ARTICULACION PROYECTO INSTITUCIONAL: EDUCACION SEXUAL PROYECTOS

Sukarno were usually clearly differentiated from perceptions of Indonesians as a people and both were simplistic and value laden.

Sukarno was usually seen as equivalent to the government of Indonesia even in the early 1950's, and as its virtual dictator after the 1958 rebellions. Power struggles in Indonesian domestic politics did not really impinge on this image except in 1958 when most Australian papers favored a rebel victory and underestimated the strength of Sukarno and the central govern­ ment. Thus there was continuing emphasis on what most papers perceived as Sukarno's personal characteristics: he was untrustworthy, mendacious, ambitious, power hungry, expansionist and a silver-tongued demagogue. Often on the same page as such descriptions would appear leading articles by Denis Warner, Guy Harriott or Bruce Grant where Sukarno appeared in a different guise: he was seen as shrewd in his dealings with the Dutch and the United States and a clever exploiter of Cold War opportunities. Unlike editorials, emphasis was placed on the problems Sukarno faced in reconcil­ ing internal forces.

Perceptions of the Indonesian people on the other hand were not so clearly, nor pejoratively, defined. Editorials had difficulties in coming to grips with the idea of Indonesians as a distinctive people and the images conveyed tended to be rather shapeless or lack content - to be Asian in tone rather than Indonesian. The dominating images were of a great and rapidly increasing population, politically volatile and poverty stricken. There were often undertones of menace in this image, but also occasionally a note of patronising superiority.

Side by side with this were frequent references to the "fund of goodwill" in Australia for the Indonesian people, a product, said the editorials, of Australia's support for the Indonesian independence move­ ment. This fund was in danger of drying up and better relations with

Indonesia would result if only the groundless claim to West New Guinea could be dropped. Thus while the Australian press was agreed that the

troublemaker was Sukarno, their perceptions of Indonesians as a people were much more ambivalent. They asked for friendship, but they feared

expansion.

Two other aspects are interesting: generally in editorials, the press regarded the P.K.I. as a part of monolithic communism,'1’ and no

Cf. Casey's statement, C . N ., Vol. 29, No. 4, 15 April 1958: "Nothing could be more dangerous than the idea that communism in Asia, or in any individual country in Asia, is different from communism elsewhere in the world."

mention was made of its particularly Indonesian character. Its growth and importance in the early 1950's was often inflated in editorial

comment. The correspondents were rather more careful in their assessment of the influence of the P.K.I. on Indonesian government policies.

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Editorial writers also had some difficulty in coming to terms with

Indonesia's anti-colonialism, often regarding it solely as a device used by Sukarno to carry out policies which could not be justified in other terms.

While such perceptions were to a greater or lesser degree shared by all newspapers, there were significant differences in attitudes between the papers. The Sydney Morning Herald took up the strongest anti- Indonesia position on the issue. In volume of news reporting, editorials and articles, and the intensity and persistence of its attention, it stood out from all the other papers. Its main preoccupation was with the

security aspects of the issue. Initially, strong support for the Dutch case was argued almost entirely on the faults seen in the Indonesian case, but increasingly the Sydney Morning Herald opted first for Dutch or

Australian trusteeship under United Nations auspices, and later for self- determination under the Dutch with the hope of eventual political

unification of the whole of New Guinea. It repeatedly charged the

government with taking too soft a line with Indonesia, and not supporting the Dutch fully. It consistently opposed Indonesia taking its case to the United Nations, and called on the United States and Britain to support the Dutch and Australian case as a concomitant of their treaty obligations.

The West Australian followed a similar, if usually less strident path. Its reporting of events was spotty, not a great deal of editorial space was devoted to the issue and editorial opinion was in similar terms to that of the Sydney Morning Herald.

The Courier Mail, the Advertiser and the Age tended to follow the government line fairly closely, and while seeking a solution in Dutch trusteeship and later in self-determination, did not devote a great deal of editorial space to the issue.

