Soviet era. The 1977 Soviet Constitution, for example, states that “citizens ofthe USSR are guaranteedfreedom of speech, ofthe press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations.”However,thisfreedomwascircumscribedbytheopen-ended qualifier that all speech mustbe “In accordance withthe aims ofbuilding communism.”113 During the1970s and 80s, Glavlit, the official censorship agency,employed about 70,000censors, who punished violators with sentencesofupto seven yearsof labor.114 High-level bureaucrats in the Central
Committeedetermined theideological line, publishinga periodically updated guidecalled “Handbookof Classified Data” which bannedreportingonthetopics of“disasterswithhuman losses, everything that concerned the armed forces, criminality andjails, cases of social unrest and protests, and of course, censorship itself,”115while they themselves reveled in reading dissident literatureand news from the West.116
115 Lauk, The Antithesis, 177
116 Pomerantsev and Weiss The Menace of Unreality, 10
117 Thomas C. Wolfe Governing Soviet Journalism : The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin. (Bloomington
IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 7
118
Sarah Oates Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia. (London: Routledge, 2006), 1-20 119 Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism, 7
Soviet journalists performed notasindependentactors vying for the latest scoop, but as governmentfunctionaries whose primary purpose was to conveythe message ofMarxist
socialism through mass media. Soviet media scholar Thomas Wolfe writesthat Soviet journalism functioned to reinforce theparty'sviewthatthecountry was not“fractured into competing
groups, but rather aspieces of a larger whole whose harmoniouscoordination itwastheparty's job to bring about.”117 Newsconsumers likewise readilyaccepted the news media's roleas
governmentfunctionaries.118Despite this larger social project, Soviet policy makers understood thatregional audiencesrequired different forms of media, andtailored newspapers to both
national identities andeconomic classesthatwere supplied from Ekaterinburgto Vladivostok, in Udmurt and in Tatar.119
However, the bedrock of the Soviet masscommunication system began to crumble during his implementationof glasnost in Soviet society. Gorbachev first mentioned thewordin
more thoughtful approachto [...]therectification of shortcomings anddeficiencies.”120
According toMcNair, Gorbachev himself was electedpartly duetothe positive response to this speech from members of theCentralCommittee.121 Though glasnost can be interpreted as a liberalizing reform, itwas also a reaction to inevitablecultural and technological processes that were unstoppable in Soviet society. Samizdat, or unsanctioned publications, wereincreasingly accessible to Soviet citizens; Western information sources suchas Voice of Americawere more widespread; and Soviet citizenswere increasingly traveling abroadand gaining accessto
alternative news sources.122Gorbachevunderstoodthat these processes were at play and that, oneway or another, citizenswould learn the truth. Gorbachev's program of glasnostcanthus also be interpreted as a shrewd political move to adjust to evolvingpublic opinion. In any case, glasnost representedatectonic shift in thedissemination ofinformation in the Soviet Union, as the focusof media changed from a celebration of the economic successes of communism toa blood sport of digging upits shortcomings.123
120
120 Quoted in McNair, Glasnost, 44
121 121 McNair, Glasnost, 44 122 122 McNair, Glasnost, 43 123 123 McNair, Glasnost, 46
Despite its positiveconnotations in the West, many Russians todaysee glasnost as akey factor that precipitated the collapse ofthe Soviet Union. With the floodgates of criticism open, Gorbachevhimselfbecamea victimof the new reality, whichblamed him forthe economic problems andincreasingpolitical chaos. Whenthe Soviet Union was officially dissolved, state subsidies ended, and the news media had toadjust to a new reality based on free market economics. Instead of repeating a message toacaptive audience,the media had to competefor
audiences byentertaining them, which led to theriseof “tabloid-style”journalism and of television astheprimary sourceofmediaconsumption. Politicians, mostnotablyBorisYeltsin, discovered in 1991 thepowerthat live TV could have when CNN broadcasted his image atopa tank speaking in front of theRussianParliament during the military coup attempt, while sweaty, apparently drunken Soviet apparatchiksdiscredited themselves as they fumbled through their explanations of the coup. The visceral contrastof images catapulted Yeltsin to thepresidency and doomedthe SupremeSoviet to infamy.
