EL ÚLTIMO CAPÍTULO Y EL MAS CORTO

The Popular Front’s victory over the opposition in late 1992, with the support of Russia and Uzbekistan, instigated deep soul-searching in Tehran.111 _{It was apparent that not} enough material support or ideological guidance was given to the opposition, and it seems that Iran was never really willing (or capable) of providing the support the opposition required. Instead, when the opposition needed Iran the most, it wasn’t there. Had Iran been willing or able to provide adequate support to the opposition, a new regime under Rahmon, and a posse of Kulobi warlords deeply hostile towards Iran, may not have firmly entrenched themselves in Dushanbe, and pushed the opposition out of Tajikistan into a northern Afghanistan exile.

Iranian leaders were fully aware that by the end of 1992 there was no chance of the opposition taking control of the Tajik state, particularly in the face of Russia112 and Uzbekistan’s military support of the Popular Front, which included the supply and use of heavy military equipment by Uzbekistan, and the eventual deployment of Russian troops upon Tajikistan’s Afghan border; a move which only further stifled the opposition’s ability to challenge the Tajik government. Iran felt that Moscow in particular had too

110 _{In particular, Iran’s alleged support of the IRP was seen as a major factor in its eventual dominant}

role in the opposition. Tajik International Relations Scholar, Recorded interview with author, Dushanbe, May 20, 2013.

111 _{Gretsky, "Civil War in Tajikistan and Its International Repercussions," 9.}

112 _{Between 1991 and 1992, key democratic figures in the Kremlin strongly supported the opposition}

groups, particularly the Democrats. However, as the former Soviet nomenclature and bureaucracy began to gain ascendency within Russian domestic politics, Russia’s support shifted to the Tajik pro-incumbent forces. See Isabella Jean and Parviz Mullojonov, "Conflict and Peacebuilding in Tajikistan," (Cambridge: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2008), 17-18.

174 readily taken the military route in dealing with the conflict in Tajikistan, and its patronage of the Popular Front would only further contribute to the destabilisation of Tajikistan, and that a political solution would eventually be required to end the conflict.113 Furthermore, Iran was unimpressed with the role of Uzbekistan, who under leader Islam Karimov had made a number of inflammatory statements against Iran, which were viewed in Tehran as nothing more than an oleaginous attempt by Uzbekistan to ingratiate itself with the US and further isolate Iran from the region.114

In response to the growing influence of Russia and Uzbekistan in Tajikistan, Iran on a number of occasions in late 1992 and early 1993 offered its services in attempting to resolve the conflict in Tajikistan, suggesting a joint Russian-Iranian peace initiative which was rejected outright by both Rahmon and the Boris Yeltsin-led Russian government, who viewed the conflict as good as over “except for the shouting”, and strongly criticised Tehran for its foolhardy embrace of an opposition that they believed had been soundly defeated on the battlefield.115 In these circumstances, Iran knew that it was critical to keep the opposition afloat if it was to maintain any semblance of influence in Tajikistan moving forward, and was “the only way of convincing the Dushanbe regime and its regional supporters to take the opposition seriously”.116 _{This support would engender a difficult} balancing act for Tehran. For instance, if Iran provided too much support to the opposition, or openly and aggressively undermined Tajikistan’s new regime, its substantive links with Moscow—which had already been placed in jeopardy in the preceding months by Iran’s

113 _{Lynch, "The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process," 55.}

114 _{An example of this rhetoric can be seen in "Karimov Claims Iran Implicated in Tajik Events,"}

Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta September 17, 1992 [FBIS-SOV-92-181, Daily Report. Central Eurasia, September 17, 1992] 52.

115 _{According to Parker, “Tehran was determined to bankroll opposition militias until their successes on}

the battlefield forced Dushanbe and its Russian patron into accepting the IRP’s return as a player in Tajik politics. Yet as long as Iran toned down its open aggressiveness in Tajikistan, Russia and Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbours appeared willing to let Iran try to expand its commercial and cultural presence throughout the region.” Parker, Persian Dreams, 84-85.

175 support of the opposition—could be permanently damaged, thus impacting Iran’s broader regional position. Furthermore, if Iran did not provide enough support to the opposition, it would be pilloried at home, and have its legitimacy as the centre for worldwide Islamic activism increasingly questioned, something that had already occurred with the radical Iranian press attacking Rafsanjani and the foreign ministry’s117 “mishandling” of the situation in Tajikistan. This political dilemma only further highlighted Iran’s caution, adaptability, and the flexibility it had displayed from the outset of Tajikistan’s independence and slide into civil war.

The opposition at the end of 1992 was in tatters. The democrats, and those of a secular or nationalist bent, had scattered themselves throughout Tajikistan and the wider region, with their leaders taking sanctuary in both Tehran and Moscow.118 The IRP had lived to fight another day, setting up its main camp in the northern Afghanistan town of Taloqan, with its leaders either taking sanctuary under the watchful eye of the Afghan mujahedeen or in Tehran, where they were provided with accommodation and financial support by the Islamic Republic.119 From this low point, the IRP sought to regroup and rearm itself, and with a number of other smaller political groupings formed a united front, the Movement for Islamic Revival in Tajikistan (MIRT), which would coordinate the Islamist’s military and political initiatives.120 This newly-formed group was led by former IRP ruling council member Sayed Abdullo Nuri, while Tajikistan’s former official clerical chief (qozikalon),

117 _{For example see Keyhan’s stinging commentary which declared that the Iranian government’s}

“wariness” to describe the war in Tajikistan as “Islamic” in nature, and the foreign ministry’s unwillingness “to voice the true and appropriate position that befits Iran’s position as Islam’s leader” was a miscalculation that would hurt Iran’s reputation in the wider Islamic world. "'International Silence' on Tajikistan Assailed," Tehran Keyhan. November 15, 1992, [FBIS-NES-92-227, Daily Report. Near East & South Asia, November 24, 1992] 62-63.