The Melbourne Herald was perhaps the most unpredictable of all the papers. It generally avoided the extreme position taken up by the Sydney Morning Herald. It saw Australia's interest in New Guinea as

(15.3.58). Editorially, it examined seriously Warner's contention that Australia's attitude to the issue helped clear the path for increased communist influence in Indonesia, and tried to keep the issue in perspect­ ive. Like the A g e , it leaned in the late 1950's towards making

Australia's relations as a neighbour with Indonesia of higher long term priority than the West New Guinea issue. Thus it did not oppose

Indonesia taking its case to the United Nations, the training of Indonesian army cadets in Australia, or arms sales by the West to Indonesia.

All Australian papers were agreed in the years 1950 to 1958 that the Indonesians should be kept out of New Guinea, but differed in their judgement of how far Australia should be prepared to go to achieve this.

The Press and West New Guinea 1959-1962

Dr Subandrio's visit to Australia in early February 1959^ was preceded by reports in the Australian press that pressure was mounting in the Netherlands for a negotiated withdrawal from West New Guinea and that Indonesia hoped for a more favourably inclined Dutch government as a result of the forthcoming elections. There were reports also that the purpose of Subandrio's visit was to try to convince the Australian

government that it should adopt a more "objective" view of the issue, like that of Britain and the United States (Advertiser 21.2.59) and most papers called on the government to "stand firm" in its policy (S.M.H. 9.2.59, Age 6.2.59) .

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The Courier Mail of 4 February 1959, however, in a change of opinion if not of heart, displayed a rare prescience:

If Indonesia's representative can be convinced that it is not the purpose of Australia's government to hinder the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands from trying to work out between themselves a settlement of their quarrel over West New Guinea, the edge would be taken from much hostile criticism which Australia's backing of the Dutch case has attracted not only

in Indonesia but also in many other Asian countries.

Australia has very important strategic interests in a region that covers the northern approaches to this continent. They are probably now adequately served by Australian administrat­ ion of all East New Guinea and adjacent islands. Australia has no claim to West New Guinea...yet the Indonesians can legitimately claim that they also have important strategic interests in the region. They fear that under continuing Dutch administration West New Guinea might become a centre of dangerous disaffection against their Republic.

The leader went on to criticize Dr Evatt's suggestion for Australian trusteeship of the territory as unwise and open to interpretation as colonialist aspiration, and hoped that eventual Dutch-Indonesian trustee­ ship would be possible.

This leader is quoted at length because it shows an uncommon editorial attempt to grasp the reality that Australia could in the future have no right or power to interfere in any settlement, that it was no longer certain that West New Guinea was "vital" to Australia's security, that even in the form of trusteeship, Indonesia's rights would have to be acknowledged.

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When the joint Casey-Subandrio communique was published on

15 February, there was a stormy reaction in the Australian press. The

important paragraphs were numbers 5 and 6 dealing with West New Guinea and in view of the differing interpretations of these paragraphs by the press, they are quoted in full:

5. There was a full explanation of the considerations which have

led each country to a different view over West New Guinea (West Irian), with Australia recognising Netherlands'

sovereignty and recognising the principle of self-determinat­ ion .

This difference remains, but the position was clarified by an explanation from Australian Ministers that it followed from their position of respect for agreements on the rights of sovereignty that if any agreement were reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia as parties principal, arrived at by peaceful processes and in accordance with internationally accepted principles, Australia would not oppose such an agreement.

