of military service is somewhat controversial. On one hand, he actively criticized the Russian authorities for the injustice, corruption and chaos that exist within the state organizations (Sipko, 2012), yet, on the other hand, he appeared to uphold the position that young men are to defend their own motherland and, therefore, serve in the military. This contributed to the confusion Russian Evangelicals had about loyalty to the Russian state. Dr. Sergienko observed:

As citizens of their own country, Evangelicals to a degree felt like they were strangers among their own people. This is why they gradually came to regard strangers as more of their own. Believers thought that if 'strangers' stood against the ‘Evil Empire', this means that they wholeheartedly support them (Sergienko, 2011).

In 1993, the new Russian constitution stipulated the right of a citizen to an 'Alternative Military Service'. Yet, for some time there was no law regulating the right of Russian citizens to substitute service in military for 'Alternative Service.' This led to confusion and gave Evangelical church members a reason to refuse to serve in the military. Sawatsky supported the view that Evangelicals, especially in parts of the Ukraine and Central Asian countries , former republics of the U.S.S.R., strictly held to pacifist views (Sawatsky, 2011).

It is likely that the absence of any mention of 'Alternative Service' in the legislation of newly emerged independent countries; namely, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan caused serious problems for Evangelical believers that held pacifist views (Katy Morrow Stigers, 2003).

In the 1990s, recognizing the right of believers not to serve in the military, several former Soviet republics, Moldova, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, introduced the Alternative Service law into their respective legislation. The West recognized this as progress

144

toward the establishment of democracy in these countries. Since then, hundreds of young Evangelical believers applied to the 'Alternative Service' programme.

4.7 Evangelical Emigration of 1980s – 1990s as a Result of Soviet State Persecutions of