118 _{Parker, Persian Dreams, 84.}

119 _{Shodman Yusuf of the DPT, and Akbar Turajonzoda were just two of a number of opposition leaders}

provided housing and support in Iran during the conflict.

176 Akbar Turajonzoda, was named first deputy of the organisation.121 Iran did support the MIRT, but this support was not enough to please MIRT leaders who openly criticised Iran’s lack of assistance, and instead received the majority of their backing—particularly in the form of weaponry—from their Afghan Tajik brethren and the Afghan mujahedeen. According to Akiner, this support from different factions within chaotic Afghanistan was substantial, and the MIRT’s links with Afghan warlord, Ahmad Shah Massoud, were particularly strong. 122 _{More importantly, low-level northern Afghan field commanders} often acted independently of their Afghan superiors in assisting the MIRT who, funded by the trade in narcotics, were able to continue to take the fight up to the Russians and the Tajik government.123

By the middle of 1993 the MIRT had effectively regrouped, and launched numerous raids across the Afghan border into Tajikistan, frustrating Moscow and thus forcing it to send more troops into Tajikistan, leading to public fears that Russia could potentially find itself mired in “another Afghanistan”. According to Nourzhanov, by July 1993 the opposition had an estimated 8,000 combatants in northern Afghanistan, and 2,000 in Tajikistan proper, and those based in Afghanistan had confronted the 16,000 Russian border guards in more than 400 cross-border combat engagements in 1993 alone.124 These frustratingly frequent cross-border raids by the opposition, who adopted guerrilla tactics not dissimilar to those used by the Afghan mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, put paid to the suggestion by Kremlin officials that the Tajik Civil War had effectively ended with the Popular Front’s takeover of Dushanbe, further highlighting the crucial need for a political solution to the ongoing conflict. However, the real turning point in shifting Moscow’s attitude to the circumstances on the ground in Tajikistan was the razing

121 _{Atkin, "Iran, Russia and Tajikistan's Civil War," 367.}

122 _{See Pinar Akcali, "Islam as a 'Common Bond' in Central Asia: Islamic Renaissance Party and the}

Afghan Mujahidin," Central Asian Survey 17, no. 2 (1998): 267-84.

123 _{Akiner, Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation?, 49.}

124 _{Kirill Nourzhanov, "Seeking Peace in Tajikistan: Who Is the Odd Man Out?," Central Asia Monitor}

177 of a Russian-manned border post by Tajik opposition militants, reinforced by Afghan mujahedeen in July 1993, which led to the death of 22 Russian Border Guards and three soldiers from the 201st MRD.125

The razing of Border Post No. 12 provoked fury in Moscow, and a realisation that Iran and Russia needed to work together in bringing the two rival Tajik sides to the negotiating table.126 _{However, even if this event had not occurred, it was apparent that a military} stalemate had taken shape between the government and the opposition. The opposition was strong enough not avoid defeat by the government of Rahmon, who despite forming an army of almost 11,000 men—backed by 5,500 loyal supporters of the Interior Ministry and the presence of Russians in the south—could not dislodge the opposition. On the flip side of the coin, the opposition’s military strength was not sufficient enough to project power into the northern regions and the capital. In these circumstances, Iran again pushed Russia to embrace a political solution to the conflict. In the words of Nourzhanov, Russia had two options:

Either to become directly involved in the intra-Tajik conflict and face the prospect of Afghanistan Mk II, or to foster stability by political means while maintaining a strong military presence in this strategically important part of the world.127

With domestic pressure at home, and an unwillingness to overcommit itself, Moscow decided on the latter option, restricting its troops to border-protection operations and

125 _{Parker, Persian Dreams, 88-89; Catherine Poujol, "Some Reflections on Russian Involvement in the}

Tajik Conflict, 1992-1993 (with Chronology)," in Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence, ed. Mohammad- Reza Djalili, Frederic Grare, and Shirin Akiner (Surrey: Curzon, 1998), 99-118.

126 _{Even if this event had not occurred, it was apparent that a military stalemate had taken shape between}

the government and the opposition. The opposition was strong enough not to be defeated by the government of Rahmon, who despite forming an army of almost 11,000 men, backed by 5,500 loyal supporters of the Interior Ministry and the presence of Russians in the south, could not dislodge the opposition. However, the opposition’s military strength was not sufficient enough to project power into the northern regions, and the capital. It was apparent that a military stalemate had ensued. See Nourzhanov, "Seeking Peace in Tajikistan," 16.

178 peacekeeping, while attempting to seek a political solution to the ongoing conflict. Iran was only too happy to assist in such political endeavours, but insisted that its interests and importance within Tajikistan had to be “acknowledged” by Russia.128 Russia was well aware that Iran’s influence could be used to bring the opposition to heel, and was willing to acquiesce to Iran’s somewhat vain political demands. Reflecting on this period of Iranian-Russian relations, a former Iranian diplomatic official believes Russia was unwilling to accept that Iran was a “player” in Tajikistan, and unfortunately carried an old “Soviet mindset”, which delayed peace talks from eventually taking place. Furthermore, according to the official, Russia did not want to give Iran “a slice of the cake” and it “should have understood from the beginning” that Iran was an integral and indefatigable component of Tajikistan’s political landscape and culture, and by the middle of 1993 this “fact” had finally been acknowledged by the Kremlin, thus paving the way for the first of what would be a long series of negotiations between the Tajik government and the opposition to take place.129