The case heard at the ECtHR, H v UK,190 concerned a vegan prisoner who brought a complaint against the UK Government under the human right to freedom of conscience.191 H objected (inter alia) to a requirement to work in the prison printing facility because he believed that he would come into contact with dyes that had been tested for safety on the bodies of nonhuman animals.192 As a vegan with an ethical orientation that opposes the resource status and commodification of nonhumans, the requirement to undertake duties in the print shop was not conducive to H’s ethical orientation.
The Commission of the Court found that vegan convictions, with regard to animal products, come within the scope of Article 9 right to freedom of conscience
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The Vegan Society has a dedicated advocacy service in the UK to assist vegans, as does the International Vegan Rights Alliance, which has representatives in various countries. The Vegan Prisoners Support Group has been assisting vegan prisoners since 1994 and works with the UK Government National Offender Management Service to ensure that vegans in prison receive adequate and nutritious vegan food as well as vegan clothing, hygiene products and body-care products. Although insights gleaned from some of these reports can only be regarded as anecdotal for the purposes of academic discussion, they do, nonetheless, illustrate serious concerns.
190
(1993) 16 EHRR.
191
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ‘freedom of thought, conscience and belief’ is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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The UK Government had denied that the dyes were derived from nonhumans and that they had been safety- tested on nonhumans. The applicant had support from The Vegan Society for the fact that most dyes had, at some stage in their development, been tested on nonhumans.
71 under the Convention. Noting relevant case law,193 it observed that this provision protects ‘private and personal beliefs, and the acts which are intimately linked with these attitudes’. On this basis (as noted earlier), the Commission found that vegan convictions with regard to animal products fell within the scope of Article 9 para 1 (Art. 9-1) of the Convention.
The Commission noted that the UK had not contested that veganism is a matter of conscience and belief within the scope of Article 9, but decided against H’s claim and in favour of the UK Government on two grounds. One was that the dyes were probably not tested on nonhuman animals and, therefore, were uncontentious to ethical vegans. The second ground was that even if under 9(2) there was interference in H’s freedom, it was legitimate on the grounds that the prison rules existed for good order and were applied to all prisoners. Interference with H’s ethical convictions was, therefore, legitimate and was considered proportional.
This case confirms that the moral standing of nonhumans and their suffering are relevant to the claims of vegans only insofar as they represent a credible, private and personal perspective. The European system of human rights accepted the credibility of such convictions, but it did not recognise the wider social and ethical regard for nonhuman animals or the moral imperative to respond to suffering, and it did not allow H the right to live with a non-reductive, uncompromising, ethical commitment to suffering animals. Instead, H’s claim for the moral standing of suffering nonhuman animals suffered in the context of the centrality of the human individual in human rights and was (partially) qualified on the grounds that there was
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For example, C v UK (1983) DR 142: ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, ie the area which is sometimes called the forum internum. In addition, it protects acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes, such as acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised form. In protecting this personal sphere, Article 9 of the Convention does not always guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by such a belief …’.
72 an overriding interest.
This case expresses a primary function of the human right to freedom of conscience to protect only the autonomous agency of individuals to live, without unlawful interference, according to individual convictions. With regard to the claims of vegans, it is, thus, considered that an uncompromising, ethical commitment to suffering nonhumans is a matter for the private and personal conscience of individuals, and that the practical manifestation of any such commitment can be lawfully limited.
A consequence of the above finding is, therefore, that an uncompromising vegan commitment to recognising and presenting the suffering of nonhumans and their moral standing can be lawfully constrained. This conclusion raises questions about the nature of a human rights enterprise that recognises the significance of nonhuman suffering in its acknowledgment that veganism comes within the scope of human rights protection. Of particular interest is the tension between the recognition of suffering others as an ethical value in human rights and the primacy of qualified human rights protection for individual autonomous conscience. This tension will be explored in the next chapter.