A MODO DE CONCLUSIÓN

Despitecases of direct governmentattacks onthe press in Russia, scholars such as Sarah Oates generally agree thatthemost pernicious effects onRussian freedom ofthepress lieinthe fear inspired by actsof intimidation on journalists, leads to “self-censorship” and a reincarnation of many of restrictions of the Soviet system. Suchself-censorshipproduces the sameeffectsas actual censorship, under official freedom of thepress policies. In a 2005 articlefor Niemman Reports, oppositionjournalist Masha Gessen describes the fear that she andhereditorial staff at BolshoyGorod felt afternewsbrokeof the arrest ofwell-known opposition politician. Withher editorialboard, Gessen was forced to determine whether ornot tocover these arrestswith a headlining article and in-depth analysis of what the arrestswouldmeanfor journalism andfree

pressinRussia, whether to include anoblique allusiontothe arrests perceptible onlytothe close reader, or whether to omit the story entirely andcontinuetoinvestigate other, lesspolitically- chargedtopics. ToGessen, each option came witha cost tofree press, since if she were silenced through somereprisal by thegovernment, shecould no longerwriteimportant stories thatcould affectherreaders. Gessen writes:

This is howself-censorship works. One bargainswithoneself. How much can I sacrifice before Iloserespectfor myselfas a journalist? Can I respect myselfif I don't givea story the playit deservesbecauseI'm afraid? Can Irespect myself if Ikill astory because I'm afraid? Can I respect myself if Iforce the reader to lookfor the truth between thelinesbecauseI'm afraid?144

144 Gessen, Fear, 116

145

Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss. “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money,” Interpreter, Special Report, November 22, 2014: 15, accessed October 13 2018.

www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Menace_of_Unreality_Final.pdf.

ForGessen, who now writesforthe NewYorker, these sorts of decisions are incompatible toher vision ofherprofession, and themediaenvironmentultimatelyledherto leave Russiaforthe United States. Suchself-exile, of course, only heightens the power ofthe original actof intimidation, since the reporters who chooseto stay are more likelyto becompliant to governmentwishes.145Inthis way, both journalists and audiences subordinatetheir own

individual freedoms to what they see as a larger mission whose goal thestate accomplishes. Even for journalistsunawareof direct mediaintimidation, doubts andrationalizations such as those Gessen describes inevitably work their way intosubconscious decision-making andleadtoa conformism that can be strategicallycrafted bytheregime.

Censorship and self-censorship nevertheless differinimportant ways. In the latter, the individual reporter retains avoice andatheoretical freedom to report on whatever he or she wants. According to Schimpfossl andYablokov's interviewstudyof rank-and-file journalists in 2015, “reporters enjoy relatively large leeway to developtheir creativity, which iscrucial for state-aligned television networks tokeep audience ratings up.”146 Tothe state, theindividual voice servesthe purpose ofkeepingthe conversation interesting andfighting back against the monotony ofthe Soviet-eramedia. Since certain topics are deemed off-limits, journalists redirect their energies at topicsthatare deemed acceptable. Through careful executionof limited

violence, the regime can steer journalists towards topics thatserve official ideology. AsIgor Yakovenko of theMoscow State Institute for International Relations notes, “if previous

authoritarian regimes were three parts violenceand onepartpropaganda, this oneisvirtually all propagandaand relatively little violence. Putin only needsto makea few arrests—and then amplify the message through his total control of television.”147

146 Elizabeth Schimpfossl and Ilya Yablokov. “Coercion or Conformism? Censorship and Self-Censorship among Russian Media Personalities and Reporters in the 2010s.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet

Democratization 22(2): (January 2014), 295-311

147

Quoted in Pomeranstev, Menace, 10

148 Ilya Yablokov. “Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT).”

Politics 35 (3/4): 301-15. doi:10.1111/1467-9256.12097.

As the Putin inner-circleis off limits, investigative reporterscan exercise their journalistic freedom by looking into failures of theU.S. or theUN, or investigating the inequalities of theWestern economic system. Sometimes, such implicitcensorship results in implausible stories: conspiracy theoriesabout 9/11 beingan inside job, UN cover-ups of health defects caused by unprotecteduranium, or discrepancies inthe Treaty ofCession of Alaska,148

while investigationintoconspiraciesbythe Russian governmentareignored. Through deliberate application of pressure, regimes can form a clear ideological agenda in themedia.

Self-censorshipperpetuatesthetenetsof Eurasianism through de facto prohibition of violations of three sacred assumptions: Vladimir Putinasthesole leader of the Russian state, the RussianOrthodox Church as anuntarnished beacon ofwholesomemorals, and the Russian state as territorially sound without threats offragmentation.Putin's image asa spiritual unifier of lands throughouttheRussianEmpire is unassailable, and even gaffes in his speech arenot

broadcast ontelevision.149 Reporters are expected to substitutethe word vlast (“power”)forPutin in any commentary that criticizes thegovernment'sconduct,150 sothatjournalists can air

grievances without undermining Putin's absolute authority. Likewise,Putin's image is trumped up whenstatemedia shares photosof Putin tranquilizing tigers or recovering ancient Byzantine artifacts, which reinforce his fitnesstobepresidentas well as his understanding ofthediverse regions and histories ofthe wide empire. This also reinforces a Eurasianist vision of a uniter-of- nationsautocrat.

