LA CRISIS DE LA CULTURA POLÍTICA EN LA PROBLEMÁTICA INTERNACIONAL
I. 1 COMPONENTES DE LA CRISIS DE LA CULTURA POLÍTICA
The need to ensure Malay elites’ political supremacy led to growing ethno- nationalism among them, and this made ethnicity a factor in the political activities of pre-independent Malaya. Ethnic consciousness among the Malays was largely a defence mechanism that emerged when the Malay elites began questioning the colonial administrative practice in Malaya. As explained earlier, it was the marginalization of Malay rulers, a symbol of Malay-Muslim political supremacy, that provoked Malay leaders to criticize the British and consolidate their political power. The Malay perjuangan (struggle) to reinforce, and thereafter maintain Malay political supremacy began by their rejection of British’s post-World War II (WWII) Malayan Union (MU) proposal that conferred equal citizenship rights to all Malayans regardless of whether they were Malays, Chinese or Indians. Under this citizenship proposal, all the immigrants were to be automatically granted citizenship. This was quickly described by the Malay elites as an attempt to erode their superiority. This unhappiness led to political mobilization among the Malay masses and culminated in the founding of United Malays National Organization (UMNO), a Malay-based political party.
UMNO symbolized Malay nationalism and its establishment was widely regarded by scholars as a result of the Japanese occupation in Malay. Wahid (1970), for example, argued that the development of Malay nationalism was encouraged by the Japanese.
The Japanese occupation of Malaya during WWII (1941-1945) ended British political and economic domination in this region. This was an indication to the Malays that the British were not invincible. As Wahid (1983) and Shaffer (1982) observed the Japanese army destroyed the myth of British and ‘White’ invincibility. Moreover, the Japanese rule largely favored the Malays over other ethnic groups. In this respect, although the Malay states’ autonomy ended as they came under the control of Japanese emperor, the treatment of Malay rulers improved tremendously after the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki to Malaya in July 1943. Tojo praised the Malay traditional leaders and in the Niponisation of Malay society appointed the Malay ruler as the Vice-President of the new state advisory council, a council that was intentionally created by the Japanese administration to give voice to local opinion on state matters. The advisory council was set up to seek the Malay rulers’ support towards creating the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daito
Kyoeiken) free of Western powers and their influence.
The Japanese also decided to implement a pro-Malay civil service. This meant a large number of non-Malays who employed by the British as it civil servants were replaced with Malays13. The Malay masses who benefited very little under the previous administration (British) were also encouraged by the Japanese to become administrators. Following this, the Malay officials increased rapidly and it was the first time Malays were given administrative role by an expatriate power in the government of the day. Moreover, in the 1943 Islamic Conference, a conference initiated by the Japanese authority, the position of Islam improved through the recognition of Pacific War as a jihad or the Islamic holy war (Suwannathat-Pian,
13 During WWII, the non-Malays, in particular the Chinese were discriminated by the Japanese. It was
because they supported the British to fight against Japanese as a directive from Chiang Kai-Shek, the Chinese President.
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2009). This inculcated the spirit of nationalism among the Malays because it was the first such recognition on the importance of Islam in Malayan states by the colonial power. The position of Islam was further enhanced by the reintroduction of religious school and the establishment of state religious council. Simultaneously, the opportunity to continue higher studies in Japan was given to Malay youths which boosted their self-confidence. As a result, they begun to feel a sense of belonging and believed that they were the rightful owners of the country. It eventually enabled the Malays to stand up against post-war colonial power because the pro-Malay policy of the Japanese had unintentionally strengthened the Malays belief as the rightful owners of Malaya, sharing one language and one religion. This attitude led to the emergence of pro-self-government or nationalist sentiments among them.
However, this was short lived as in 1945, the British returned to Malaya after the defeat of the Japanese army in the hands of the Americans. This was viewed with alarm by the Malays and once again they felt threatened when the British colonial Office in London tried to gain full control of Malaya. This was seen as a great disaster mainly because it implied their loss of ethnic superiority. As a matter of fact, Braddell14, argued that some British officials reckoned that the Japanese occupation as “a God-sent chance to clear up all the country troubles” (as quoted in Ariffin, 2014, p. 2). It was because before the WWII the British have never gained full control of Malaya due to autonomy granted to Malay states. Thus, the Japanese occupation had created an opportunity for the returning British colonialist to gain full control of Malayan politics and economy effectively ending their autonomy. Though
14 Braddell R.S.J. was a prominent lawyer in Singapore (1880-1966), Chief Justice of the Federated
Malay States (1913-17) and the first attorney general of the Straits Settlements (1986-1982). He was also a joint editor and a contributor to Singapore’s centenary celebration publication, One Hundred Years of Singapore, as well as the author of numerous legal and historical publications (Jia & Ong, 2008).
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the Malays were given opportunity to work as administrators, as explained earlier, during the Japanese occupation any decision relating to state administration was subject to Japanese emperor’s approval and that the Malay administrators who included the Sultans have not say to such decisions. This therefore suggests that the Japanese occupation in Malaya have indeed reduced the autonomy of the Malayan states.
