LA TARDE DE LAS BODAS

The violence of 1992 is arguably one of the most controversial and divisive periods of Iran’s early involvement in post-Soviet Tajikistan. A number of authors88 _{have asserted} to varying degrees that Iran was in fact a key force behind the outbreak of the civil war in Tajikistan in May 1992. On the other hand there is a “remarkable consensus”89 of authors and observers90 who hold that Iran either could not, or did not, play an active role in the terrible events of 1992. This split within the literature is also borne out in the author’s personal interviews and discussions that took place in Dushanbe and Tehran in 2013, where a number of key actors and observers who had first-hand experience of the Tajik Civil War displayed a highly divergent, yet entrenched set of positions on Iran’s involvement in the events that led to the civil war. Although this is the case and the biases

remains president of Tajikistan to the time of writing. Akbarzadeh, "Why Did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?," 1113.

87 _{Low-level conflict continued to take place from the end of 1992, until the signing of the 1997 peace}

accords in the remote mountainous areas of Gharm and Tavildara, and in the Afghan border regions of Kulob and Qurghonteppa. See. Nourzhanov and Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, 329.

88 _{Parker, Persian Dreams, 69; Rashid, Resurgence of Central Asia, 181; Kuzmin, "Tajikistan: The}

Causes and Lessons of the Civil War," 175-219; Khaidarov and Inomov, Tajikistan: Tragedy and Anguish of the Nation, 17.

89 _{Sergei Gretsky, "Civil War in Tajikistan and Its International Repercussions," Critique: Journal for}

Critical Studies of the Middle East Spring, no. 6 (1995): 17.

90 _{See for example, Roy, The Civil War; Hunter, "Iran's Pragmatic Regional Policy, 133-47; Atkin,}

"Iran, Russia and Tajikistan's Civil War," 361-76; Mesbahi, "Iran and Central Asia: Paradigm and Policy"; "Tajikistan, Iran, and the International Politics of the ‘Islamic Factor’, 141-58; Akiner, Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation?

165 of those interviewed must be accounted for, a clear picture of Iranian involvement in Tajikistan throughout 1992 does emerge from the existing literature, and is supplemented by the aforementioned interviews.

In the early months of 1992, Iran did not play a direct role in the instigation of protests that eventually spiralled into violent conflict and ripped Tajikistan apart for more than five years, despite the often loud, albeit sporadic, views to the contrary.91 _{The impetus for} these protests and the concomitant violence was solely derived from the domestic local and political dynamics as described above, and cannot and should not be placed at the feet of any external party, whether that be Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. Iran did however seek to surreptitiously increase its influence and make political gains during the chaos unfolding on the streets of Dushanbe that began in March 1992, as did all the other aforementioned external parties. This influence, like most of Iran’s foreign policies was reactive, opportunistic, and multifaceted.

On an official level, Iran’s embassy in Dushanbe repeatedly insisted that negotiations needed to take place between the opposition factions throughout the March cycle of protests. The spectre of violent conflict between the opposing forces had been so concerning to Tehran that—according to a former Iranian diplomatic official—President Rafsanjani, made a personal phone call to Nabiev pleading with him to negotiate with the opposition in full and open terms, and attempted to relay to Nabiev the threat that conflict in Tajikistan posed not only to the Tajik people, but also the whole region. Rafsanjani even offered his own services in mediating between the two parties—an offer that was

91 _{For example, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, during a US}

Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing in January 1994, stated that: “Terrorism remains a central tool for Iran’s leaders in seeking to accomplish these objectives, and Iranian support for Hizballah and other such groups from Algeria to Tajikistan has not abated.” Effectively Woolsey linked Iran’s so-called ideologically-driven approach taken in the Middle East context to its policies in Tajikistan. See US Select Committee of Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Risks to the United States and Its Interests Abroad, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1994), 8.

