The concept of consociational democracy introduced by Lijphat (1968; 1969; 2003) suggests that cooperation between elites from different ethnic groups that transcend cleavages at a mass level is a prerequisite to the establishment of a grand coalition to govern the country. Lijphat noted that the key element of consociational democracy is elite cooperation because it is “a government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (2003, p. 143). For this reason, he stressed that the key principle of consociational democracy is the need for the creation of a ‘grand coalition’ among the elites of all segments of society, the establishment of mutual veto2, the application of proportionality-based
representation within the grand coalition, and creation of segmental autonomy3. Through the implementation of these key elements, it was expected that all ethnic groups in the society including the minorities would always have representatives in
2 The concept of mutual veto here refers to the consensus among the groups on the majority rule
principle.
3 The concept of segmental autonomy here refers to need of creating a sense of individuality and
allows for different culturally based law.
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the grand coalition. Such representation, however, is always based on the population composition, in a way that the percentage of representation in the state political system and public sector employments mirrors the group’s percentage in the entire society. At the same time, any decision made by the elite representative of each group is based on the compromise or negotiation process among the elites as a way to defuse any inter-groups conflict because the interests of all citizens are protected within a peaceful framework.
Therefore, scholars commonly describe states formed through consociational democracy as the product of growing concern among the elites within the country of the challenge of critical society fracture. Lehmbruch (2003), for example, argues that the consociational state is a state formed following the growing concern among the political elites of the challenge of strong sub-cultural segmentation. For this reason, many social scientists, especially the supporters of consociationalism such as McGarry and O’Leary (2006), argue that consociational power sharing is the most realistic option for a plural society as it can prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating. With the consociational focus on power sharing at the elite level, I argue that class hostilities may eventually become more important than ethnic hostilities when consociationalism is used as a mechanism for state formation. This is because the elites’s determination to protect their class interests as an elite within the state by maintaining the balances of power and managing conflicts often made the elites cooperate to ensure that ethnic cleavage remained the focus. But this often rebounded on them as animosity against them as an elite class.
The growing determination among the elites to protect their class interests, Mahmudat (2010) argues, results in the intensification of ethnic manipulative
activities by the elites for their political benefits. I argue that this phenomenon is a direct result of a state formation using consociationalism principles as it requires each ethnic group to be represented by an ethnically based party, and these political parties usually form a post-electoral governing coalition of all ethnic antagonists (Horowitz, 2014) based on the principles of proportional representation and ordinary majority rule. Under these principles the ethnic party with the most number of seats is entitled to govern the country (Halim & Yusof, 2008) or in other words, to control the state. Most importantly, this system also allocates the posts of Prime Minister and most of the ministries to the elite of a political party representing the ethnic group that constitutes the majority of the country’s population. The political outcome of these principles is that the governing political elites are increasingly interested in manipulating social divisions for their political benefits through an election and thus ensure the state’s commitment to preserve social harmony and provide transparent governance. Significantly such elements provide the governing political elites with the opportunity to maintain power through the manipulation of an ethnic cleavage and at the same time deny the rights of others to rule the country because those others do not prevent, but rather encourage the governing political elites in manipulating the social cleavage. Therefore, despite Lijphat’s (1968) conviction that such a system can prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating, I would rather describe consociational democracy as a system that is always inclined to allow the governing political elites to use ethnicity as their tool to maximize tenure in office.
Consociationalism in Lebanon4, for example, has made the governing political elites from both Christian and Muslim groups become more interested in using social
4 The consociational power sharing mechanism in Lebanon has been implemented through ‘1943
provision of the Lebanese National Covenant’.
