¿RESPONSABILIDAD CONTRACTUAL O EXTRACONTRACTUAL?
III.2 LOS PARIENTES
IV.1.3. A) INDEMNIZACIÓN DEL DAÑO MORAL CONTRACTUAL
SECTION 5
2. Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
GARCIA v FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE
FACTS:
Petitioner Epicharis Garcia was enrolled in the Ateneo School of Theology for the summer of 1975, a program leading to a Masters degree in theology. When she sought admission for the regular semester (1975-1976), she was denied re-enrollment allegedly because the faculty was not compatible with her learning orientation.
According to Ateneo, she asks a lot of questions and posed many difficulties that seriously hampered the progress of the class. She was advised instead to enroll in UST Graduate School of Theology but UST’s MA in Theology program requires prior completion of a Baccalaureate in Philosophy that will take another 4 years of study.
Nevertheless, she enrolled as a special student in UST. She hopes that the courses she took therein would be credited by Ateneo at the end of the suit.
On the other hand, it is the contention of Ateneo that Garcia was merely a layperson who was accepted by the Loyola School of Theology free of charge. Also, Ateneo said that she was only accepted to attend classes for credit but was not admitted for degree because her admission was not acted upon by the Dean of the Ateneo Graduate School. Finally, Ateneo contends that it has the discretion to admit or not to admit students depending not only on their intellectual ability but also on the basis of their personality and character orientation with respect to other students and the faculty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia must be admitted - NO
HELD:
Mandamus does not lie because there is no legal duty on the part of the Theology school to admit Garcia. In the first place, the Theology school is a seminary. It is a school for those aspiring to be priests. Garcia, therefore, being a woman and a lay person cannot assert any demandable right to admission.
Even if she has such right, whether or not to admit is a matter of academic freedom of universities. Universities have the freedom on (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to
study. From this ruling it is readily apparent that not only teachers are accorded academic freedom, rather even the institutions through which these teachers disseminate their knowledge enjoy the same right; otherwise, academic freedom will be nugatory.
TANGONAN v. PANO
FACTS: Mely Tangonan was temporarily admitted to the Capitol Medical School of Nursing, subject to the submission of an unsealed copy of documents (Honorable Dismissal and Transcript of Records). She enrolled for 2 semesters. However, she flunked one of her subjects and had to cross-enroll. To solve her problem, she attempted to bribe Dean Florecia Pagador so that her name could be included in the list of enrolled students for the summer.
She confirmed her attempt to bribe by writing a letter of apoligy to the dean. ("Sorry for offering you P50,000 just to help me. I hope and pray for your forgiveness...").
When she applied for re-enrollment at Capitol, she was referred to the guidance counsellor to explain the bribery attempt, her cross-enrollment and her missing admission record. She refused so she was refused readmission also.
Informed of the said board's decision disallowing her re-admission, petitioner lodged a complaint against the school before the Department of Education. The lower court issued a writ ordering the repondents to admit Tangonon on a probation basis.
ISSUE: W/N the court may order the school to re-admit petitioner.
HELD/RATIO: NOOOO.
etitioner's case in the court below is that of mandamus, to compel respondent to admit petitioner in its School of Nursing. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused of a ministerial duly, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion.
In the case at bar, the petitioner has miserably failed to show a clear legal right to be admitted and be enrolled in respondent's School of Nursing. This is not merely a ministerial duty; it is rather a duty involving the exercise of discretion. Every school has a right to determine who are the students it should accept for enrolment. It has the right to judge the fitness of students This is particularly true in the case of nursing students who perform essential health services. Over and above its responsibility to petitioner is the responsibility of the school to the general public and the community.
Petitioner would want Us to compel respondent school to enroll her despite her failure to meet the standard policies and qualifications set by the school. To grant such relief would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the respondent school enshrined under Article XV, Section 8, Par. 2 of our Constitution which mandates "that all institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." This institutional academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them—the grant being to institutions of higher learning—free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.
Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.
SECTION 5
3. Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
TABLARIN V. JUDGE GUTIERREZ
FACTS: TABLARIN ET AL sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for school year ’87-’88 but they did not take or failed the NMAT. They then filed a petition to enjoin the SECS (Sec of M[inistry]ECS), BME (Board of Medical Education) and the CEM (Center for Educational Measurement) from enforcing Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 2382 (Medical Act of 1959), as amended, and MECS Order No. 52 (which established a uniform admission test [NMAT] as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools and a condition for securing certificates of eligibility [CEA]
for admission, a document required to take the NMAT.)
and from proceeding with and accepting applications for the NMAT. The Order states that in the NMAT, the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. TABLARIN says the previous sentence violates equal protection due to the fact that they were subjected to a different cutoff score as opposed to that of the applicants the previous year. This is thus discriminatory and makes the MECS Order arbitrary and capricious. Judge GUTIERREZ denied the petition and the NMAT proceeded.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985 are constitutional (not violates equal protection). – YES.
RATIO:
The Court held that the portion of the MECS order allowing the BME to determine the NMAT cutoff score every year is not a violation of equal protection. Far from being arbitrary and capricious, different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by the changing circumstances and conditions surrounding the medical industry. The rationale for this is for the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, and by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
Another (and more impt reason) is for the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. Thus, the Order allows the BME some flexibility needed to meet such changing circumstances.
Side Note: Police Power
The valid exercise of police power includes the regulation of access to medical schools. The regulation of the practice of medicine has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Thus, the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improving) the quality of medical education in the country."