166 firmly rejected.92 This offer was again repeated by Rafsanjani during Nabiev’s visit to Tehran in June 1992, however Nabiev continued to reject Iran’s offers of mediation. Nabiev’s June 1992 visit to Iran is often cited as a key example of Iran’s close ties with Tajikistan’s government during this period of upheaval. However, the opposition had been very critical of Nabiev’s foreign policy, particularly of his efforts to build ties with Iran, which they felt did not go far enough, and it appears that Nabiev’s June visit to Iran—that took place while fighting continued to rage in his country—was used as a means to silence the criticism of his opposition partners. However, this effort backfired, with his opposition partners unwilling to join him on the trip to Iran, which only further isolated Nabiev and gave off the obvious impression that he was politically isolated and lacked coalition support as president of the republic. Furthermore, despite the fact that a range of agreements in the fields of trade, banking, finance, culture, and science were signed, and that Iran pledged to provide Tajikistan with $50 million in aid, Nabiev was lame-duck president who oversaw a country that lacked central control, and a leader who had very little ability to fully wield the benefits of independence. His visit should be viewed in such light, and its significance should not be over-exaggerated.93 In fact, Nabiev came to grow extremely suspicious of Iran, whom he believed was heavily supporting his political rivals, a suspicion which he confirmed following his ouster in September 1992.94

92 _{Former Iranian Diplomat. Personal communication with author.}

93 _{Mesbahi, "Iran and Tajikistan," 130; Khaidarov and Inomov, Tajikistan: Tragedy and Anguish of the}

Nation, 27. In an interview, Nabiev expressed his displeasure at those movements and individuals who “did not want to improve the situation” in Tajikistan, and “for reasons unknown” did not take part in the trip to Iran. See "Nabiyev Interviewed on Iran, Pakistan Trips," 75-76; Maqsudal Hasan Nuri, "Tajikistan in the 1990s," Spotlight on Regional Affairs XV, no. 9 (1996): 14.

94 _{When asked how strong the opposition’s military position was in Dushanbe by a journalist, Nabiev}

bristled: “You know perfectly well that they are getting help from Afghanistan and Iran.” "Ex-President Nabiyev on Situation in Republic," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta November 3, 1992 [FBIS-SOV-92-214, Daily Report. Central Eurasia, November 4, 1992] 61.

167 For its part, Iran was clearly apprehensive regarding Tajikistan’s domestic situation, and its consistent calls for mediation pointed to the fact that there was awareness in Tehran that the GNR status quo, with Nabiev at the helm, could not and would not hold for long. However, while calling for mediation, Iran was also playing a double game, ensuring that it was in a strong position to benefit from the possibility that Nabiev would be ousted. Iran felt its political interests could be best served by supporting an opposition whose groups made no secret of their admiration for Iran, and throughout early 1992 Iran attempted to further cultivate its ties and “unofficial” relations with the opposition groups, a fact that is confirmed by a number of sources, particularly Russians and Tajiks who were on the ground in Dushanbe at this time. One of the most prominent of these sources was Safarali Kenjaev, who asserted that the Iranian embassy funnelled almost 1.5 million roubles to Turajonzoda alone from July to November 1992. Although this is not a large sum, due to the poor exchange rate for the rouble at the time, Kenjaev believed that Iranian funds were sufficient enough to allow opposition leaders to purchase weapons and other inventory.95 According to Russian Foreign Ministry officials, Iran had provided

95 _{See Safarali Kenjaev, Perevorot V Tadzhikistane [Upheaval in Tajikistan] vol. 1 (Dushanbe:}

Dushanbinkiy Polifgrafkombinat, 1996), cited in Parker, Persian Dreams, 71. Kuzmin, quoting the Novoe Vremya weekly, claimed that in only 50 days Iran had spent up to $10 million in supporting the protests in Shahidon Square. See Kuzmin, "Tajikistan: The Causes and Lessons of the Civil War," 188. Adding to these Russian accounts is that of former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin, who declared that: “At the beginning of the turmoil the Iranians were quite active: they were the first to open the embassy and their diplomats were seen handing out cash to Tajiks. Tehran surely had nothing against planting an obedient government in Dushanbe.” See Anatoly Adamishin, "Tajikistan: Lessons of Reconciliation," Russia in Global Affairs, (October 7, 2012). http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Tajikistan- Lessons-of-Reconciliation-15695, accessed February 11, 2015. Aside from these Russian views an interesting eyewitness account is given by Rashid who claims: “In October [1992] when the entire foreign diplomatic corps from six countries resident in Dushanbe numbered around 20 diplomats, the Iranian mission alone comprised 21 official diplomats and some 50 unofficial diplomats.…At Dushanbe’s central mosque, teachers at the new madrassa built by Qazi [Turajonzoda] proudly claimed that the building has been built with Iranian funds, that their salaries were paid by Teheran.” However, Rashid goes on to note that Iran was pursuing a “broad-based policy” supporting not just one group or actor, but all sides in the knowledge “no one party had either the mandate or the military clout to assert itself across the country”. See Rashid, Resurgence of Central Asia, 180-81.

