Security Unified Command
Graphic 2:
Principles of LIC
Internal Security: Force and Population Security/Conservation
The first of Mao’s principles of insurgency is the “preservation of oneself and the annihilation of the enemy”.7 Stealth and subterfuge is the way of the insurgent, to strike and withdraw without taking debilitating casualties. Since preservation is central to the insurgent, flexible transition between operational phases becomes acceptable. The insurgent will forgo advances made, if these advances threaten the insurgency. For example, an insurgent will revert to guerrilla operations and terrorism, if sufficiently defeated at the mobile warfare phase. The insurgent will
even retreat to the initial organisation phase, in an attempt to protect cadre members. Even in this relatively inactive, embryonic situation, the insurgent still threatens the counterinsurgent because of the possibility of re-emergence. An Al Qaeda manual, titled ‘Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants’, emphasises patience as one of the key characteristics of an Al Qaeda member: “[The member] should have plenty of patience for [enduring] afflictions if he is overcome by the enemies. He should not abandon this great path and sell himself and his religion to the enemies for his freedom. He should be patient in performing the work, even if it lasts a long time.”8 Without the real capitulation of the insurgent, the counterinsurgent’s organisation, counterterrorism and counter-guerrilla warfare operations must be sustained. There is a risk that without a clear threat the counterinsurgency may become unpopular politically, causing a hasty withdrawal of counterinsurgency forces and a re-appearance of the insurgent.9 This must be resisted.
It could be argued that suicide terrorism has undermined the principle of preservation. However, the principle of preservation remains salient despite the advent of the suicide bomber. Suicide attacks undermine the strength of the insurgent organisation, so must remain a peripheral operation in the terror phase of the insurgency. If the insurgent remains in the terrorism phase, the insurgent is less likely to succeed.
Conversely, preservation is as critical to the counterinsurgent as it is to the insurgent. The primary objective of the counterinsurgent must be to preserve security and control in friendly zones. As an insurgency progresses from the organisational phase to mobile warfare, agency becomes more direct, actions become more overt, and the operational strength of the insurgent grows. Invariably the counterinsurgent will strive to oppose the most visible of the insurgent’s violence: mobile warfare. This becomes problematic, if in doing so, the counterinsurgent neglects the organisation, terrorism and guerrilla phases of the insurgency. With the concentration of the counterinsurgent otherwise occupied, the insurgent can begin to infiltrate areas under counterinsurgent control. This infiltration advances the insurgent’s cause, and will initiate the process of organisation, terrorism and guerrilla warfare in a previously safe zone. Local security and police forces, as well as the population, may initially attempt to resist the insurgents. However, without the support of the regular security forces,
the local forces and population may find themselves overpowered and discontinue resisting the insurgent. The counterinsurgent’s control structures will be removed and personnel may be executed. The feeling of betrayal by the counterinsurgent of the population will thus undermine any attempt to reclaim the zone. Therefore, despite offensive operations being necessary to defeat the insurgents, the primary task must be protecting areas from insurgent infiltration.10
Once the security of the counterinsurgent’s safe zones has been entrenched, the insurgent’s zones of control and marginal zones must be contested. The counterinsurgent must preserve itself and begin to annihilate the enemy. The expansion into insurgent contested areas must be deliberate, entrenching all phases of the counterinsurgent’s strategy. This means contested areas are not secured merely by mobile counterinsurgent warfare, counter- guerrilla, counter-terrorism and organisational operations must be equally expanded into the new zones. If the counterinsurgent does not install all counterinsurgency phase strategies, the insurgent could easily retake the zone. Stealth and subterfuge are the insurgent’s most lethal attributes, which most threaten the security and control of the counterinsurgent’s safe zones; this should be the focus of the counterinsurgent.11
LICs are long-term wars, which cannot be constrained by artificial timelines.12 This is significant for international responses to insurgency, where short-term political imperatives can undermine long-term counterinsurgency strategies. For example, the suggestion of a date of departure may factor well in domestic politics, but will also strengthen the morale of the insurgent and give a date for an expansion of insurgent operations. The counterinsurgent must guarantee that their presence will be maintained until a peaceful and stable governing structure has been entrenched.
The most effective means of shortening a LIC is to improve doctrine, strategy and tactics and expand the resources available to the counterinsurgent. Given the time sensitive nature of counterinsurgency, international forces must have the capacity to rapidly deploy civil, police, intelligence and military personnel and resources, utilising a holistic approach to ending the LIC. Moreover, counterinsurgency forces in LIC must maintain a sufficiently ‘heavy footprint’ to create stability and peace; the idea of a ‘light footprint’ is contrary to the principles of counterinsurgency operations in LIC.