The terms of reference had already been established by the Labour government, so the incoming Heath government did not alter them, but the appointment process was still ongoing when the Conservatives entered government. Thus, this was the point that the influence of business interests began to overshadow that of organised labour. In the spring of 1970, the new government set about appointing a committee.897 In line with John Chicken, surveying the appointment of the committee allows us to observe the measures taken by the government to avoid the conventional approach.898
The government expended significant resources to keep the committee independent or ‘non– governmental’. This was because the appointment of an independent committee was a means to produce ‘radical solutions’.899 Essentially, the appointment of independents was ‘a device to break through the political impasse that inhibited earlier reform efforts’.900 The DE’s
correspondence on the establishment of the Robens Committee revealed that it was a well-
895 Alison Broadhurst, ‘Robens: A Missed Opportunity’ (1972) 4 ICT 12 p595
896 Vicky Long, The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory: The Politics of Industrial Health in Britain 1914 - 60
(Palgrave Macmillan 2011)
897 Alfred Robens, Safety and Health at Work: Report of the Committee, 1970-72, Volume 1 (HMSO Cmd 5034
1972) p182
897 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press, 1960) 898 John C. Chicken, Hazard Control Policy in Britain (Pergamon Press)
899 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the
Management of Occupational Risk' (PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 2016)
900 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the
documented and well-thought-out selection process, with officials demonstrating a desire to avoid any repetition of past efforts. It is safe to say that all the committee members were ‘safe bets’.901 The DE was fully aware that the proposals of the committee needed the consent of other government departments and it ultimately had to pass through both Houses. Thus, even though the DE stated that the ‘final choice could not prudently be made until the TUC/CBI have had its way’, their choice was restricted to individuals that the DE had ‘cleared’.902
The Government, TUC and CBI settled on six members; Alfred Robens, Sydney Robinson, Anne Shaw, George Beeby, John Wood and Brian Windeyer.903 Lord Alfred Robens was appointed to chair the committee. The fact that the DE officials put forward Robens to chair the committee indicates three matters. First their intent to put forward proposals that would please both Labour and Conservative MPs. Even though Robens was a Labour MP, he was appointed to head the NCB by the Harold Macmillan government.904 Robens depicted himself as a
practical man that had a ‘sensible business approach to politics’.905 Moreover, Robens’ ‘NCB1’- registered Daimler, private plane, and exclusive apartment in Eaton Square may have eased concerns about his socialist origins.906
Second, the DE appreciated the radical nature of their mission; there seems to have been foresight that it would cause departmental friction. Thus, they needed a seasoned and strong individual to break the political impasse; Robens, or the ‘New King Coal’, was that individual. Derek Ezra, Robens’ NCB successor, spoke of his predecessor as an individual that was able to
901 Ministry of Labour, ‘DEP Evidence’ 1967 - 1971 (Archive no: Lab 96/366) TNA – Kew Gardens
902 Ministry of Labour, ‘Letter from C.H. Sisson to K. Barnes’ 5 March 1970 (Archive no: Lab 14/2475) TNA –
Kew Gardens; W. Dibelius, England (Jonathan Cape 1930) p254; Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Methods of
Social Study (Longmans 1932) p45
903 The DEP did not want a large committee, so the initial number considered was just 3 or 4, but through
negotiations with the CBI and TUC, it was extended to 6
Ministry of Labour, ‘Memorandum to P.H Edwards / Safety and Health Inquiry Memo to C.H. Sisson’ 27 February 1970 (Archive no: Lab 14/2475) TNA – Kew Gardens
904 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the
Management of Occupational Risk' (PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 2016)
905 Education + Training, ‘Interview’ (1972) 14 ET 5 p154, p155; Ministry of Labour, ‘Mr Feather, Meeting on 20
April’ 1970 (Archive No: LAB 96/447) TNA – Kew Gardens
906 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the
forge a new path, ‘He is a very dominant, vigorous and human personality, and he definitely left his imprint on the coal industry in a way no one else will. The coal industry could be
