Marcadores moleculares microsatélites (SSR) y microsatélites de

The developmental context of security sector reform (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004),also referred to as the development approach to security sector

reform (Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, 2012) or security as development (Francis, 2012) is mainly associated with the development community.

From the development point of view, SSR describes measures aimed at creating an effective and accountable security sector that contributes positively to sustainable peace and development (Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, 2012).

Despite the articulation of the nexus between security and development in the early 1980’s through the 1980 Brandt Report on International Development and the 1982 Palme Report on Disarmament and Security, it was not until after the Cold War ended that security was re-presented as a development problem (Luckham, 2007).This renewed interest in security-development nexus significantly shaped the SSR discourse.

During the Cold War, security was defined from military point of view, which meant protecting the state from any external aggression. Thus, aid to the security sector of allied developing countries was to the extent that security forces of such states were supplied with weapons and training.

This however disregarded the negative impact, be they political or economic, of the military assistance to such regions especially in terms of fomenting conflict. Thus, scholars started questioning such assistance to the ‘third world’ regimes that constituted a threat to the security of their citizens.

This perception therefore led to development theorists and critical security analysts beginning to address security-sector issues primarily through general critiques of the distribution of military aid and excessive defence expenditure. Security issues became ‘too important to be left to security specialists alone’ (Luckham, 2009, p.2). Bloated military sectors of such regimes were judged to have a negative impact on overall economic development (Cooper and Pugh, 2002). The underlying argument then was that a reduction in military expenditure in terms of reducing force levels and budgets, is both a ‘good thing’ in itself and, once effected, releases valuable resources for the on-going development of the country concerned (Williams, 2000).

However, in other instances, ill-conceived military restructuring bedevils political stability. Williams (2000) for example maintains that ill-conceived SSR is partly responsible for the many coup d’états in Africa in the 1990’s and argues that in some cases, disarmament in some states leaves the state with limited capacity to defend itself, as with the case of Eritrea against her neighbour Ethiopia.

The above arguments portray the nature and characteristic of security sector assistance during the Cold-War period as being mainly concerned with civil-military relations. Security assistance was highly politicised and based on ideological contours of the period. Military assistance was much concerned with the technical assistance and the overarching emphasis was on state security under strict management of highly skilled practitioners who had limited interactions with non-state actors.

The emergence of the civil society in the post-Cold-War period, and increasing interest in governance and accountability issues by bilateral donors, development agencies and international financial institutions introduced a paradigm shift in the understanding of development approach to security sector assistance. The concept of security widened with military restructuring being seen in terms of holistic defence management, while police reforms broadened to include the entire criminal justice system. This therefore gave rise to more engagement with security sector reform.

The boldest articulation and the push for security sector reform agenda into the international development scene came with the Department for International Development (DfID) Policy Paper on security sector reform.

The paper by Clare Short, the then British Secretary of State for International Development in March 1999 at Kings College, London, (Short, 2000) acknowledged that a reformed security sector can help to provide a safe and secure environment for poor people and communities.

This in turn promotes sustainable development. Where the security sector is unreformed, ill-disciplined and repressive it can be a major source of insecurity, perpetrating violence itself rather than protecting people from it.

With these proclamations, the SSR debates gained momentum. Clare Short (1997-2003), played a key role in promoting SSR concept during its formative stages and subsequent funding, dissemination and development. Her pronouncements were later to be reinforced in both policy and academic circles.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for example, in its ground breaking publication, Handbook on Security Sector Reform (OECD DAC, 2007), provided perhaps the best platform to articulate the developmental context of DfID security sector reform agenda. The dominant theme reigning in the book is that a coherent security sector is a function of economic progress. Benefits of greater security to the poor are repeatedly affirmed (Ryan, 2011).

In her speech to the Security Sector Reform and Military Expenditure Symposium in London, Short (2000) argued that whilst the underlying causes of conflicts remain complex and unique to different contexts, a common theme was the role of the security sector, which in most cases is negative and fuels conflict. Elements within the security sector can be a major source of insecurity and human rights abuse, with the potential of aggravating the social and political tensions within a society. These sentiments were later to be echoed by the World Bank President on the need to bring security and development together to break the cycles of fragility and violence affecting more than one billion people living countries affected by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence (Zoellick, 2008).

In academic circles, the push for security sector reform as a precondition for sustainable development received overwhelming attention.

Hendrickson (1999) for example, highlighted the role of the security sector in the public life of the world poorest countries. Ball (2001) proposed mainstreaming of security-sector reform as a development issue based on their comparative advantage of both the IMF and the World Bank.

In Africa, Policing in Africa (Francis, 2012) perhaps remains one of the boldest articulation of the link between policing (and police reform) and development in the post-Cold War period.²² Francis (2012) argues that the end of Cold War and neo-liberal globalisation sweeping across the continent had a profound impact on policing in Africa. There was reduction in donor support which affected resourcing and capacity building for police forces and policing institutions in weak state. This coupled with the impact of structural adjusted programmes left African police forces with limited capacities to ensure peace and public security that would spur development. Police reform therefore became a major issue amongst actors in development community.

Linking security-development debate to the Kenyan context, Kenya’s Vision 2030²³ acknowledges security as a critical ingredient for development. For this reason, there has been increased investment in reforms in security agencies through capacity building, improvement in operational logistics and improvement of welfare of personnel. However as will be discussed in subsequent sections of this thesis, these initiatives did not translate into improved provision of security and policing.

The involvement of the security agencies, particularly the police in post-election violence of 2007 was a costly affair for the country thus confirming the stated position at the beginning of the SSR debates, that of the security agencies being a source of insecurity and creating conditions not suitable for development to take place.²⁴ The post-election crisis resulted in substantial damage to Kenya’s social, infrastructural, institutional, and economic systems. During the period 2002-2007, Kenya’s real GDP had reached an all-time average of 5.4% (Kitiabi, 2011). This was reduced to a low of -0.4% in 2008 (Global Finance, 2015). Kenya’s key sectors including trade, tourism, agriculture and service industry suffered decline with the impact felt by the local people.²⁵

22 See also Hills (2000).

23 Kenya’s economic blueprint for economic development.

24 See; Short (2000) and OECD DAC (2007).

25 See; Ksoll, Macchiavello, & Morjaria (2009); Mueller (2008).