6. The Ministers indicated they believed that the issue between

the Netherlands and Indonesia over Western New Guinea was one to be resolved by peaceful means, and that they were in accord with the view that force should not be used by the parties concerned in the settlement of territorial

differences. 1 (emphasis added)

Two things about this statement bear emphasising: Australia recognised Netherlands sovereignty and the principle of self-determinat­

ion that the Dutch now espoused. If, in the future, an agreement were

reached (and Australia recognised the Netherlands' sovereign right to enter an agreement) peacefully and without duress, Australia would not

oppose it. In the rather "fine spun prose" of the statement (the words

are the Daily Telegraph's), the press immediately perceived on the one hand an attempt to satisfy Australian domestic opinion and on the other, an acknowledgement of Indonesian pressure on Australia to accommodate itself to a solution to the problem.

Each newspaper's reaction to the communique depended on

whether it stressed its present or the future aspects. The Sydney Morning

Herald called the statement " a great tactical victory for Dr Subandrio"

(16.2.59), while attempting at first to downgrade the implications of the

communique by a reference that "it is understood that Cabinet has a formal understanding with the Dutch government that the Netherlands will not withdraw from its New Guinea territory" (18.2.59). But it was soon clear that the Sydney Morning Herald did not really credit this

interpretation that the non-interference clause was merely a sop to the Indonesians. In a typical leader entitled "A Blunder and its

Consequences", the Sydney Morning Herald attacked the government strongly:

...the undertaking...that Australia will not oppose an agree­ ment extorted from the Dutch by the extremes of economic and political pressure amounts to nothing less than a complete reversal of Australian policy...It amounts to Australian acquiescence in Indonesian sovereignty over West New Guinea. And this stab in the back is delivered by the very Govern­ ment that consistently encouraged the Dutch to stand firm and make cruel sacrifices while Australia suffered no inconvenience. (18.2.59)

Yet the Sydney Morning Herald did not believe the situation was irrevers­ ible; the government, it said, should make an unequivocal assurance that it would continue to support the Netherlands; it was still not too late to place East New Guinea together with West New Guinea under joint Dutch- Australian administration; "Australian forces /should/ stand ready to defend any part of the island of New Guinea against aggression from any quarter" (18.2.59) (emphasis added).

The Age took a clear pro-government line in spite of its "stand firm" editorial of 6 February: "On careful examination it must be agreed that there has been no change of p oli c y .../the statement is/7 not a concession - merely a restatement of the basic realities of the situation. She /Australia/ has no rights in the matter" (19.2.59). It was

"unthinkable" said the A g e , that Australia should contemplate going to war with Indonesia, and Australia's concern for self-determination must be pursued in the United Nations.

Denis Warner in the Courier Mail said:

Indonesia will eventually get sovereignty over West New Guinea. That is the meaning of the joint announcement...Since this was inevitable anyway all parties concerned have reason to congratulate themselves that what once seemed likely to end in a disastrous military clash will be resolved... (21.2.59) He pointed out that the United States was now no longer really neutral as it did not want to see a communist government in Indonesia and now that Australia had also adopted a neutral attitude, some of the obstacles had

been removed from the path to a settlement. Not surprisingly the

Courier Mail editorially described the communique as "a useful clarific­ ation of Australia's position" (16.2.59.).

The Melbourne Herald's position differed in emphasis from the

others: "If the communique commits us to acquiesce in any deal, then

this qualifies the 1957 Dutch-Australian statement that the principle of trusteeship should apply to both Dutch New Guinea and Australian New Guinea."^" This was a "big and startling modification of policy" in which the vital principle of self-determination had been abandoned and which

undermined our own position in New Guinea (16.2.59, 17.2.59). After Mr Casey had denied on 18 February that there had been a reversal of policy, the Herald complained that he was "playing with words in a vague

effort to satisfy both Indonesian opinion and the disturbed public opinion in Australia" (19.2.59).