Russiansociety inthe 1990s appearedto bedeveloping acommitmentto free press. In 1990, as the USSR was collapsing, theRussian Parliament, headed by future-President Boris Yeltsin, adopted a new law On thePress and other Mass Media that established three principles of free press: complete abolishmentofcensorship, private ownership ofthepressforthefirst time, andjournalists' independence from their owners.124 Legislators also clarified legal
definitions of defamation andintellectual property, which allowed journalists tooperate without fear ofarbitrary crackdowns based onbureaucrats' political whims. After Yeltsin'selection, the Constitution of 1993 established that “Everyone shall havethe right tofreely lookfor, receive, transmit, produce and distribute information by any legal way.”125 Ingeneral, theperiod
suggestedthattheRussianmedia's developmentwould alignwiththeWestern model as partofa larger Atlanticist movementtowards universal, neo-liberal values. Soviet media scholar Andrei
124
Andrei Richter. “Media Regulation: Foundation laid for free speech.” Ed. Kaarle Nordenstreng,, Elena Vartanova, and Yassen N. Zassoursky. Russian Media Challenge. (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2002), 116.
125
125Constitution of the Russian Federation. 1993. Article 45.1. Accessed October 3, 1993. http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm
Richterwrote optimistically in 2002 that“Internal processes insociety and in themedia [...] make it impossible to reverse the flow of the freepressback into the dictatorial riverbed.”126
126 Richter, Media Regulation, 122
127
Richter, Media Regulation, 116
128
Richter, Media Regulation,116
129
Richter, Media Regulation, 150 Richter, Media Regulation, 151
ThoughWesternizers were optimistic, there were still indications that things hadnot really changedso much. One signal thattheWesterizershadmisread was themotivation of the new government, which was “governed more by an instrumental importancethanby an idealistic approach tothisvalue.”127 Richter explainsthatYeltsinand hisadministration usedpromises of mediafreedom and protection towinthesupport of the press andof the international community inthehopethat Russia would beaccepted into theG-7andother international fora.128 And despite federal protections for journalists, enforcementof rights was patchy andregional laws could be contradictory. Yeltsin's famous charge to the regions to “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” apparently had implications for media control aswell. Bashkiria, an
autonomous ethnic republicsitting attheWestern edge of theUral Mountains, for example, established strict permitting requirements for reporters from mediaoutside its borders and prohibited journalism that would underminethe“unity and integrity of theregion
[Bashkiria].”129Information was weaponized intheregions' fight for self-determination, andthe federal government was tooweak to respond, despitethe fact that these regional power-grabs contradicted federal laws and statutes.130 Thisregionalization was of course anathema tothe Eurasian tenet of continental political integrity, but it also enabled the development ofregional
identities that had previously been suppressed by themonopoly of newsfromthe center in Moscow.
Other signs indicated that the Soviethabits of governmentinterference hadnot entirely died. Privatization, whichwas extolled by Westernizers, proved tocutbothways. Inthe early nineties, TV channels and newspapers were sold off to private investors--sometimes wholly and sometimesin part--in an attempt to shake the governmentchokehold onmediaproduction. But this opened the door for corruption, as the state apparatus granted licenses preferentially to those with whomit wishedtogain concessions. For example, theKremlingavetheRussian channel NTV, a full-time license to operateon abroadcastTVchannel inreturnfor its complimentary coverage of President Yeltsin'scandidacy, inviolation of laws that prevented that very kind of interference.131 The state also retained rightsto cancel broadcast licenses by a secretcommittee vote, should mediacompaniesviolatethe criminal codeby “spreading purposefully misleading information.”132 Writing in 2002, media scholar Zassoursky saw glimmersof a “corporate authoritarian” model--aprecursortoPutin's more strong-armed consolidation of businessand mediathat kept theirpower in return for allegiance tothepresidentandobeyed certain unwritten rules--which he argued allowed the wealthy media moguls to monopolize information tore-elect Yeltsin in 1996.