168 significant funding to the opposition groups in Shahidon Square96 in March 1992, and on a number of occasions Russian intelligence services had caught Iranian agents “red- handed” seeking to assist the opposition protest groups through the provision of aid and other funds.97 _{This support should not be considered far-fetched, and is confirmed by a} former Iranian Foreign Ministry official who advised the author that Iran did indeed provide food and provisions to the opposition protests. However in conceding this, he also pointed out that Iran also provided similar support to groups that were generally pro- incumbent in their political outlook.98 However, a former advisor to President Rahmon went even further than most observers, claiming that Iran’s support for the opposition while Nabiev was in power throughout 1992 went well beyond aid in the form of food and basic provisions. Instead the advisor declared that:

[N]obody acknowledges that the war started with the initiative of Iran. The essence of this is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the Iranian politicians attempted to win the influence over our religious leaders and create in Tajikistan a state similar to the Iranian model. Therefore they were provided with the religious literature and weaponry. This helped our opposition to gain power, and relying on Iran, to create in and outside of Tajikistan armed formations. This led to the civil war.99

96 _{Iranian support of these protests was placed into sharp relief by the fact that many of the protesters}

were chanting proto-Iranian slogans, and holding placards that included terms such as “Death to America” [Marg ba Amriko] and other pro-Iranian revolutionary slogans. Although symbolic, according to a number of authors and observers these actions were little more than “haphazard and reactive sloganism” that was grassroots in nature, rather than inspired by outsiders. See Mesbahi, "Iran and Tajikistan," 121. This was also considered to be the case by a prominent Tajik scholar who believed that the slogans and actions of the protests in Shahidon Square reflected “confusion” among the protesters rather than strong support for an Iranian-like revolution. Independent Historian. Recorded interview with author, Dushanbe, May 31, 2013.

97 _{In Parker’s interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry officials there were a number of claims that}

Iran had provided significant funds to the opposition and when caught, the Russian government would take the evidence directly to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, “which of course denied any wrongdoing”. See Parker, Persian Dreams, 74.

98 _{The official gave the example of Iran providing aid to Kulobis who had been starving due to an}

opposition blockade of their region in 1992. Former Iranian foreign ministry official. Recorded interview with author.

169 This view was consistently rebuffed by Iranian officials interviewed, with a former diplomatic official strongly denying such suggestions as baseless and “sheer nonsense”.100

Although there is the possibility that despite the public pronouncements of Iranian officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Va’ezi, who denied that Iran supplied weapons to the opposition, Iran did in fact do so.101 _{However, confirming this is} almost impossible, and if Iran was providing weapons it was unlikely to have been to the extent that is claimed by elites in Moscow, and would have been limited at best.102 Iran had neither the capacity nor the inclination to provide so much support, and many of the weapons the opposition seem to have acquired were from the same military stores as those used by the pro-government forces, with many former soldiers and interior officials defecting to the opposition in the early months of 1992. Furthermore, a stream of weapons and other equipment from bordering war-torn Afghanistan would have been much easier for the Tajik opposition to obtain.