149 Schimpfossl, Coercion, 307 150 Schimpfossl, Coercion, 307

The Russian Orthodox Church, meanwhile, has risen in prominencesincethelegislated atheism ofthe Soviet Union. In 2012, just afterPutin'sreturn to thepresidency,fivemembersof theall-female punk band Pussy Riot tried to perform animpromptuconcert in the Cathedral of Christ ourSavior in downtownMoscow as a protest against theincreasingcronyism between the church and the state. Instead ofreportingit as a political protest, however, thestate-aligned media developeda unanimous narrative implyingthatthemembers of the group were part of a

deep-rooted conspiracy against the entireRussian civilization. Ilya Yablokov writesthat“the media presented theRussianOrthodoxChurch asthe main marker of Russian identity andthe key force bindingRussianpeople,”and thusabove criticism.151 Theenergy that could perhaps havegone into investigating the corruptionof the churchthatPussy Riot was protesting instead was redirected to innuendosofelaborate conspiracytheories in whichtheOrthodox Church was besieged by a liberalcabal of homosexuals, blasphemers, and provocateurs bent ondestroying the Russian state.152

151

Ilya Yablokov. “Pussy Riot as agent provocateur: conspiracy theories and the media construction of nation in Putin's Russia.” The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity. 42 (2014), 623

152 Yablokov, Pussy Riot, 628-629

153

Russian National Security Strategy, December, 31 2015-Full Text (Russian).” Approved by the Russian Federation Presidential Edict 683. Moscow, the Kremlin.

154 Damm, Resurrection, 950

155 Damm, Resurrection, 950

The idea of a renaissance of theOrthodoxChurchevenenteredthe 2015 National Security Strategywhich calls for a reassertionof “traditional Russian spiritual andmoral

values.”153 While critics have accused the Russian Orthodox Church ofbeing filledwith corrupt charlatans masqueradingas spiritual holymen, the mainstream mediafocuseson the leadership of the Orthodox Churchin “protectinga greater shared history, culture, and language” of the Eurasian people.154 The government thus takeson analmosttheocratic character in line with many of the Eurasianists' prescriptions, althoughthe press usuallyportrays Putin asthe dominant actor in theChurch-State relationship.155

The tabooagainst reportingon any political disunity withintheRussian state ismost important. In contrast tothe Yeltsin era's divestment of powertothe regions, thePutinregime seems to be sensitiveto slights against the unity ofthe nation and responds to anythreats to

territorialintegrity withviolent, extra-governmental retribution. The most famous case is of journalist Anna Politkovskaya,whose critical coverage ofthe ChechenUprising from 1999 to

2005led to international recognition andtoher murder under mysteriouscircumstances in 2006 nearher apartment in Moscow. Politkovskaya wrote storiescritical of theChechnyan

government, which many viewed asa puppetof theRussiangovernment, given its inordinate loyalty to Moscow despite tenuouscultural ties and ahistory of oppression of itsown citizens. The killing of Politkovskaya, which many have speculated wasorchestrated by theKremlin, sent a clear signal to journalists working in Russia that questioning Russia's hegemonyover nations oftheEurasian continent wouldnot be tolerated. Politkovskaya's killing, thoughnever solved, undoubtedlydiscouragedothers from investigating wartime abuses. In any case, Putincodified this insistence on territorialintegrity when, onDecember 30, 2013, he signed alaw criminalizing “calls for separatism.” The datewastellingina country whereNewYearis celebrated lavishly and symbols of rebirth and cleansing aretied to the holiday. Under thelaw violators face afine of up to306,700 rubles ($9,500) or jailterms of up to five years for making public calls for action aimed against the country's territorial integrity.156

156 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices February

27, 2014. Accessed October 5, 2018. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/eur/220324.htm

The governmentenshrinesthe concept of territorial integrity in other waysas well. “Inter-ethnic journalism” (“mezh-etnicheskii zhurnalizm”) is a termdeveloped in Russia inthe