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division for their political interests. This phenomenon emerged because the 1943 provision of the Lebanese National Covenant (Al-Mithaq Al-Watani) prioritized the political elites from the ethnic majority governing the country. The Al-Mithaq Al-
Watani set out the principles of Lebanese state formation that gave a slight advantage
in government to the Christian groups, in particular, the Maronites, over the Muslim components of Lebanese society. Specifically, the presidency was always allocated to a Christian Maronite due to a population census conducted in 1962 that recorded a slight majority of Christian Maronites (Salamey, 2009). The implementation of Al-
Mithaq Al-Watani has been a self-perpetuating capture of the state politics by
sectarian governing political elites using social cleavage or ethnic boundaries for their electoral victory but it lacks national accountability and undermines government commitment to the public good. This shows that the implementation of consociationalism in state formation in this particular country has made governing political elites from different ethnic groups more inclined to use ethnicity as a source to secure electoral victory by giving them the opportunity to retain office and control the state.
Using ethnicity as a tool to secure electoral victory in turn has led to the strengthening of existing ethnic hostilities within the country. In Rwanda, for example, the governing political elites’ determination in utilising ethnicity to gain electoral office acquired through consociational mechanism led to the hardening of ethnic conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. This ethnic conflict resulted in the deaths of 800,000 people between 1990 and 1994 (Payam, 1996; Romeo, 2005). In the light of Rwanda’s experience, in some countries such as Kenya the masses became more supportive of political actors who strongly rejected the idea of
mobilizing political support using ethnicity as a way of preventing what had happened in Rwanda from taking place in their country.
Nevertheless, the growing political support from the masses for political actors who oppose the idea of ethnic politicisation often leads to the decline in the significance of ethnicity in politics, and thus exposes the governing political elites to the possibility of losing power. I argue that when such a situation arises, the governing political elites are inclined to do whatever they can to maintain office through the formation or strengthening of existing federations. For example, in order to maintain its political dominance, the ruling Kenyan Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Raila Odinga in 2010 decided to strengthen the White-African created federation by redrafting the Kenyan Constitution. The constitution amendment proposal was aimed at the creation of a more decentralized political system through the removal of a total political power from the hand of the President following the death of over 1000 Africans who were pushed off their land by the existing president (McKenzie, 2010). Under this newly amended constitution Raila Odinga managed to retain office as the Prime Minister of Kenya. His success in retaining power was the result of strong political support from the various tribes such as the Kalanjin and Samburu who had sought change in the way the government treated them in terms of land ownership. This then suggests that the strengthening of federation tends to contribute to the success of ruling elites’ efforts to retain power.
The success of the white-only Federal-Independent Party (FIP) to maintain power in the pre-independence Kenya also demonstrates the importance of a federation for the political survival of ruling elites. In this respect, the White African political dominance in Kenya through its principal objective, of protecting the ‘White
Highlands’ (Ajulu, 2002) decided to establish the Kenya federation in 1954. This newly created federation comprised of several provinces, except the Nairobi province. Each province covered several countries but the number of counties covered by each province varied. The Central province comprised of five counties (Nyandarua, Nyeri, Kirinyaga, Murang’a and Kiambu), the Coast province six counties (Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifili, Tana River, Lamu and Tata-Taveta), the Eastern province included eight counties (Marsabit, Isiolo, Meru, Tharaka-Nithi, Embu, Kitui, Machakos and Makueni), the North Eastern province three counties (Garissa, Wajir and Mandera) the Nyanza province six counties (Siaya, Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori, Kisii and Nyamira), the Rift Valley province fourteen counties (Turkana, West Pokot, Samburu, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Elyeyo-Marakwet, Nandi, Baringo, Laikipia, Nakuru, Narok, Kajiado, Kericho and Bomet), and the Western province four counties (Kakamega, Vihiga, Bungoma and Busia). With the creation of a federation, the FIP later transformed into the Progressive Local Government Party (PLGP) and quickly gained control over Kenya’s politics through the strengthened support from the local government.
In order to gain strong support from the local government usually dominated by the local tribes, the PLGP decided to impose a new legislation on land tenure. Under this legislation, the tribes who tended to oppose the PLGP were dispossessed of their land and were confined to reservation areas. As a result, many tribes such as the Kikuyu lost their land, while the tribes with leaders who tended to support the PLGP such as the tribes of Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana, Giriama and Samburu were given the opportunity to remain in their land. This was the policy imposed by the Kenyan president in 2010, which led to the death of more than 1000 people forced from their land.