Adding further difficulties in understanding Iran’s actual support of the opposition throughout 1992 is the fact that even within Iran’s government itself there were divergent interests and forces at play when it came to Tajikistan. In the author’s discussions with the former Iranian Foreign Ministry official, an interesting anecdote relating to the complexity and dual tracks of Iran’s foreign policy was made. According to this official, Iran’s Foreign Ministry placed its support behind all opposition elements, whether they were nationalist, democratic, or Islamist, however at the same time Iran’s Ministry of

100 _{Former Iranian Diplomat. Personal communication with author.}

101 _{According to Va’ezi, a number of Tajik political groups asked Iran to ship weapons, however Iran}

refused the request. "Iran Refuses to Ship Arms to Tajik Political Groups," Moscow ITAR-TASS October 28, 1992 [FBIS-SOV-92-211, Daily Report. Central Eurasia, October 30, 1992] 11.

102 _{For instance, despite having “no reliable sources on the ground” former Russian Foreign Minister,}

Andrey Kozyrev claimed that the “chorus of accusations” flowing from “every” Central Asian leader had persuaded him that Iranian money and weapons were flowing to the opposition in Tajikistan. Quoted in Parker, Persian Dreams, 84.

170 Information (The Ministry of Intelligence and National Security - MOIS) was also providing its own backing and support solely to the Islamist elements of the opposition in the hope they would eventually gain power over the secular, democratic, and nationalist opposition elements. In the words of the foreign ministry official:

The divergent policies of the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Ministry did not cause a split [or conflict] between the ministries—we all wanted to keep the opposition government in power against the former Communists [following the GNR agreement], however there was a preference, particularly within the Ministry of Information for the IRP leaders to have a bigger role in the provisional government [GNR], nevertheless this support was mainly financial and did not despite the accusations of the West include the supply of weapons.103

These comments only further illustrate the complex and multifaceted nature of Iran’s foreign policies, and the fact that Iran did not even have a coherent approach towards the opposition itself, let alone Tajikistan more broadly.

On the question of Iran’s support of Islamism and the IRP in Tajikistan, it is clear that Iran’s elites were aware of the possibilities of expanding their Islamic revolutionary influence in Tajikistan, and as noted above there were elements within the MOIS who wanted the IRP to take a greater role in Tajik political life. However, the idea that Iran supported the IRP purely due to ideological considerations should be debunked. Iranian elites were well aware of the ideological fissures that existed between their Shi’a Islamic Revolution and the Sunni-inspired ideology of the IRP, and that the IRP was basically a Gharm-based regional faction using religion as an ideological shield for its own narrow material and regional interests.104 Iran’s support for the IRP was based not on the fact that it was the most ideological, but rather because it was the strongest of the opposition groups, with the best chance of succeeding in the conflict among the opposition and pro- incumbent forces. If anything, Iran’s support for the IRP throughout 1992 was undeniably

103 _{Former Iranian foreign ministry official. Recorded interview with author.}

104 _{For a history of why the IRP found most of its support within the Gharm district see Mullojonov,}

171 sober and pragmatic, and punctuated by a healthy dose of political scepticism. As highlighted by Mesbahi, Iran’s “overall policy” towards the opposition and in particular its apparent support of the IRP could be “characterised as sceptical optimism, reflecting scepticism in practice and substance and optimism in the realm of possibilities”.105 Mesbahi goes on further to declare that between May and October 1992, Iran could have “easily exploited” the IRP’s wish to establish an Islamic state. However, Iran’s support of the IRP was “hesitant if not passive” and this hesitation was a reflection of Iran’s awareness that the “clash in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, while couched in ideological terms, reflected tribal, regional, and ethnic differences, rather than an immediate receptivity to an Islamic alternative.”106 In the bluntest of terms, a former Iranian statesman with significant first-hand diplomatic experience in Tajikistan and Central Asia summed up the Tajik Civil War as follows: “That war in Tajikistan was a village conflict! It had nothing to do with Islam!” The official went on to declare that although there were “of course Muslim forces” involved in the conflict, overall the Tajik Civil War had nothing to do with any “Communism versus Islam dynamic”.107 It seems as 1992 wore on this view became the ascendant one in Tehran, and as the pro-incumbent forces began to reconsolidate their power Iran was unwilling to back the IRP’s somewhat flimsy Islamist agendas to the extent it required to truly rule Tajikistan. This view is highlighted by noted expert Roy, who states that Iran’s relationship with the IRP was based on a double misunderstanding. According to Roy, “the IRP was never ready to enter