Análisis de la entrevista al estudiante 4

Question 1. Here at the beginning it could be asked: does it pertain to the first philosopher¹¹⁶ to discuss definition? About this [see] the introductory Disputation 1, Section 4,¹¹⁷ where we have shown that the form of defining, both in the mind and then after in speech, pertains to the logician. But it belongs to the metaphysician to explain the basis for a definition, which is the essence of a thing. However, because this very essence and quiddity, as it is in itself, is known with difficulty, for that reason Aristotle speaks much about that definition insofar as it is crafted by us or must be crafted so that in relation to us he may explain the character of an essence, and especially so that he show that matter belongs to the essential character of some things, so that by this character he may show against Plato that of such things there cannot be Ideas separate from matter. Therefore, for this reason, he is talking in these Chapters about definition, in the treatment of which [Chapters] we will briefly touch on all things which are merely logical.

Question 2. Therefore, second, it is asked: is it of the essence of a defi-nition that it consist of parts? About this, Aristotle’s opinion here, which is affirmative, is explicit enough. And if the name itself and the task of definition is explained, there is no difficulty. For we cannot through simple concepts know and explain the essences of things. Therefore, in order distinctly to conceive and explain the nature of something, we divide it into several concepts, so that we may know what is proper to it, what is common, what is essential, and what is accidental. Finally, by appropri-ately joining together essential concepts of the thing, we may conceive it distinctly. And that distinct conception, we call its essential definition, either conceived in the mind or expressed in speech. In this way, therefore, it is evident with regard to the nature of a definition that it be a statement (oratio), and that it consequently have parts. Hence, the most proper way to search for a definition is through a division of common concepts by rejecting those which are alien down to those which are proper, as Aristotle says, more extensively in the Posterior Analytics, Book 2, Chapter 14.¹¹⁸

Question 3. Third, do the parts of a definition correspond to parts of the thing defined? The Philosopher seems to affirm that at the beginning of this Chapter when he says: “As the definition (ratio) is related to the thing, in a similar way a part of the definition is related to a part of the thing.”¹¹⁹ And that can be inferred from both the task and the aim of a definition. For because it distinctly states the whole essence of a thing, and

for this task it uses, so to speak, “partial concepts,” it seems necessary that proportionate parts in the thing defined correspond to those concepts.

But on the other hand, it is a fact that the thing defined is often some-thing simple, and it does not have true parts. /p. XXXVI/ Again, even though it may have parts, the parts of the definition do not always cor-respond to those parts; but rather each part of the definition expresses the whole essence of the thing, although less distinctly than the [whole]

definition itself. For a genus and a difference, even though they are parts of the definition, do not signify parts of the thing defined, but rather the whole thing in a confused and incomplete concept.¹²⁰

Some think that Aristotle is speaking only about natural and composite things, and that in these his statement is universally true—for the reason that to the genus there corresponds a generic form and to the difference there corresponds a specific form, which forms are distinct. But this reply first supposes a false opinion about a plurality of forms following the order of essential predicates—which opinion we have disproven in Disputation 15.¹²¹ Then besides it is against both the simple and the common mean-ing of Aristotle’s words.

Therefore, the Philosopher can be interpreted in two ways. First, that he is speaking only by a proportional comparison and not in an absolute way, but with a proportioned distribution. For he wants the parts of the definition to keep among themselves that proportion which the parts of the thing have with one another and with the whole. This is not because it is necessary that every defined thing have parts, but because the comparison is made to that [kind of thing] which has parts. But the proportion consists in this that the parts of the definition are compared, like the parts of the thing, as potency and act.

The second interpretation is that parts of a thing may be said to be either physical parts, if the thing is physically and properly composed, to which the parts of the definition correspond, whether really (secundum rem), if the definition is given in a physical way, or according to proportion or imitation, if the definition is proper and metaphysical: through a proper genus and difference. Or more broadly, parts of a thing may be those metaphysical grades precisely conceived which are indicated through the genus and difference as they are parts of the definition.

Question 4. The fourth and principal question with regard to this Chapter is: whether matter is a part of the quiddity of a material substance? And, consequently, whether matter is to be placed in the definition of such things? The first question is explicitly treated in Disputation 36, Section 2,¹²² where with Aristotle¹²³ and St. Thomas¹²⁴ we embrace the affirmative

Metaphysics Book VII 133 position. From this it follows that in a quidditative definition of material substances matter is placed not as something added, for this is outside the perfection and nature of a complete substance, but as an existing part of the intrinsic essence of such things. But matter is placed in such a definition, either explicitly, if the definition is given in a physical way, as when man is said to consist of body and soul, or implicitly, as included in a metaphysical genus, as when man is called a rational animal. Finally, matter is placed in a definition according to some universal character, and not as designated matter (materia signata), for this is proper to individu-als, as Aristotle teaches here, and as St. Thomas¹²⁵ and others explain at length.