The returning British proposed the establishment of the Malayan Union (MU) in 1946 aimed at centralizing politics and public administration. Nevertheless, the return of British colonialist to Malaya through the introduction of Malayan Union (MU) in 1946 was regarded by the Malays as a means of returning to the pre-war era, a dark era for the Malays. The objective of MU was to gain full control of the Malayan politics and economy by transferring the sovereignty of the Sultans to the British Crown and confer equal citizenship rights to the non-Malays, a plan that effectively overturns any past privilege and protection given to the Malay race and religion (Hamid, 2007, p. 385). Therefore, the Malays perceived British MU as a threat to their position and political future (Arifin, 2014, p. 6), and the dignity of Islam and Muslims (Hamid 2007, p. 375). Rahim, Mustapha, Ahmad and Lyndon (2013) observed that this was because MU envisaged concentration of power under the hands of a central government15 but because the union was against Malay
interests. The union was perceived as favoring the Chinese and other non-Malays as the British believed that the non-Malays (Chinese and Indian) had remained loyal to the colonial power during WWII. During the Japanese occupation, the non-Malays were engaged in an armed battle against the Japanese through Malayan People Anti-
15 The Malayan Union main idea was to simplify the British-Malaya administration through the
incorporation of all Malay Peninsular states under a single, central government.
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Japanese Army (MPAJA) and Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as the Japanese
kempeitai16. Both MPAJA and MCP leaders then decided to co-operate with the
returning British and adopted a constitutional line of struggle (Yaakop, 2010, p. 46). In contrast, the British regarded the Malays as disloyal to the colonial power as they had strongly associated with the Japanese administration.
Moreover, the introduction of MU was actually in line with the non-Malay plea for equal rights. The non-Malays demanded the British administration recognize them as citizens and be given opportunity to serve in the public service like the Malays. They wanted to be given the same treatment as the Malays as they have sworn their allegiance to the Malay states. Thus, perhaps as to recognize the non-Malay and to punish the Malay for being pro-Japanese during WWII, the MU idea was first expressed on October 10th 1945 in a brief statement in London by the British (Yaakop, 2010, p. 49). The pro non-Malay policy of MU and the demand by the non- Malays for equality led to xenophobia among the Malays (Muhammad (2000) who looked it as a threat to their Malay supremacy.
This was aggravated by the dramatic increase in the number of non-Malay population in most of the Malay states (Muhammad, 2000, p. 50). For example, the 1931 population census showed the Chinese population in Selangor (45.3%) was twice that of the Malays (23.1%) while in Perak, Malay accounted for only 35.6% of the population, while the Chinese made up 42.5% of the population (Muhammad, 2000, p. 50; Mustapha, 1999, p. 177). The Malays vehemently opposed the implementation of MU and demanded self-rule. This movement for self-rule that symbolized the beginning of Malay nationalist sentiment was initiated and led by
16Kempeitai is a Japanese word, to the military police, an arm of the Imperial Japanese Army. It was
largely regarded as a secret police and was not a conventional military police.
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Islamic-educated, Malay-educated and English-educated intellectuals and culminated in the founding of Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (Malay Nationalist Party, PKMM) in October 17th, 1945 (Soh, 2005, p. 13). This new political party was associated with Islam as the religious-educated intellectuals believed that it was vital for their struggle to create Indonesia Raya or Melayu Raya (independence of Malaya within greater Indonesia or greater Malaya), an independent movement which envisaged a political merger with Indonesia (Roff, 1970). The PKMM sought unity with Indonesia as the leaders believed the creation of a so-called Malay speaking world will strengthen Malaya and Indonesian resistance against colonialism and enable them to achieve independence early (Angus, 1973). Accordingly, the PKMM was instrumental in cultivating anti-British sentiments through publication of their journals such as Al-Iman, Neraca and Saudara and emphasizing unity among Muslims.
The intellectuals began campaigning against MU and demanded self-government by forming voluntary Malay Associations in various parts of the country such as Johor, Selangor and Melaka. The struggle of these associations therefore is centered on self- government and requesting the British colonial power to protect the special position of Malays and Islam. However, the British refused to entertain the MNP and Malay Associations’ protest against the MU as well as their bid for the independence of Malaya. As a result, on March 1st 1946, the Malay Associations led by Dato’ Onn Jafar and other Malay-Muslims political group gathered in a conference, called the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress, held in Kuala Lumpur to unite the Malays against the MU. Following this, Pan-Malayan Malay Congress gathered on May 11th 1946 in Johor Bahru, Johor. At this conference, the Malay Associations and other Malay- Muslims political groups established a political party, the Pertubohan Kebangsaan
Melayu Bersatu (United Malay National Organization, UMNO), to represent the Malays. Under its slogan of Hidup Melayu or ‘long live the Malays’, UMNO was led by Dato’ Onn Jafar, the Chief Minister of Johor (Rahim, Mustapha, Ahmad & Lyndon, 2013, p. 40) as the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress successor to oppose the MU proposal.
