Working-Capital (Cash) Improvements

The fragmentation of the public sphere has been a topic of discussion for theorists for a long time (e.g. Arendt, 1958) and Habermas (1989) developed the theoretical investigation. Currently this fragmentation is a topic that divides theorists, as some claim that the fragmentation has a negative effect on society, e.g. leading to a loss of the common good or common interest among people (McKee 2005, p. 141) and weakening public engagement and debate (Hodkinson 2017, 192). Some scholars argue that fragmentation threatens deliberative democracy, because people should be exposed to opposing opinions (Downey & Fenton 2003, p. 185). On the other hand, however, some argue that the fragmentation of the commonly shared public sphere

DIGITAL PUBLIC SPHERE AND ZELENSKY’S CAMPAIGN

has worked as a power against homogeneity and allowed e.g. different minority voices to be heard by the common public, as well as new issues to be brought forward for public discussion (McKee 2005, p. 146).

Habermas himself sees the fragmentation of the public as a destructive phenomenon. He questions whether the public sphere worked better earlier, before, for example, women and the working class were allowed to vote or participate in public society. This is not because he opposes human rights but because the women and the working class brought their own stories, discourse and matters to the public sphere, thus fragmenting the homogenous public society (McKee, 2005, p. 145).

From the Habermasian standpoint, it seems that the fragmentation of the public sphere was and is a historical challenge and is not solely based on the development of the Internet (which is a commonly analysed factor in the studies of fragmentation today).

However, as the research on the fragmentation of the public sphere has evolved since Habermas and he has been criticized for basing his views on the patriotic, bourgeois public sphere of the 18th and early 19th centuries (Hodkinson, 2017, p. 196), his views might not be the most applicable tool for analyzing modern phenomena.

The fragmentation of the public sphere has been a topic of research since at least Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 United States presidential election, since his victory took a large part of the population by surprise. However, not everyone finds this fragmentation alarming. According to McKee, some theorists claim that the public sphere has always been fragmented and different issues have always divided the citizenry into competing interest groups (McKee, 2005, p. 142). The media landscape itself also adds to the fragmentation and to the dividedness of society with the media outlets diversifying into smaller units to respond to different needs

(Hodkinson 2017, p. 192). The Internet is also adding to this as it is facilitating the divide into smaller and smaller interest groups as users wish to only discuss certain topics or issues. (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 17).

Another issue that is closely related to the fragmentation of the public sphere is the echo chamber phenomenon. Echo chambers are not necessarily created

deliberately as a political marketing strategy but might be a product of natural human coping mechanisms (Zakharchenko et al., 2019). Some theorists see the whole Internet as an echo chamber. It has been discovered that people tend to look for opinions that are similar to their own, and the phenomenon is explained by theories such as cognitive dissonance and selective exposure theories. This way the Internet does not necessarily expose users to new information, different opinions or opposing political views, but rather reaffirms the political orientation an individual already holds (Arvidsson et al., 2014). It is possible that a fragmentation of the public sphere has always existed, but the Internet effectively works as an echo chamber, reinforcing already existing political views.

How can these theories of fragmentation be applied to the Ukrainian public sphere? The digital sphere became an important factor in Ukraine during the protests around 2013. Since then the topic also captured the attention of researchers, who found that the circumstances increased the political and social importance that the

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digital sphere had in Ukraine (Zakharchenko et al., 2019) and Zelensky also used that in his campaign, which was mostly conducted online. It has also been discovered that Zelensky used different campaign messages to different groups of people (Ben, 2019).

The echo chamber phenomenon and fragmentation throughout the Internet might add to the fact that different interest groups do not necessarily have any contact with each other, and Zelensky was able to use this to his advantage in his campaign.

At a first glance Zelensky could be seen as a unifying power in society and the Ukrainian public sphere especially compared to many other presidents if we compare the Ukrainian results to those in countries with a strong conservative-liberal divide in elections, such as the Trump election or the Brexit vote. Judging from that framework, gaining an immense majority the way Zelensky did could even be seen as a unifier of Ukrainian society and public sphere. He gained 73% of the votes (Ben, 2019) which could signal that much of the population, fragmented public sphere aside, desired change and Zelensky managed to brand himself as one to deliver change.

Looking more closely at Zelensky voters supports this claim, as e.g. in the case of NATO, Zelensky voters were rather divided (37% supported joining NATO and 37% were against it), yet most of these people voted for him. This could be seen as proof of the earlier argument about Zelensky as unifying the Ukrainian public.

However, Ben has also discovered that different campaign messages were targeted at different people. This strategy shows Zelensky and his team possibly understanding the concept of fragmentation in the public sphere and using it cleverly to their advantage. This is where further fragmentation of the public sphere in society could pose a threat or raise issues, because different interest groups not communicating with each other enables this to happen. If a candidate is able to target different groups with different (or, quite frankly, opposing) campaign messages (without being called on it), it is questionable whether a common public sphere even exists.

However, some research points to the direction that the state of the Ukrainian public sphere contributed to the possibility of a populist leader gaining power in the Ukrainian election. The demand for a new political leader and the overall

dissatisfaction among the citizenry were not answered in the common public sphere that was largely controlled by the oligarchs in Ukraine. Therefore, the fragmentation of the public sphere into smaller entities was essential for the strategy of Zelensky’s campaign and the grounds for his popular support (Haran & Burkovsky, 2019).

It needs to be addressed that the reasons behind Zelensky’s victory include most likely many other factors besides the fragmentation of the public sphere.

Research already conducted on the election underlines the importance of populism and the typical (unrealistically) easy solutions to complex issues, as well as the empty discourse typical of populists. In Zelensky’s case the voters were ready to accept all of his promises at once (Dodonova, 2019). In addition, Zelensky’s campaign consisted mostly of going against and defaming the incumbent Petro Poroshenko. Zelensky tried to profile himself as a unifier of society and as working against the

fragmentation—even his slogan was “Servant of the people”. Due to the huge