RESOLUCIÓN N.º 1991/MSGC/

As in Afghanistan, the Mi-24 attack helicopter provided effective close air support (CAS). However, helicopters were vulnerable over Groznyy until appropriate tactics were developed. These tactics involved the helicopters using the urban terrain. Simply, helicopters could advance below the cityscape to safe areas

behind friendly buildings, then ‘pop up’ to fire on the target before hiding again. Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) were also highly effective in Groznyy. Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) presented an effective technical answer to the Russian problem of gaining real time intelligence. UAVs, while expensive, enabled situational awareness without risk.

Initially, Russian aviation assets were utilised to gain air control over Chechnya. On 1 December 1994, Russian combat aircraft destroyed 266 aircraft based in Chechnya. Although half of these aircraft were in a state of disrepair, the remainder were being readied for combat in November 1994. The threat these mostly antiquated trainer aircraft posed, was primarily unconventional. The aircraft were being readied to act as piloted cruise missiles, utilised against civilian infrastructure in Russia. The Russians were also successful in isolating Chechnya from air re-supply. A-50 Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and MiG-31 interdiction fighters denied the potential for external air links.27 Chechen C2, communications and other key infrastructure were not destroyed in the Russian preparation of the battlefield. This potential failure was attributed to deficient planning and intelligence.28 However, Russian forces may have planned to occupy these facilities for their own use. This occurred in Afghanistan, and would seem consistent with Russia’s initial Chechnya strategy.

The Chechen antiaircraft threat was not insignificant in the first Chechen war. The Chechens possessed ZU-23 anti-aircraft cannon, DShK machine guns, and utilised RPGs in an improvised antiaircraft role. In addition, ZSU-23-4 self- propelled antiaircraft guns, SA-14, SA-18 and Stinger SAMs were potentially in the possession of the Chechens. These systems, and small arms fire, partially suppressed Russian helicopter operations. Chechnya’s partially mountainous terrain and poor flying conditions further degraded helicopter operations. The Russian’s attempted to reduce the risk posed by Chechen air defences with complicated target approach manoeuvres, high speed, low level approaches, complex attack formations and mutual covering fire. These tactics were partially effective. However, they could not make up for the antiquated Russian equipment, weapons and limited pilot training. Consequently, each sortie resulted in 10% loss and 25% damage of participating aircraft.29 A significant issue for the Russians in Chechnya was obsolete equipment; the Mi-24, Mi-8 and Mi-6 helicopters were so designated by their crews. More modern or upgraded

helicopters, such as the Mi-8MTV2/3 and Mi-26, performed well in Chechnya. However, there was a need for gunships like the Ka-50 or the Mi-28, which can locate and engage targets from a safe distance, at night and in any weather. 30 There were six significant operational lessons learned from helicopter CAS operations in Chechnya. First, enhanced target acquisition and PGMs are required to reduce collateral damage. Second, pilot proficiency is central in alleviating risk and improving capability. Third, the provision of ground based intelligence is critical for helicopter operations, especially around fortified villages. Basically, helicopter gunships are becoming too vulnerable to operate in some environments independently. Rather, helicopter gunships should support land force elements. Fourth, the intelligence provided by UAVs can be effectively utilised by helicopters. Fifth, night operations functionally dislocated the Chechens insurgents. Hence, night vision equipment is a force enhancer. Sixth, CAS must be prompt, otherwise targets can escape.

Ground based reconnaissance, in support of Russian airborne operations, was a critical deficiency in Chechnya. Air inserted or regular reconnaissance troops were often unable to communicate with other infantry or air units. These land force elements often lacked radios, night vision devices, silencers and binoculars. Due to the lack of ground based intelligence, gunships often failed to eliminate targets or understand Chechen air defence strategies. Due to this lack of synergy between land and air units, Russian strategy often called for general counter-fire. This strategy was ineffective, as the Chechens would fire and withdraw. Furthermore, counter-fire lacks accuracy and increases the chance of collateral damage.31

Russian CAS was predominantly performed by the Su-25. The Su-25 is the Russian equivalent of the American A-10. The Su-25 is a subsonic, manoeuvrable aircraft with heavy armament and armour. These characteristics enable the aircraft to survive in unfriendly environments. The manoeuvrability of these aircraft enabled reasonably precise strikes against small targets, in any non- urban environment. The aircraft could also loiter on the battlefield for extended periods. Due to the significance of this aircraft in combat, the Su-25 has been upgraded and re-designated the Su-39. The upgrade enabled night operations with precision weapons, and reduced the vulnerability of the aircraft with improved electronic countermeasures. The other significant Russian fighter-bomber in

Chechnya was the Su-24M. The Su-24M performed two essential functions. First, the Su-24M provided all weather and night aerial reconnaissance information. Second, the Su-24M was capable of delivering of PGMs.32 The Su- 24M was employed frequently over Groznyy, dropping KAB-500/1500 TV and laser guided bombs and Kh-25 ML laser guided missiles.33

This section illustrates that the effectiveness of air assets in counterinsurgency is dependent on timely intelligence. Hence, combat aircraft, helicopters and land force elements must be well integrated. This integration is a product of realistic training. Personnel training and a synergistic approach to joint air-ground operations are vital. Another source of effective intelligence was UAVs. UAVs were used with good results in Groznyy. However, the primary intelligence source in urban terrain is the infantry unit. This section also illustrates the effectiveness of CAS in counterinsurgency. The use of combat aircraft was essential to Russian operations in open terrain. However, combat air assets were of little value in urban terrain, without the use of PGMs. CAS was essential in Chechnya. However, aircraft providing CAS must be: (1) well armed and armoured; (2) constantly on station; (3) able to apply precise firepower; and (4) possess countermeasures against AA threats. Air control is also important in LIC. The airborne isolation of a conflict is critical, so as to deter airborne re- supply missions.