1990s in response to the generalmood of separatismthat the nationalist-mindedfound

objectionable. Justas in the Soviet Union, the Putin regime usedthepress as a tool to achieve political gains, and‘inter-ethnicjournalism' became a catchphrase for a journalistic stylethat

described variousethnicities in ways that celebrated differences while suggestingan immutable tiewiththe civic Russian state. However, this connectionwas depicteddifferently thanin Western countries, where civic andethnic identities are more or less siloed. In inter-ethnic journalism, thevery distinctiveness of theethnicity is couchedwithinthe banner of the Russian

ethnic and civic mythology. Russian scholar Iskhakov writes in his 2002 analysis of inter-ethnic journalism that he finds the themesof “acknowledgementof oneself as acitizen of Russia (as a

piece of the whole); acknowledgementof thenational language of Russia as native;

acknowledgementof one's own [ethnicity] as a composite ofRussia; acknowledgementof the unity ofRussia; and acknowledgementofthe super-ethnic mythology (history) of the citizens of Russia.”157 A code of ethics for “inter-ethnic journalism,” released in 2013 by theGuild of Inter­ ethnicJournalism, is instructive. The preface totheEthical CodeforJournalistsConcerning Inter-EthnicThemes in the RussianFederation released in 2013 statesthat“thegoal of thework ofthe journalist is notto suppress facts orproblems, butto attract theRussianpeople's interest and respect for thehistory and culture of the people inhabiting Russia, building the audience for the creation of astable and multi-ethnic society” [italics aremy own]. Subsequently, thetext states that reporting oninter-ethnicissues is “themostimportant condition for the existence and development of a unifiedRussian state” [italicsare my own] that reporting on conflicts should encourage their ending “peacefully in aconstructive, inter-ethnicdialogue” that “doesn't

necessitate the interferenceof law-enforcement agencies” andthatthe journalist should strive for

157

P. L. Iskhakov. “Etnicheskaya zhurnalistika kak faktor geopoliticheskoi rasvitiya Rossii” (“Ethnic Journalism as a factor in the geopolitical development of Russia.”) Problems of Geopolitical Security of Russia: Materials of the

All-Russian Scientific Practical Conference. Yekaterinburg: Ural State University. September 25, 2009. 39. Accessed October 4, 2018.

the “harmonizationof inter-ethnic relations insociety.”158In addition to clearly contradicting Western journalisticstandards--which encourage journaliststoput aside any agenda other than reporting facts--the Code very clearly excludes reportingon secessionist movements within Russia. The Code's suggestions clearly endorse a“unified Russian state”unmarred by ethnic tensions and seem to suggestthat reporting must lead to “harmonization.” Any news piecethat might provoke tensionor conflictshould not be published, the Code suggests. Inthis way, journalists reinforce the tenets of Eurasianism without any legal action from theRussianstate.

Guild of Inter-ethnic Journalism. “Eticheskii kodeks zhurnalistov, osveschayushikh mezhetnicheskuyu tematiku v Rossiysskoi Federatsii” (“Ethical codex for journalists covering inter-ethnic themes in the Russian Federation.”). April 9 2012, accessed September 10 2018. https://nazaccent.ru/about/eticheskij-kodeks/

This codeandthe general concept of inter-ethnicjournalism as it hasdeveloped in Russia raises interesting questions. If agroup within Russia wereto demand secession from the Russian state, wouldan inter-ethnic journalist be allowedto report on it? Does reportingonthe

democratic wishes of an ethnically defined sub-state further thecause ofthe“harmonizationof inter-ethnic relations insociety”?Andwhatof inter-ethnic journalistsworkingabroad in, say, the United States? TheCode seems to apply onlyto“aunifiedRussian state,”not necessarily to other states,which can be read as an implicit endorsementof reporting on such movements elsewhere, i.e. theUnited States. Does thatthenmake it wrong? In 2014, two years afterthe Code was released, the FederalAssemblypassed alawthatcallsfor jailtime for those who publish "public calls for actionsviolatingthe territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” The Code, ostensibly composed by a guild of independent journalists, suggests support among the mediaforsuch alaw. Media scholar Sarah Oates likewisefinds public support in Russiaforthe

mediaas a “stabilizing” and“inspiring” force within society,159 as opposedtothewestern

conception of themedia as a “watchdog.” Should thelaw be interpretedthen as an affirmationof Liberal democratic principles since itis enacting thepeople's will, or should it instead be viewed as a subversion of theLiberal democraticvalue of free press? The lawalso confounds

understandings of who is leading in this social projectof Russia: Is the regime leading through its establishmentoflaws and its surreptitious enforcementofcensorship, oris it merely

responding tothenatural inclinationof the passionaries of Eurasia to pursue agoal? The Putin regimeseems to masterfully and intentionally confound these dynamicsbetweenthe regime and the electorate.

Sarah Oates. Television, democracy, and elections in Russia. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 17

In either case, the dynamic indicates thatthereis anarrativeof ethnic harmony within the continent of Eurasiathatis condoned by boththeregime and accepted bythe majority of the population, since thereislittlepushback against these forms ofmedia influence. The Russian media landscape is much more diverse--and critical--than it once was, with instancesof

government mismanagement, bureaucratic corruption andpolitical neglect as acceptable subjects of newsreporting. But reportingon ethnictensionsis still categorically excluded, which suggests the importance thatgood ethnic relations playin Russia's self-perception. The fact that

Eurasianism isintegrated into the code of conduct of Inter-ethnic journalism furtherprovides evidencethatthe dynamicsbetween majority andminority ethnic groups within Russia is an important component of thegovernmentand the population's perception of their civilization.