131
Richter, Media Regulation, 120
132
Richter, Media Regulation, 137
Alsoduring the late1990s, western conceptions of PR (piar in Russian) begantotake hold of media moguls and take the formofdirect censorship. Marketersbegantopay close attention toaudiences'emotional responses first during the Yeltsin reelection campaign of 1996
and later duringPutin's ascendancy in1999-2000, when the latter's strongman image was developed. As Yeltsin's chosensuccessor andPrime Minister during the election campaign, Putinhad certain advantages, butalso a clearweakness: Nobody knew anything about him. Instead of aweakness, however, the rising Putinteamused his anonymity as a strength to create his image from scratch. In this, theywere aided by terrorist bombings of an apartmentcomplex inMoscowonthe eve of the election,which offeredthe perfect chancetodefinethisnew character tothe electorate. MediacoveragepresentedPutin as a masculine and energetic leader, whoacted decisively in response tothe bombings bysending Russian troops into Chechnya, the ostensible home region of the bombers. Hisapproval rating shotup from 14percentto 41 percentin about a month, and hadrisen to 71percenttwo months later.133 His electionwas all but assured, aswasthe new utility oftelevision in manipulating voterpreferences, whilethe theoreticalregulatory mechanisms for non-bias were proven ineffective.134Russian media scholar AndreiRaskin explainsthatnews channels devoted up to48percentoftheir political coveragetoPutin just prior tothe election, whilethenext closest candidate receivedjust over 11 percent.135 Media images showed Putin piloting his own airplane to his next meeting,and
sheddingtears over lost servicemen in Chechnya, solidifying both sides of his patriarchal
image.136 Sincethat time, scholars have noted the singularityofPutinand his team in controlling and responding to audience's perception of him, which involved ahybridizationof new visual technologies withthe Soviet Union's insistenceon journalism'sideological mission. Russian
133
Andrei Raskin. “Television: Medium to Elect the President.” In Nordenstreng et al. 2002, 102, 106 134 Raskin, Television, 114
135 Raskin, Television, 110 136 Raskin, Television, 110
media scholar Zassoursky calls thistrend “manipulation using thelaws of drama,”137in which drab, overly-censored news mediaofthe Soviet era was replaced by sensationaliststories whose powerwasredoubled by the use ofthe relatively new medium of television. Newtechniques, such asde-contextualizing events, changingfoci, and even staging events, weredeveloped and applied tothe new paradigm.138
137
Ivan Zassoursky. “Media and Power: Russia in the Nineties”. In Nordenstreng et al. 2002, 87 138 Zassoursky, Media and Power, 80
139
Masha Gessen. "Fear and Self-Censorship in Vladimir Putin's Russia." Niemann Reports 59, no. 2 (Summer, 2005) 115. Accessed October 8, 2018. https://search.proquest.com/docview/216752577?accountid=14470.115 140 Gessen, Fear, 121
141 Gessen, Fear, 115
142 Sarah Oates. "The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media." Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 8 (2007): 1287. Accessed October 4. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20451453.
Whiletherewere similarities with Soviet times, the new landscape wasmore complex than a reversion to an essentially Soviet landscape as some claimed.139Though he re-nationalized the ownership of the main mediastations, Putin left large shares in private hands. Though he removed the editor of theprominentdaily newspaper Izvestia, he apparentlydid so through behind-the-scenespressuring on the newspaper's owners instead of throughdirect action,140and while journalists were threatened with retribution for criticizing thegovernment, the threats came through extra-legal means.141 Putinfurtheravailed himself of the general confusion regarding medialawsand instead issued Presidential edicts to supersedethemwithwordingthat left them open to interpretation.142 Furthermore, the globalization of media,which was firstevidencedby CNN's influential coverage of the breakup ofthe Soviet Union, addeda new dynamic. Since news consumers hadaccessto alternative media,news outletshad to be sure to cover what their competitors covered. The government primarily controlled the narratives and emphasized certain stories,rather than prohibitingstories entirely. As Damm andCooley explain, “what becomes
truth is less about presenting facts(or even hiding them), and becomes much more about establishing and controlling the dominant narratives thattakeplace through all the controlled media channels.”143
143
Emily Belle Damm and Skye Cooley. “Resurrection of the Russian Orthodox Church: Narrative of Analysis of the Russian National Myth.” Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) 98 (3) (August 2017), 945
doi:10.1111/ssqu.12429.
Russia's brief experience withaWestern model of media left clear marks onthe Russian media system. Glasnost precipitated an unravelingof the strictly controlled, ideological
recitationof impressive statistics that characterizedSoviet mediaand replaced it witha “wild west” ofbright-lights and sensationalism that attracted and entertained audiences in ways that Lenincouldneverhave imagined. But Putin harnessed the new market-based mediaand combined itwith his new government's developing ideology.