Correlación entre datos morfológicos y moleculares de los individuos de pino

The year 2002 was a watershed in Kenya’s reform trajectory. With Moi not eligible to run after twenty four years in office, Kenyans overwhelmingly elected Mwai Kibaki, defeating former president Moi’s preferred candidate Uhuru Kenyatta. During his inauguration, Kibaki announced that the ‘era of roadside policy declarations is gone’ and assured Kenyans he would ‘bring back the culture of due process, accountability and transparency in public office’ (GoK, 2002). With this declaration, there was ‘hope and great expectation in the security sector that KPF would among other things be reformed and professionalized to be able to deliver efficient and productive policing’ (Omeje and Githigaro, 2012, p.65).

The government initiated the donor funded sector wide reform initiative under GJLOS, which was the most ‘extensive SSR process that targeted the Kenya Police in particular’ (ICTJ-Kenya, 2010, p.1). A taskforce on

police reform was set up in 2004, and parliament changed the law so that only confessions made in court were admissible, to reduce the use of torture to extract confessions (Hornsby, 2012, p.714). The goal of the police reform process was to transform the institution into an effective, efficient, human rights-compliant, people-oriented, and accountable institution (ICTJ-Kenya, 2010). The reform prioritised the improvement of policing and security as fundamental prerequisites of economic growth. This was also articulated in Kenya’s Economic Recovery and Wealth Creation Strategy (2003), and later Vision 203053 which considered security as a foundation of the pillars of the vision. As a result, there was a relative increase in police funding to improve their terms of service and operational capacity. Community policing which sought to include the public in local policing was also given prominence.

Whilst there seemed to be some accountability in the security sector compared to Moi’s tenure, the NARC dream did not last long. Internal problems due to perception that Kibaki did not honour a pre-election MoU with Raila Odinga impacted negatively on the reform process.54 ‘Some appeared to believe that their preferment owed as much to Odinga as Kibaki’ (Hornsby, 2012, p.712), while Kibaki systematically consolidated power through a political elite from Gema communities, more often described as the ‘Mount Kenya Mafia’ (Hornsby, 2012).

The sacking of the then police chief perhaps signalled earlier attempts by Kibaki to consolidate control of the police. After serving for only a year, Edwin Nyaseda, perceived to be a close ally of Raila Odinga, was sacked after ‘he provided state security for Odinga during a mixed official and political visit to the Coast’ (Hornsby, 2012, p.712). By 2006, the Gema communities took control of the entire internal security; the permanent secretary for internal security, the CID director, GSU commandant , Presidential Escort and NSIS heads, previously held by the Kalenjin, – all Kalenjin in 2002-were all Kikuyu, Embu and Meru’ (Hornsby, 2012,

53 _{This is Kenya’s economic blueprint for economic development.} 54

In the run-up to 2002 election, various parties under the banner National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) entered into a memorandum of understanding in which the position of executive prime minister would be created for Raila Odinga.

p.713). Notably, during Kibaki’s entire tenure, all the four CID directors were from Kikuyu community. The military too underwent reshuffles with the overall effect ‘to retire or side-line the most senior Kalenjin and Luo and increase Kikuyu (and Kamba) representation’ (Hornsby, 2012, p.713). The judiciary too underwent what became known as ‘radical surgery’. The then Chief Justice Bernard Chunga, a Luo, resigned and was replaced by Evan Gicheru, a Kikuyu. In October 2003, the state suspended from office 23 judges and 82 magistrates, nearly half of the judiciary, following investigations by Aaron Ringera (Meru) that made shocking allegations of illegal and unethical behaviour (Hornsby, 2012, p.705). While judicial reform was one of the most notable achievements of the NARC government during the formative stages, ‘there were allegations of politicisation and tribalism in the appointment of NARC-era judges as well (Hornsby, 2012, p.705). The above developments in relation to SSR that emerged during Kibaki’s’ first term indicate a systematic de- kalenjinisation55 of the security sector and the entrenchment of members of Gema community in public service. By the year 2007, ethnic composition of Kenya’s public institutions supported the allegations of tribalism with key institutions notably finance and security dominated by members of president Kibaki’s Gema communities.56

Whilst Kibaki’s first term succeeded in exposing blatant disregard for the rule of law during the Moi regime, evidence from the literature indicates that nothing much changed. The security system failed to address the security challenges and was also accused of complicity in crime, and in particular the 2007 post-election violence, thus raising questions about commitment to reforms (Manby, 2008).

The trajectory of reform processes in Kenya prior to the 2007 general election reveal different reform contexts discussed in Section 2.3. The period under Moi was characterised by authoritarianism in which the police and the judiciary were used to silence those critical of Moi’s

55

See; (Hornsby, 2012).

government. During this period, ‘the image and reputation of the police was at its lowest ebb in the post-independence history’ (Omeje and Githigaro, 2012, p.65). President Kibaki’s first term mimics developmental context with the realisation that security was vital for development hence inclusion of security as a pillar of Vision 2030. In fact, ‘Kenya’s economy is yet to recover from the slump that followed the disputed 2007 elections, with economic growth dropping from 7.1 per cent in 2007 to 1.5 per cent in 2008’ (Karambu, 2012). There was increased investment in reforms in security agencies through capacity building, improvement in operational logistics and improvement of welfare of personnel.

While the reform processes that emerged during the period 2003-2007 were fairly impressive, vested political interests undermined the police and justice system, thus facilitating the on-set of the post-election conflict in Kenya (ICPC, 2011). These developments raise questions about the responsiveness of the reform processes to policing and public security needs and whether the reform processes that emerged during Kibaki’s first term were founded on solid base that would guarantee security and safety of Kenyan citizens. Again, how did the political dalliance with the security sector during Moi and Kibaki’s first term affect the police reform processes that emerged in the immediate post 2007 election violence period to date? These questions are addressed in Chapter 3.