The UMNO leaders refused to attend the MU installation ceremonies and the British- Malaya Advisory Council meetings. At the same time, the UMNO leaders urged the Malay aristocracy and the rakyat to work together to protest against the MU so that the British would grant self-government for Malaya as they declared that Malaya belongs to the Malays. This declaration was acknowledged by the Raja of Perlis, Tuanku Syed Putra Jamallulail, during his speech at the 1949 UMNO annual meeting in Penang. He said, “Malaya belongs to the Malays” (Suwannathat-Pian, 2009, p. 126). Following the declaration, the UMNO leaders then publicly promised the Malay masses that they “do not want the other races to be given the rights and privileges of the Malays” (Ongkili, 1985, p. 47). The Malay elites and Malay rakyat collectively decided to terminate their participation in the British-Malaya government bureaucracy and politics.
Since then, UMNO effort to unify the Malays to oppose the MU scheme intensified which subsequently prompted the British administration to pursue confidential consultations with UMNO representatives and the Malay rulers as a preparation for self-government through the formation of an Anglo-Malay Working Committee. The Working Committee’s role was to draw up one alternative socio-political arrangement that was acceptable to Malays17. It proposed an alternative socio-
17 See Malayan Union (1946).
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political arrangement namely the federation of Malaya, with increased safeguards for the sovereignty of Malay rulers and the special position of the Malays, and more restrictive citizenship requirements. The Federation of Malaya came into existence on February 1st 1948.
It, however, triggered opposition from Malays and non-Malays who were frustrated with the British decision to retreat from its promise for the creation of a federation that “welds together the different peoples in Malaya into one united nation” (Hing, 2009, p. 63). In opposing the non-democratic and communally divisive nature of federation due to the consolidation of ethnic division and Malay privilege, in early 1946 a multiracial but largely non-Malay-dominated Pan Malayan Council for Joint Action (AMCJA) was formed. It was followed by the creation of Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Centre of the People’s Power, PUTERA) in early 1947 by several progressive and left leaning Malay organizations. These political and civic organizations coalesced into the PUTERA-AMCJA in mid-1947 to demonstrate that united political action on the part of all ethnic groups in Malay was feasible through the promotion of an alternative foundation for the new Malayan federation namely the People’s Constitution. Under this alternative arrangement, the PUTERA-AMCJA proposed a system of equal rights, with no distinction between ethnic communities, and retained Malay as the official language, allowing other languages to continue to be used in the short-run. This alternative arrangement also deliberately stripped of any religious connotation the conceptualization of the term Malay.
Equal rights and the new conception of the term Malay were recognized by the non- Malays. For their part, the Malay elites in PUTERA-AMCJA such as Burhanuddin Al-Helmy and Ibrahim Yaakob, were willing to oppose the UMNO conceptualization
of Melayu which referred to ‘one who habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom, and professes Islam’ by suggesting that the concept of Melayu needed to embrace Chinese, Indians and other regardless of religion, language or customs. Both Burhanuddin and Ibrahim also used Bauer’s (1907) definition of nation that stressed the distinction between ethnicity and nationality by proposing the creation of a unitary political entity called Malaya Raya (Greater Malaya). According to Burhanuddin, any individuals who were willing to sever ties with their original nationality and “totally commit allegiance to, as well as fulfill the conditions and demands of, Malay nationality (kebangsaan Melayu)….[could become]… Malay national, in the political sense” (Tan, 1988, p. 18). Therefore, the very basis of the creation of Malaya Raya, as Noor argued was the “willingness to de-racialise the divisions...between Malays and non-Malays by insisting upon a broader conceptions of Malay culture which encompasses the different cultural groupings of the Archipelago” (2002, p. 93).
The PUTERA-AMCJA proposal of People’s Constitution, however, was rejected by the British. The British believed that any person born in Malaya automatically became a citizen and the use of the term Melayu as a nationality was farcical. In fact, the British, as Omar (2009) argued, stressed that such a proposal would allow blackmailers, gang robbers, murderers and other criminals (who were mainly non- Malay) to become the citizens of Malaya and be identified as the Melayu (Malay). Most importantly, the British also opined that the Malay elites would not agree that non-Malays could be referred to as Melayu and that non-Malays themselves would not agree to have themselves designated as Melayu. In a similar tone, Onn and the rest of the UMNO hierarchy also argued that the idea of Melayu as a nationality could jeopardize the agenda of safeguarding the privilege of Malay as an ethnic
majority. In this regard, it is important to stress that their strong opposition towards PUTERA-AMCJA’s suggestion of the term Melayu to include Chinese and Indians was driven by their determination to ensure a clear boundary between Malays and non-Malays and consolidate their political interests (O’Shannassy, 2012, p. 95). As a result, in January 1948 the Federation of Malaya agreement was signed by both British and UMNO leadership18 and effectively ended the MU on January 31st 1948. Most importantly it effectively ended the PUTERA-AMCJA conceptualization of what the term Melayu (Malay) should mean.