Antecedentes

As of September 2012, the AAF was rated as CM-4 (exists but cannot accomplish its mission) because not all manpower billets are sourced, and the airmen filling current billets often lack appropriate training. Kabul Air Wing is still awaiting its programmed allocation of aircraft. Currently, Kabul aircraft include 16 G222, 17 Mi-17s, and seven Mi-35s. As part of this fleet, Kabul Air Wing also hosts the Presidential airlift, which will consist of three Mi-17s and two G222 dedicated aircraft.

Kandahar Air Wing is assessed as CM-4, due to the absence of all programmed mission aircraft (Mi-17s, G222s, LAS, and C-208s). Additionally, the wing lacks manpower and training, which will follow once it begins to receive additional mission aircraft. Kandahar currently has five of the planned 13 Mi-17s. NTM-A continues to evaluate whether to locate four G222s in Kandahar should the final four G222s be delivered to Afghanistan. Kandahar will also receive the C-208 light lift aircraft as deliveries continue through December 2012.

Although Shindand Air Wing is assessed as CM-4, it has continued to mature as the AAF’s training wing. During the reporting period, Shindand began initial pilot training with newly delivered C-182, C-208, and MD-530 training aircraft. Additionally, the AAF’s English Language Training immersion program, “Thunder Lab,” was moved to Shindand Air Base.

2.6:

A

N

P

C

G

As with the ANA, the ANP continued to make steady progress, increasing in size and capability during the reporting period. The ANP’s growing operational effectiveness was demonstrated in an increase in capability ratings during the reporting period. Although progress was not uniform across all sections of the ANP, some units, such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), are now highly effective, frequently partnering with ISAF forces in successful operations. Progress has been less rapid in other areas, such as the development of ANP logistics capabilities, and the development of the Afghan Border Police. The ANP remain significantly behind their ANA counterparts in developing the capabilities necessary to transfer to full Afghan lead by the end of 2014.

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MANNING

The current approved end-strength for the ANP is 157,000 personnel, which they are currently estimated to reach by February 2013. This figure represents the projected requirement to support transition to Afghan security lead.

As of the end of the reporting period, the overall ANP force level reached 147,158 personnel, a decrease of 2,484 from the force level in March 2012. This force includes 24,566 officers, 43,632 non-commissioned officers, 74,956 patrolmen, and 4,004 initial entry trainees.

Figure 15: ANP End-Strength, Attrition, Recruiting, Retention, and Goal

Source: NTM-A DCOM-P/ACG-PD. Data Period: Solar Month September, Aug 22 - Sep 21.

The ANP did not meet its end-strength growth targets this reporting period, finishing 8,548 below the target goal of 155,706. Earlier this year, the ANP were recruiting at a pace to achieve the October objective ahead of schedule. However, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) ceased recruiting during April 2012 to focus on rebalancing ANP assets. The ANP had more low-level recruits than necessary at the time, but was facing a shortage of officers and NCOs. The MoI

-3,000 -2,000 -1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 110,000 120,000 130,000 140,000 150,000 160,000

Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12

A tt rit io n, R e c rui ting, a nd R e te nt io n En d- s tr e ng th

Actual Attrition Recruiting Retention Goal

Month/Year Se p-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 De c-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12 End-strength 136,122 139,070 140,596 143,797 145,577 148,932 149,642 149,208 144,182 146,641 147,912 146,339 147,158

Attrition -1,939 -2,452 -1,773 -1,895 -1,338 -1,608 -894 -1,747 -1,400 -1,691 -1,538 -1,980 -1,594

Recruiting 2,908 4,091 3,135 2,778 2,735 2,801 2,171 0 464 2,100 2,357 1,016 2,458

Retention 117 140 66 135 207 164 154 320 372 213 316 87 136

Goal 136,708 139,159 141,610 144,061 145,355 146,649 147,943 149,237 150,531 151,824 153,118 154,412 155,706

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opted to pause input of new (and mostly low-level) recruits to focus on ensuring that officers and NCOs were serving in actual officer and NCO billets, as well as to effect the reassignment of personnel from over-strength units to under-strength units. The MoI also used the recruiting pause to improve overall force quality by using training capacity to provide NCO training for promotable patrolmen and to train untrained patrolmen. Although this pause will slightly delay ANP from meeting its end-state force growth goal, NTM-A sees this as a positive sign of the MoI’s increasing independence and ability to assess its own recruiting needs accurately.

As a result of the pause, the ANP did not recruit any personnel in April and recruited only 464 in May, after resuming recruitment late in the month. The ANP General Recruiting Command (ANPGRC) recruited 7,931 police during the last four months. NTM-A and MoI have implemented a plan to mitigate the shortfall and are focused on meeting the end-strength goal by February 2013.

As part of the rebalancing of the force, the ANP were able to remove 3,400 personnel from over-

tashkil positions and began assigning them to units where they were needed. The recruiting pause also enabled untrained patrolmen to receive formal police training. There had been success in recruiting for direct entry NCO courses, but almost no success in reducing recruiting of untrained patrolmen until the recent recruiting freeze. NTM-A leadership continues to engage and assist the MoI to overcome the issues of untrained patrolmen and low NCO numbers.

The ANP generally reflects the ethnic make-up of local communities, as personnel typically serve in the area where they join the force. However, when aggregated at the national level, Tajiks are significantly overrepresented in the force and Pashtuns are represented equivalent to the Afghan population, but Hazara, Uzbeks, and other ethnic groups are underrepresented to varying degrees.

Attrition25 in the ANP remained relatively steady during the reporting period, averaging 1.1 percent, consistent with the goal of 1.4 percent.

FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING

As of September 2012, the shortfall of NCOs in the ANP was approximately 9,464. However, due to the increased NCO training capacity resulting from the recruitment pause, the ANP added 3,341 NCOs since the beginning of the reporting period.

The training base capacity of NTM-A and the German Police Project Team (GPPT) has decreased as a result of the closure of temporary training sites at Mazar-e Sharif, Shouz, and Sheberghan. These sites were closed as part of the overall Transition plan that will consolidate the number of training sites from 30 to 13 by December 2014. National Police Training Center Wardak has expanded to its 3,000-man training capacity. ANP Training General Command and NTM-A are working to ensure that throughput is improved as soon as possible. The total

25

At the end of February, the ANP began reporting attrition as only unanticipated losses to the ANP. "Dropped From Rolls" (DFR) and "Other" have replaced "AWOL" and "WIA" as counting toward attrition. "Other" are members who have left the ANP because they disappeared, were captured, or were transferred to other ANSF units. Source: ANP HRD Date: 7 May 2012

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number of ANP patrolmen, NCO, and officer graduates from initial pillar training for the reporting period was 19,433.

The key to the ANP’s professional sustainability following the 2014 transition is an enduring and effective training management capability. The ANP Training General Command (ANPTGC) continues to assume increasing control of training issues, with emphasis on “Reform Training” for untrained patrolmen, recruiting for direct NCO (“Satanman”) training (expected to start early September), and the transition of the training system to Afghan control. The transition of course- scheduling continues, and ANP ownership will be in-place to enable the ANPTGC to design, deliver, and implement the next 12-month iteration of the course tracker from January to December 2013. Furthermore, ANPTGC has taken the initiative to assist training the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). APPF training is running at three sites, with more being scheduled as capacity is identified.

The training priority over the coming months will focus on supporting training for promotable patrolmen, replacing losses due to attrition, and shifting the focus of the ANP from COIN missions to a rule-of-law-based police force.

Part of this effort includes planning for a class of 400-500 training instructors who will augment the decentralized Permanent Training Teams, Zone Training Teams, and Provincial Training Companies. These training units will provide the quality training needed to transform the ANP from a COIN-focused security force to one capable of investigating and deterring crimes. ANP’s goal is to have an additional 861 instructors trained and certified by the end of 2012.

Total training attrition for Solar Month September was 5.9 percent, which was an increase from last month's attrition rate. Reasons for attrition include academic failure, drug use, discipline, and voluntary withdrawal. The variation in these figures is consistent with previous reporting periods.

Table 2: ANP Trainee Attrition

Course Arrived Trainees

Graduated Attrition * Attrition %

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) Basic 926 919 7 0.8%

AUP NCO 364 315 49 13.5%

Afghan National Civil Order Police

(ANCOP) NCO 28 27 1 3.6%

Afghan Border Police (ABP) Basic 227 184 43 18.9%

ABP NCO 0 0 0 0.0%

Specialist Courses 448 427 21 4.7%

OCS Courses 70 69 1 1.4%

Total * 2,063 1,941 122 5.9%

*Trainee Attrition is calculated on a monthly basis by subtracting the number graduated from the number arrived. The attrition rate is calculated by dividing attrition by the number arrived.

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EQUIPPING

The ANP remains under-equipped as a result of fielding challenges, including battle loss replacement needs and the closure of Pakistani GLOCs earlier this year. Distribution of vehicles in particular was slowed by the GLOC closures. To mitigate the border closure situation, many vehicles en-route to Pakistan, or planned for the Pakistan GLOC, were rerouted via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). This route was able to deliver some vehicles and equipment, but at considerably less volume than the Pakistan GLOC or Karachi port. The re-opening of the Pakistan GLOC has increased on-hand quantities and ability to complete fielding of the ANP. Light Tactical Vehicles (LTVs), Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs), and other non-tactical rolling stock are still arriving via the Trans-Siberian Railway or the NDN. Up-Armored (UA) HMMWVs remain the top priority item to field once the vehicles arrive in country from Pakistan. Security along the GLOC remains an issue and has impacted the amount of material crossing the border. Weapons and communication equipment fielding has continued since the reopening of the GLOCs without unexpected delays.

CSTC-A was able to procure and deliver to Afghanistan high quantities of the required ANP equipment. Of the three main categories of equipment required by the ANP (“shoot”, “move”, and “communicate”), CSTC-A has been able to deliver to Afghanistan 99 percent of “shoot” equipment, 77 percent of “move” equipment, and 108 percent of “communicate” equipment. However, much like the situation with ANA equipment, problems arise when delivering the equipment from national (and largely ISAF-run) depots to smaller regional depots and to the units themselves. When equipment is fielded to the ANP, either staged by local pickup in Kabul or a convoy, CSTC-A has little oversight over the ultimate destination and unit receiving the equipment. Diversion of equipment from its intended unit as stated on the CSTC-A issuing order has occurred, although the exact rate of equipment diversion remains unknown. Often, far more equipment than necessary is delivered to one unit at the expense of others, giving rise to a situation in which some units are over-equipped while others are under equipped. In addition to diverted equipment, damaged equipment is often not reported by the units. This causes lower “on-hand” numbers at the unit level than what is documented as the quantity fielded.

Night-vision devices (NVDs) and other high-end equipment continued to be issued to ANP Special Forces, dramatically increasing the capability to conduct high-risk counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions. Sensitive items such as NVDs require monthly inventory. The ANP also has a monthly inventory requirement for a variety of explosive ordinance device/counter- IED, personnel protection, and specialty/tool items and equipment. ISAF is assessing the accuracy of multiple inventory records to gain better accountability of on-hand equipment numbers in all ANP pillars. Fielding of equipment to the ANP will continue, with a goal of on- hand quantities at 95 percent by September 2013.