1. Análisis individual de las entrevistas
1.3. Análisis de la entrevista a la estudiante 3
Aristotle at the end of the preceding Chapter promised that he would treat of substantial form. But because substantial form is what completes the quiddity of a substance, or, as he talks, the “what something was to
be” (quod quid erat esse), therefore from that “what something was to be”
there arises debate (disputatio). And he tacitly directs this debate against Plato, with the result that he shows that separate Forms or Ideas are not necessary—neither because of definition, nor because of the being of individuals, nor because of the generations of things. Therefore, in this Chapter he treats of quiddity, or “what something is”50 (for this term is more proper and concrete than “quiddity”). He treats [this], I say, “logi-cally,” as he himself says,51 or in relation to definitions. But because “what something is” extends more widely than substantial form taken rigorously, here, therefore, he more generally discusses that [namely, “what something is”]. And on this occasion many things are prefaced about the order of teaching by proceeding from things more known to those which are less known52—about which to delay or raise a question is superfluous, since that method is everywhere repeated by Aristotle, and to explain it is the proper task of a logican.
Question 1. First, therefore, it can be asked: whether it is true that in the beginning of this Chapter Aristotle says that it is “the what something was to be” of a thing which is essentially and first (per se primo) predicated of that thing53—that is, as he himself explains, in such way that in the definition of the predicate the subject is not posited? And a reason for doubting can be that a genus is predicated essentially and first (per se primo) of a species, as for example, animal is predicated of man, and neverthe-less it is not “the what something was to be” of man. Again, a difference, such as “rational,” does not express “what something is,” because it is not predicated quidditatively (in quid) but rather qualitatively (in quale). And still it is predicated in an essential and first way. However, this question must be left for the Book of the Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle exten-sively discusses the modes of essential (per se) [predication].54 And briefly we must say that “what something was to be,” taken logically, is nothing other than the essential definition and the quiddity of a thing, which, as it is formally in the mind or in the [spoken] word (voce) is the concern of logic. But insofar as it is the essence of the thing objected to the mind, or expressed in the definition, it is the metaphysical essence, which, when it is explained in relation to the definition, is said to be explained logically.
And this is the way the Philosopher is speaking here.
But this definition can either as a whole be predicated of the thing defined, and then there is a proper and adequate predication of quiddity.
Or, again, it can be predicated by parts expressing only the genus, or only the difference. And in that case, even though absolutely the whole “what something is” is not predicated, nevertheless, some part of it is explicitly
Metaphysics Book VII 123 predicated and the whole is implicitly [predicated]. For neither the genus nor the difference is predicated as a part, but as in some way expressing the whole. And therefore under “what something was to be” not only the definition, but also the genus and the difference are comprehended, with that character by which they are predicated of the thing defined. And in this way animal is said to be the “what something was to be” of man, not the whole thing formally, but still the whole thing confusedly. And it does not matter that a difference may be said /p. XXXII/ to be predicated quali-tatively (in quale), because it is predicated “as something qualitative” (in quale quid), that is, as essential and constituting the essence of the thing.
Hence, it is clear that all accidental predicates, of whatever kind they are, are excluded from the “what something was to be”, for the reason that they are not predicated of a thing “essentially and first” (per se primo).
Question 2. Secondly, it can be asked here: whether accidents have a “what something was to be,” that is, whether, and how, they can be defined? Aristotle treats this subject most extensively here in Texts 1255 and after, and in the whole following Chapter. But here there can hardly be a question about a thing (de re), but only about a name (de nomine).
Therefore, the summation of what Aristotle says is contained in this: if we speak metaphysically about “what something was to be,” that is, about an essence, it is clear that accidental things have some real essence, just as they are real beings. For a being is constituted in the character of being by an essence. But just as accidents are beings analogically and “to a certain extent” (secundum quid), in this way they have an essence only to a certain extent and with the same proportional analogy.
From this, further speaking logically about “what something was to be,”
that is, about a definition, it is clear that it must be said with the same proportion that accidents can have some definition. For they have a real essence which is metaphysically composite (non ominino simplicem56). But every real and composite essence can be explained by some statement (oratio) and expressed conception of the mind; and this amounts to being defined.57 Likewise, accidents have their proper genera and differences;
therefore, they can be defined through those. However, just as an accidental essence is imperfect, so it can be defined only in an imperfect way. This imperfection can consist either in the fact that its genus and difference are very incomplete and imperfect within the range of being, much more than is the genus of the soul58 or of matter,59 or certainly in the fact that accidents cannot be defined except by putting some added thing in the definition, so that in relation to that [added thing] an essence of this kind will be explained. In this way it was said earlier that substance is prior in
definition to accident and that accident cannot be defined except through substance. For in order that its definition truly and properly disclose its essence, it is necessary that it explain it through some relation to substance, about which subject we have spoken in Disputation 37, Section 1 [sic].60
However, note this that Aristotle seems in this Text to sometimes be speaking about “being by accident” (ens per accidens) and sometimes about an accident—about which two, however, the reasoning is not altogether the same in relation to definition. For a being by accident in fact does not have a definition, it must be explained through a number of definitions, or an aggregate of definitions. For just as it is not a being, but rather beings, in this way it does not have an essence but rather essences—and the same is proportionally true about its definition. But accident taken properly is, I say, “a being by itself” (ens per se), not inasmuch as it is distinguished from “a being in another” (ens in alio), but inasmuch as it is distinguished against “by accident.”61 Or it is “by itself” not in the character of being (ratio entis), but in the character of unity (in ratione unius), and in this way it can be defined with one definition, but not with a definition that is perfectly one, for some added thing must be put into it. And in this regard it is compared in some way to a being by accident.62