Variables Económicas Negativas de los países que integran

The MoD and the General Staff (GS) have made steady progress during the reporting period. In August and September development within the MoD and GS was delayed due to the removal of Minister of Defense Wardak and his replacement with Bismillah Khan Mohammadi. The First Deputy Minister, however, filled in as Acting Minister to ensure continuity during the transition. The follow-on effects of this transition remain unclear. The MoD and GS face a number of persistent challenges. Nonetheless, progress is being made in all of these areas, and the MoD remains one of the most capable parts of the Afghan government.

The MoD and GS have been expanding their capabilities along several lines of operation simultaneously, having overseen the rapid expansion of the ANA in both size and capabilities

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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

CM-1A Capable of autonomous operations.

CM-1B Capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only. CM-2A Capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance;

only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered. CM-2B Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.

CM-3 Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.

CM-4 Department or instutition exists but cannot accomplish its mission.

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over several years. As the ANA nears its targeted surge end-strength, focus is shifting toward institutional, enabler, and logistical development. The timetable for reaching full autonomy from Coalition advising is slower than initially expected due to challenges in several cross-cutting functions, such as human resource management, life support, intelligence, infrastructure, logistics, and contract management. Additionally, the MoD and GS face a shortage of qualified and experienced advisors: currently 27 percent of advisor positions within DCOM Army are unfilled.

The MoD and GS have made impressive progress in their ability to plan operations, which is an exceptionally difficult task even in Western defense ministries. However, the ability of these ministries to actually implement operational plans is still developing. The MoD, like many Afghan government institutions, lacks sufficient trained, educated, and professional staff in order to plan and execute operations at a requisite pace. The MoD is capable of deploying forces, but is deficient in its ability to ensure that those fielded forces are physically issued with equipment that has been provided by NTM-A. In many cases the equipment is in depots and not in the hands of the soldiers who require it. The ability to collect, share, and act on intelligence at the ministerial level is being developed; an assessment of this ability is not possible at this time, however. As a general rule, the various departments within MoD and the GS function well internally (although some departments, such as Counter-IED operations, continue to face challenges); however, their interaction and coordination with other departments requires improvement. Reflective of a problem common to many ministries of defense, internal stove- piping of information and a lack of staff interaction between departments hampers the maturing of the MoD and GS.

Due to the high pace of ANA expansion, the MoD and GS often do not have sufficient time to examine issues and develop coordinated, cross-functional solutions. Structurally, the Afghan military is not a mirror image of Coalition militaries, and the Afghans are, with ISAF support, developing their own strategies, policies, and procedures to address these issues. Afghan solutions to these issues will not replicate NATO or other Coalition’s procedures, and western standards should not used as benchmarks to gauge Afghan progress. It is assessed that the MoD and GS will require Ministerial Advisory Group (MAG) assistance until mid-2014.

The MoD is also actively involved in supporting the Transition process. The MoD works closely with ISAF on base closure and transfer, training infrastructure transfer, procurement responsibility, and the transfer of logistics and supply management. Although it is a slow and unwieldy process, ISAF and the MoD are moving forward on the transfer of logistics responsibilities, and have already transitioned Class I and Class II supplies to the Afghans. Planning for the transition of Class III Fuel is ongoing, although it is being done slowly and deliberately due to the increased potential for corruption in this class. MoD is now responsible for procurement of all Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE) for the ANA and is beginning to contract for base services such as facility maintenance and repair. The ANSF does possess the capability to contract; this capacity has not been fully developed across all commodity areas, however, but is being addressed. The MoD is challenged with budget execution and transparency in its procurement processes, and still requires advisor oversight.

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Full transition of most MoD offices and functions to CM-1A (“Capable of autonomous operations”) is not expected before mid-2014. However, given the recent replacement of the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and the unknown follow-on effects, it is highly likely that progression to higher CM ratings will be subject to further delays.

Figure 9: Ministry of Defense and General Staff CM Ratings and CM-1B Projections

*CM Date is the projected advisor-recommended transition probationary period.

The NTM-A Ministerial Development Board (MDB) assesses the Ministry of Defense & General Staff quarterly. Departments or offices highlighted in purple are MoD, highlighted in blue are GS, and those in white are Cross Functional Areas (CFAs)

Source: NTM-A. Date: September 30, 2012.