B) CRITERIO PARA DETERMINAR EL MONTO DEL DAÑO MORAL

1 assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties

defendants and of the subject matter because the real party in interest was the US government and not the individual officers named in the complaint.

HELD: Since the action was against the US government, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case. The US has not given its consent to the filing of the suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. This is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent, but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without the said government’s consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.

ANGEL MINISTERIO VS CFI

Facts: National Government took physical and material possession of a land and used it for road widening purposes. No expropriation proceedings were commenced and just compensation remained to be unpaid. Ministerio et al, filed a complaint against the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General in their official capacity to collect just compensation.

Issue: Whether the complaint violates the principle of governmental immunity from suit?

Held: No!

The government is immune from suit without its consent. Even if the defendant named was not the government itself but public officials, the doctrine would still find application because it is possible that the litigation will result in a financial liability of the government.

However, it is a different matter if the public official was made to account in his capacity for acts contrary to law and injurious to the plaintiff. This is because unauthorized acts of public officials are not acts of the state. Thus, a suit against an official by one whose rights have been violated by the acts of an official is not a suit against the state.

The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure provided by law, then it would have filed an expropriation complaint and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.

QUIRICO DEL MAR V. PHIL. VETERANS ADMIN (PVA)

Del Mar was a major who served during WWII and he obtained an honorable discharge from service due to permanent total disability. The PVA granted him a monthly life pension, but it discontinued payment on the ground that the US Veterans Admin, by reason of military service rendered in the US Army in the Far East, also during WWII, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Phil. Gov’t. Thus, Del Mar filed a petition for mandamus against PVA to compel the latter to continue paying him monthly life pension (provided by law) and monthly living allowance for each of his minor children.

PVA’s argument is that it, being an agency of the government, is immune from suit.

Issue: Is PVA immune? – In this case, no. Del Mar can sue.

Ruling: The PVA invoked an earlier case, where the money claim against it was dismissed, since it cannot be sued without its consent. This Court stated the issue in that case, thus: Is the PVA exempt from the filing of an appeal bond? To resolve this issue, it had to determine whether the PVA is an agency or instrumentality of the Republic, and whether it exercises governmental functions. The decisive point in that case related to the status of the PVA as an agency or instrumentality of the exercising governmental functions as to be entitled to exemption from the filing of the appeal bond, and not to the nature of the claim sought to be enforced. Thus, in the said case, this Court showed that PVA is an entity or agency of the Republic performing governmental functions. True, this Court referred to the claim of the private respondent therein as "a claim for a sum of money against the Government, which claim, if adjudged finally to be meritorious, would render the Republic of the Philippines liable therefor," since the funds from which the claim was to be satisfied were funds appropriated by Congress for the PVA; but this Court properly and advisedly omitted any consideration of the question of suitability or non-suitability of the Government in connection therewith. That case does not really apply here.

The rule — well-settled in this jurisdiction — on the immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property.In such actions, which, in effect, constitute suits against the Government, the court has no option but to dismiss them.

Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant institutes an action

against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. As clearly discernible from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception.

CARABAO, INC. V. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION

FACTS: Plaintiff had filed on October 3, 1967 in the CFI of Rizal its complaint to recover the sum of P238,500.00 representing the unpaid price of 300 units of fire extinguishers sold and delivered by it to defendant Agricultural Productivity Commission. It alleged that it had presented on June 14, 1967 a claim for payment of the sum with the Auditor General, but that since the latter had failed to decide the claim within two (2) months from date of its presentation which should have been by August 13, 1967, it had acquired the right under Act No. 3083 to file the original action for collection in the lower court.

Defendants moved for the dismissal of the case principally on the ground of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, alleging that under sections 2 and 3, Article XI of the Philippine Constitution, creating the General Auditing Office as a constitutional office and defining its functions, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 327 enacted in 1938 as an implementing law, and under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court, the settlement of money claims against the Government of the Philippines has been placed under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Auditor General to the exclusion of courts of first instance, while the Supreme Court is vested with appellate jurisdiction over the Auditor General's decision involving claims of private persons or entities.

ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction? NO. THE JURISDICTION IS WITH THE AUDITOR GENERAL. ACT

3083 HAS NOW BEEN REPEALED BY

COMMONWEALTH ACT 327. ACT 3083 NOW STANDS AS A GENERAL LAW WAIVING STATE’S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.

