RESOLUCIÓN N.° 562/SSASS/

Small scale operations are fundamental to counterinsurgency. Independence, training, authority, trust, secure communications, mobility and the confidence to take the initiative must be conceptual imperatives in any counterinsurgency doctrine. All terrain types must be planned and trained for. Small scale mountain and desert warfare were neglected by the Soviets in Afghanistan, and similarly urban warfare was neglected by the Russians in Chechnya. These deficiencies led to casualties and the loss of equipment. Once these training issues were resolved, Russian operations became far more successful. The Soviet/Russian equivalent of counterinsurgency troops, which proved most effective in Afghanistan and Chechnya were airborne, reconnaissance and Spetsnaz. Their operations included raids, infiltration, mining, search, disruption and destroy missions. Moreover, these forces were invariably inserted and extracted by air. Airlift and strike enabled the application of greater force at the point of conflict, this reclaimed surprise, deception and the initiative. C2 improved in the second Chechen war, becoming decentralised and enabling initiative, situational awareness and mutual reinforcement. Thus elite operations were successful when combined with prompt aerial or land based indirect fire support. The use of conscripts was detrimental to Russian urban operations. This was because urban training was not

widely disseminated. In addition, the skills learned in combat were lost when soldiers were rotated. Moreover, NCOs and junior officers were continuously in short supply, so were radios, night vision devices, silencers and binoculars.

Terrain

Topography, weather and infrastructure are critical factors in effectively planning and conducting counterinsurgency operations. The extremes of temperature in Afghanistan severely hampered the use of mechanised equipment and the durability of troops. Given that air mobility and air strike are important in counterinsurgency, adverse conditions caused by smoke, wind, fog, cloud or rain highly are highly significant issues. This is particularly the case when all weather, night capable aircraft are unavailable or scarce. Air strike assets in LIC must be armoured, heavily armed, able to loiter on the battlefield and be slow enough to acquire targets. However, these requirements can be discounted or disregarded if air-launched PGMs are utilised. This is because PGMs can be launched further from the target than unguided ordnance, which in turn means aircraft can remain outside the range of enemy fire. Moreover, heavier munitions (especially those launched from the air) that are to be utilised in cities should be limited to PGMs. There are two reasons for this: (1) so as to limit collateral damage and harm done to civilians; and (2) prevent urban terrain from being turned into rubble, which is a terrain better suited to defence than undamaged urban structures. This of course is an ideal principle that may be impossible to achieve in certain circumstances. Consequently and importantly, this principle should not prevent the use of those weapons that are available, if the ideal weapon is unavailable.

Aviation

The Mi-24 and the Su-25 proved versatile and decisive in both Afghanistan and Chechnya. The survivability of attack helicopters in both conflicts was improved with the introduction of defensive manoeuvres. These manoeuvres included terrain hugging and pop-up tactics, complex target approach manoeuvres, high speed approaches and mutual cover fire. When utilised as convoy defenders, Mi- 24 pilots were granted operational independence. This enabled the use of embarked infantry to deny the enemy key tactical positions. The Mi-26 and Mi-

8TV2/3 were found to be effective and reliable helicopters. However, there is a need for an all-weather, day and night, PGM-capable replacement for the Mi-24. The Ka-50 and the Mi-28 constitute the likely replacements. The Ka-50 was deployed in field trials in Chechnya, although cost is prohibiting the widespread introduction of this aircraft. The Su-24M provided all weather and night reconnaissance and strike capabilities. However, the most significant requirement for the effective use of airborne assets is timely intelligence. Tactical intelligence is most effectively provided by UAVs, the integration of helicopter and strike aircraft and synergy between air and ground units. However, these requirements can only occur after realistic and extensive training. Within such a complex environment, C2 and long-range surveillance assets, analogous with the A-50 were also required. In terms of military principles, air assets must be viewed as tools that perform most effectively when seamlessly connected to intelligence and command nodes in a joint environment.

Armour

The initial use of armour in Afghanistan’s mountains and in Chechen urban areas provides analogous operational lessons. The least suited armoured vehicle in Afghan and Chechen close terrain was the wheeled BTR. This vehicle lacked armour, firepower and manoeuvrability. Absolute vigilance, impenetrable infantry escort and stand-off support tactics must be maintained if such vehicles (wheeled BTRs) are deployed in mountainous or urban terrain. The T- 55/62/72/80 tanks and BMP also lacked manoeuvrability and had a constrained firing envelope. The airmobile BMD was lighter and more manoeuvrable, while the self propelled AA ZSU series performed a critical field suppression role. In general, Russian armoured vehicles suffered from a lack of visibility, a propensity to overheat, track loss in mountainous terrain, poor maintenance and an inability to survive without air cover. When fitted with chain guns, AA guns, AGS-17s and ATGMs, armour became more adept at creating suppressing fire and was thus more suited to LIC. The importance of reactive armour became apparent in the Chechen campaigns, as armoured units were predominantly destroyed by fire on non-protected surfaces. One effective Russian improvised defence for armoured

units, against RPG and other shaped charges, was a wire mesh cage installed 25- 30cm from the hull.

Combined Arms

The use of armour in close terrain requires skilled procedure. Soldiers must be trained to disembark, if not already disembarked, to defend armour and strike at targets of opportunity. Ground reconnaissance and the control of high ground (and subterranean structures in cities) are critical. AA guns provide effective suppression fire against ground targets, and have an unconstrained fire envelope. Overlapping indirect fire support is essential for shielded mobility. Thus, fire bases with heavy artillery or MRLSs are important. In mountainous and urban terrain, the essential combat element is the soldier. However, in contemporary engagements their firepower should be supplemented with compact artillery pieces, heavy mortar, automatic grenade systems, forward air and artillery observers, combat engineers and reconnaissance troops. Combined arms is an important military principle because the combination of differing weapons systems amalgamates individual strengths and diminishes individual vulnerabilities.