In the ensuing debate on the matter in the House of

Representatives on 24 February, Prime Minister Menzies gave his gloss on

the communique: there was no change in policy because the government was

not prepared to urge the Dutch to negotiate. Australia's interest lay in preserving Netherlands sovereignty and in applying the principles of

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self-determination (S.M.H. 25.2.59). The Sydney Morning Herald in its

leader the following day, welcomed Mr Menzies' assurances of continued

Australian interest in the issue, but rightly pointed out that "This is not the impression that Indonesia's Foreign Minister was encouraged to carry away with him...how can this admirable new attitude possibly be

squared with that proclaimed in the communique?" (25.2.59). The rest of

the papers also tried to sort out the confusion of what the communique

stated and Mr Menzies' explanation. The Age and the Advertiser both

accepted the new gloss as a welcome return to the previous position: the Age now accepted self-determination as the paramount consideration, with Dutch sovereignty confirmed as a matter of law and rather hopefully

concluded: "There should no longer be any doubt as to where Australia

stands" (25.2.59) . The Advertiser felt that Mr Menzies' statement

dispelled much of the uneasiness created by the communique and also stressed the self-determination argument (26.2.59).

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See below, p.178, for the text of this 1957 statement.

For the Australian press, Dr Subandrio's visit and the resulting communique meant that the leader writers, after some years of

confidence that Australian policy on West New Guinea would prevail,

had to face up to the likelihood that Indonesia would not

be diverted from its claim and that Australia would not interfere in a

Dutch-Indonesian settlement. But as soon as Mr Menzies re-emphasised

the by now traditional aspects of Australian policy - support for the Dutch and future self-determination for the Papuans - the papers happily

reassumed their old Australia-centred stances. They now saw the

communique as "a harmless promise of Australian non-intervention in the

/uniike 1^7 event of the Netherlands and Indonesia reaching peaceful

agreement" (Sun Herald 1.3.59). Mr Menzies1 explanation had clearly been

of importance in re-establishing their previous viewpoints.

Indonesian hopes that a new Dutch government would be prepared to negotiate on the issue were dashed when the results of the

elections were made known in May 1959. The Dutch Prime Minister,

Professor de Quay, and his Foreign Minister, Mr Luns, heading a more conservative coalition, were both opposed to rapprochement with Indonesia and a bill passed to send conscripts to serve in West New Guinea was a pointer to their hardening attitude.^ In June 1959, Mr Menzies held

talks with Dutch officials and told journalists in Zurich on 1 July "there has been no change in the mutual policy of the Netherlands and

Australia in respect of New Guinea" (S.M.H. 3.7.59). This was reported

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in Australia as was the Times of Indonesia's criticism which characterized the statement as

running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. During

Subandrio's trip, and in a joint communique which was subsequently issued, the Menzies government gave the

impression it would sit on the sidelines. Now, however, the statement made after his conference in Zurich reveals the Australian government's duplicity. (Age 6.7.59)

The Melbourne Herald (4.7.59) felt Menzies' statement had been ill-timed while the Age (6.7.59) and the Sydney Morning Herald (4.7.59) supported

his stand.

Later in the year, Mr Menzies made a statement which although

welcomed in Australia, was again badly received in Indonesia. On

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Age, 6.7.59. Of 2 July 1959.

2 August on A.B.C. Television,1 23** he said: "It is very difficult to look into the future but if you look far enough then I would hope to see self-government in New Guinea and I think there would be great merit

myself in seeing that as self-government of the entire island". Dr

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Subandrio's rejoinder that this appeared to conflict with the spirit of the February communique was opposed by most sections of the Australian press who welcomed Mr Menzies' statement as a return to a proper policy as well as a stop to the false construction that they felt the

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Indonesians had placed on the February communique. Most papers looked

forward to Mr Menzies' projected visit to Indonesia in December to

further clarify Australia's position.

The published object of Mr Menzies' visit was to establish 4

closer understanding. Although no statement was issued after Sukarno

and Menzies met at Bogor on 6 December, the Australian press generally

felt that his visit had been successful. The press reported that Mr

Menzies received an unequivocal assurance that Indonesia would not use 5

force in pursuing her claim and, for his part, Mr Menzies "managed to establish Australia's interest in New Guinea on another ground - that of