considerably different today if he had not been skilfully selected by Macmillan to take the job on’.907
Third, it represented the desire to see voluntarism come to the fore. Robens was well – versed in the voluntary approaches to tackle workplace accidents. Christopher Sirrs notes:
As NCB chair, Robens became closely acquainted with health and safety in a major hazardous industry… As a nationalised industry able to draw upon public funds, the NCB developed a more comprehensive
approach to health and safety compared to other industries. In response to the high accident rate among
miners, Robens raised the status of professional safety staff, and pioneered a variety of methods to
disseminate the safety message: publications, posters, league tables, as well as shock films, ‘more horrific
than any Hammer Films production’.908
Robens’ experience was derived from the collieries, an extremely hazardous industry distinguished by its dissemination of responsibility to non–state actors. What is clear from Robens was his desire to ‘decentralise’. In an interview shortly after the cessation of the committee, Robens stated, ‘In every large industry it is a mistake to centralize… You should devolve as much as possible the day-to-day operations in management down to the operating units. Right down to the foremen on the workshop floor’.909 Robens’ idea expressed itself in the milder form of ‘self – inspection’. However, in contemporary times, it is referred to as
‘responsibilisation’; through internal responsibility frameworks, the workforce is strongly encouraged to take personal responsibility for their own safety while they are at work.910 We would see varying forms of Robens idea with the passing of key legislation in the late 1970s.
907 Industrial Management ‘New King Coal’ (1972) 72 IM 1 p46, p46 - 7
908 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the
Management of Occupational Risk' (PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 2016) p146
909 Education + Training, ‘Interview’ (1972) 14 ET 5 p154, p155
Also, the collieries were distinguished by cooperation between workers and management.911 Robens carried these ideas with him into his deliberations on the Committee.912
The union element of the committee was dwarfed by business interests and ‘two independents’. Anne Shaw was a management consultant, George Beeby was the Chairman of the British Titan Products Co and the Director of Cape Universal Building Products and Tory MP for Melton, Mervyn Pike was the Director of Watts, Blake, Bearne & Co. The two independents, Sir Brian Wellingham Windeyer and Professor John C. Wood, were selected due to their non – partisan background.913 This left one trade unionist, Sydney Robinson, by himself. On paper, he seemed the perfect ‘union’ candidate. However, there seems to have been some friction between Mr Robinson and the TUC leadership. These feelings were manifested with Robinson’s earlier appointment to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the late 1960s. The Minister of Labour, Ray Gunter, wanted Mr Robinson on the Committee to the dissatisfaction of The TUC General Secretary, George Woodcock, who refused to endorse Mr Robinson and proffered his own shortlist.
The rank and file of the labour movement also expressed dissatisfaction of Mr Robinson’s appointment to the Robens Committee:
So there we have it; for all the talent in the trade union movement and for all the long service by many
people such as Dr Murray, Chief Medical Adviser to the TUC, none of them was on the Committee. The
sole representative of the trade union the labour movement was Mr Sydney A. Robinson; no room for the
National Union of Mineworkers, Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers or the Transport and
General Workers' Union and many others. A foretaste of things to come in the Report (emphasis added).914
Thus, instead of Robinson, the TUC wished to put forward ‘a short list for the trade union member’ to sit on the Robens Committee, the DE did not afford the TUC this privilege; instead,
911 Education + Training, ‘Interview’ (1972) 14 ET 5 p154, p155
912 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the
Management of Occupational Risk' (PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 2016) p148
913 Ministry of Labour, ‘Letter from C.H. Sisson to K. Barnes’ 5 March 1970 (Archive no: Lab 14/2475) TNA –
Kew Gardens
the DE’s deliberation process made sure that ‘right’ unionist sat on the committee seat, to the extent that no other candidate was so heavily scrutinised.915