Question 5. From this there arises a fifth question: whether something singular is definable as it is singular, and consequently whether designated matter (materia signata) can be placed in its definition. But the question concerns a singular, not as such (in actu signato), if I may say it so, that is:

as concerns the common character of singularity.¹²⁶ For when it is taken in this manner there is already something common which can be defined in its own way, just like person, supposit, and other things of this nature.

But the question concerns an actually existing (exercito), if I may speak thus, singular. And in this way Aristotle here, in Text 35,¹²⁷ denies that a singular is defined. For in this way he denies that designated matter is placed in a definition. He has the same opinion below in Chapter 15, Text 53;¹²⁸ and above in Chapter 4, Text 13,¹²⁹ he said that only a species can be properly defined. And in the Posterior Analytics, Book 1, Chapter 7,¹³⁰ he says that there is neither a science nor a definition of individuals. In that place this matter is treated explicitly.

But there is a problem as to why an individual cannot be defined, since it can be resolved into two concepts, namely, into the concept of the spe-cies and that of a proper individual difference. For what certain people say¹³¹—that an individual does not have a proper individual difference but only an individual accident—is false, as is clear from what we have said in Disputation 5.¹³² Moreover, there is science¹³³ about eternal individuals, for example, about God or an angel (for Aristotle denied this only about material individuals). Why, therefore, can there not be a proper definition of those same individuals? But if there can be such a definition of these, there will also be such of others as they are abstracted from time and from actual existence. Because of this there are some who think that a singular thing is definable of itself and from its nature, however it is not defined by us because we do not apprehend its proper difference.

But I think the question is purely verbal, and that Aristotle’s speech is more correct just as it is more accepted.¹³⁴ For a properly enunciated definition explains the essence of a thing. Hence, just as an individual does not have another essence apart from the essence of its species, so neither is it thought to have another proper definition. Likewise, the con-traction of a species to an individual is as it were material in the concept of such an entity. And therefore, that which an individual adds beyond /p. XXXVII/ a species is not so much explained by its proper definition as by an application of an essential definition to this entity. Therefore, properly there is defined a species, which consists of a genus and essential difference. But the highest genus and individuals do not have in this way a proper definition, even though they can be in some way described and explained. But the fact that there is neither science nor demonstration about singular things must be understood in almost the same way. For about these as they are such only contingent and mutable things are known.

But if some necessary things appear to be demonstrated, that is always by virtue of some universal middle term; and in this way it is an application of a universal science to a particular thing rather than a proper science of particulars. This is perhaps true in the case of all created things, because nothing is essentially singular except for God about Whom there can be a most perfect science. And this is particularly so with regard to human science, for angelic science is of another character through its intuition of singular things as they are in themselves.¹³⁵

Question 6. Again, it can be asked here: whether the parts of the thing defined are prior to that thing itself which is defined? Again, whether it is always permitted to put a definition in place of a part of that definition?

Question 7. Aristotle seems to propose these questions here. And indeed he treats the first more explicitly and in sum he answers: formal parts are prior but material parts are not. But by formal parts he understands those which are taken from the form as such, or which formally correspond to that, or finally which are taken equally as universal and defined as that. Hence by material parts he understands individuals or all those which contract the essence (ratio) of the thing defined to a particular matter which it does not by virtue of its own formal nature require, as for example, in the case of a sphere that it be [made of ] brass. However, formal parts are said to be prior to the thing defined by a certain priority of nature or of causality, sometimes also by an order of subsisting¹³⁶—although not always, because sometimes just as a whole cannot be without these parts, conversely neither can the parts be outside the whole, as Aristotle has noted here.

Metaphysics Book VII 135 But about the second question Aristotle says almost nothing, and its resolution can be taken from what was noted above, in Chapter 4. For if that which is put in a definition is truly essential and has its own proper definition, nothing impedes that it be posited in place of its definition.

For in this way since man is defined as a rational animal he is rightly said to be a living sensible rational thing. Indeed, in this way the definition is more distinct. But if a part of a definition is so simple that it does not have a definition it is not necessary in place of that part to posit its de-scription, as is clear in the case of the highest genera and differences—and for this reason transcendentals are not posited in definitions. Likewise, if that which is posited in a definition is not essential, but rather something added, the definition is not posited in its place, because [otherwise] there would often be committed a reduncancy (nugatio) or a vicious circle, as was said briefly in Chapter 4. And Aristotle himself should be understood in this way in Topics, Book 2, Chapter 2.¹³⁷

Chapter Eleven