HELD: It is patent that the governing law under which private parties may sue and seek settlement by the Philippine Government of their money claims pursuant to Article XI, section 3 of the Philippine Constitution is Commonwealth Act No. 327. Under section 2 of said Act, the aggrieved private party may take an appeal, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Auditor General's adverse decision only to the Supreme Court, by filing with the Court a petition for review thereof, as provided in Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The corresponding provisions of Act 3083 which are utterly incompatible with those of Commonwealth Act must therefore be deemed superseded and abrogated, under principle of "leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant" — a later statute which is repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the same subject matter. (IN OTHER WORDS, Act 3083 upon which the petitioners rely to support their action to file their money claim as an original action in ordinary courts due to the Auditor General’s inaction upon their initial claim has now been repealed by Commonwealth Act 327. In CA 327, Supreme Court cannot adjudicate on the money claims anymore, except in their appellate jurisdiction over an adverse decision by the Auditor General involving claims of private persons or entities.)

Inaction by the Auditor General for the sixty-day period now provided by Commonwealth Act 327 (exclusive of Sundays and holidays) and of time consumed in referring the matter to other persons or officers no longer entitles the claimant to file a direct suit in court, as he was formerly authorized under Act 3083 in the event of the Auditor General's failure to decide within a flat period of two months. Since the Constitution and Commonwealth Act 327 expressly enjoin the Auditor General to act on and decide the claim within the fixed 60-day period, a claimant's remedy is to institute mandamus proceedings to compel the rendition of a decision by the Auditor General in the event of such inaction.

The courts of first instance no longer have the original jurisdiction to act on such claims, which actions, under section 4 of Act 3083 now discarded, "shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties" — since exclusive original jurisdiction under Article XI of the Constitution and the implementing Act, Commonwealth Act 327 is vested in the Auditor General, and appellate jurisdiction is vested in the President in cases of accountable officers, and in the Supreme Court in cases of private persons and entities upon proper and timely petitions for review.

The Court has so indicated in a number of cases that claimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.

BAER v TIZON

FACTS:

Edgardo Gener was engaged in the logging business somewhere in Bataas. His operations were stopped by Donald Baer who was the Commander of the US Naval Bases in Olongapo.

Gener sued for injunction under the sala of Judge Tizon. Baer claims sovereign immunity from suit claiming that his act of ordering the stoppage of the logging operations was within his scope of authority conferred to him by the US government as commander of the bases. Nevertheless, Judge Tizon issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Baer is immune from suit – YES

HELD:

The of Baer’s stand is therefore evident. What was sought by Gener and what was granted by Tizon amounted to an interference with the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important public function of any government - the defense of the state — is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act.

This ruling however must not be misconstrued as giving Baer diplomatic immunity. He does not have it. Therefore, he can be proceeded against in his personal capacity or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.

Even without the sovereign immunity issue, Gener would still stand to lose. This is because his license to cut timber was already expired. He has no right in short.

ARCEGA v. CA

FACTS: Petitioners Rafael and Teresita loaned P900,000 from private res RCBC. Loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on the Arcegas’ land property with improvements. The spouses were able to pay around P300,000 of their loan but defaulted on the rest.

RCBC foreclosed the mortgage and acquired said property at the public auction. Registered the certificate of sale on the same day, with the RD.

Spouses Arcega repeatedly communicated with RCBC’s assistant VP Emily Hayudini, in connection with the status of the foreclosed property. 2 days prior the redemption period, Arcega wrote the bank for extension of 3 weeks saying that he applied for a housing loan to refinance his loan with RCVC. The extension was granted.

But despite this, Arcegas didn’t pay their loan and in fact, VP Hayudini found out that the spouses were going to file a case in court to annul the foreclosure/auction. In the complaint, Arcega said that they were not aware of the auction sale. They sought for a writ of preliminary injuction or TRO to prevent the bank from transferring the property to 3^rd persons. This was granted.

ISSUE: W/N the writ of preliminary injuction was issued with GAD.

HELD/RATIO: The issuance of the writ was unjustified. The spouses Arcega not having any legal right the merits protection by the court.

For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is no ground for an injunction.

The circumstances in the case at bar show that the Arcegas did not possess a clear legal right sought to be protected by said writ. Petitioners defaulted on their loan and failed to redeem the subject property during the extended period granted by the bank. It was only three days prior to the redemption period that petitioners added to question the foreclosure proceedings, giving the impression that the case at bar is an afterthought or a last-ditch effort to save their property. Title to the property had already been transferred to the bank which now possesses a certificate of title in its name.

Respondent bank's right to possess the property is clear and is based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale to whom title has been conveyed.