PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INDEMNIZACIÓN

Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes like any other corporation. It is also well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.

2 _{where payment is based on quantum meruit, the amount of recovery}

would only be the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered regardless of any agreement as to value

RAYO ET AL VS CFI AND NPC (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION)

Facts: During the height of the typhoon Kading, NPC through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, simultaneously opened all 3floodgates of the Angat Dam. As a result, several towns in Bulacan were flooded. Petitioners (there are a lot) in this case were among the many victims of the man-made flood. Complaint was filed against NPC and Chavez.

NPC answers that in the operation of the Angat Dam it was performing a purely governmental function hence, it cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.

Issue: Whether the complaint violates the principle of immunity from suit without consent? – NO.

Held: As a GOCC, NPC has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from the government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can sue and be sued in any court is without qualification on the cause of the action and accordingly, it can include a tort claim as in this case. (1par lang talaga yung decision ng court. This is almost

the entirety of it)

US v. RUIZ

Facts: US had a naval base in Subic. US invited the submission of bids for several projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequently, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests.

Later, the company received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties. The company sued the United States of America and other members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

HELD: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them- between sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii ) and private, commercial and proprietary acts ( jure

gestionis ). The result is that State immunity now extends

only to acts jure imperii.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the

projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Ultimately, the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act.

RP VS FELICIANO

FACTS: FELICIANO filed a complaint against RP, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of 4 parcels of land. F says he bought land previously but Pres. Magsaysay issued a Proclamation reserving for settlement purposes various lands, including F’s land. F wants to exclude his land from this Proclamation and be declared rightful owner. RTC favored F but RP raised non-suability.

ISSUES: WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land. – NO.

RATIO: A suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris. F contends that RP’s

consent may be read from the Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation “subject to private rights, if any there be." SC held that no such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Moreover, the

Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

SANDERS v. VERIDIANO

FACTS: Sanders was a special services director of the

US Naval Station in Olongapo. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Respondents Rossi and Wyer (who died) were gameroom attendants in the special services department of the Naval Station.

In 1975, Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted to permanent full-time to permanent part-time. This led them to file a protest for their conversion (demotion) to the US Dept of Defense. Hearing was conducted which reported an autocratic form of supervision.

Sanders disagreed and asked for the rejection of the report of the hearing. Later on, a letter allegedly from Moreau was received. The letter said that the records are public.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners were performing their official

duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents.

HELD/RATIO: On the basis of these antecedent facts,

the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.

The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.

It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."

As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re- designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.

Given the official character of the above- described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.

There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to

foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.

US V. GUINTO (1990)

Facts

Consolidated complaints:

o G.R. 76607: private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection w/ the bidding for contracts for barber services in said Base. On Feb. 1986, Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Air Exchange, US Air Force solicited bids for contracts through said offers. Ramon Dizon won, over the objects of private respondents who claimed that he made a bid for four facilities which was not included in the invitation to bid. Private respondents filed a complaint w/ the trial court to cancel the award to Dizon and conduct a rebidding. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground the ground that the individual defendants, as official employees of the US Air Force were immune from suit (the action was effectively against the US, which had not waived non-suability). Trial Court denied motion since the transaction entered into was commercial. Moreover, the RP-US Bases Agreement does not cover services such as a barber shop concession.

o G.R. No. 79470: Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as a cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at John Hay Air Station. Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the defendants, as officers of the US Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity. Motion denied.

o G.R. No. 80018: Luis Bautista, employed as a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners, officers of the US Air Force. Bautista was dismissed from employment and thus filed a complaint for damages. Defendant-petitioners filed motion to dismiss because they were being sued for their official acts. Motion denied.

o G.R. No. 80258: complaint for damages for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of defendants. Another motion to dismiss filed, which was also denied.

Issue: Are the officer/defendants immune even if the US was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effects suits against it which the US has not consented to?

The doctrine of non-suability is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.

The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.

The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non- suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.

Dispositions:

o G.R. No. 80018: The individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy- bust operation. They were charged with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. PETITION GRANTED.

o G.R. No. 80258: The contradictory factual allegations in this case is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. Only after the trial court shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable. PETITION DISMISSED.

o G.R. No. 79470: The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. The facilities are made available to everyone (including tourists) like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, the complaint is dismissed because petitioners are not liable for illegal dismissal. PETITION GRANTED.

o G.R. No. 76607: The barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut

and shave (as required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial. PETITION DISMISSED.

ARTICLE XVII