In order for the government’s initiatives to impact industry, it required a thorough knowledge of what was happening in British factories. However, the collection of government statistics on ill – health and accidents in the workplace had long been inadequate.501 Remarkably, until 1949, there were no official figures available for the accidents and disease sustained each year by the working population.502 It was essential for the organs of the modern state to have at its disposal
495 HM Factory Inspectorate, Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1934
(HMSO Cmd 4931 1935) p23 – 24
496 T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942) p184 - 185 497 T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942) p70 - 71 498 T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942) p70 - 71 499 T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942) p70 - 71 500 H.A. Mess, Factory Legislation and its Administration 1891 – 1924 (P.S King 1924) p34 501 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960)
sound data. For the government to comprehend and promote the best interests of its constituents, identify areas of concern, monitor areas of progress and regress, allocate and withhold resources, a sound information base was essential.
The government was not solely to blame, fraudulent and apathetic employers and noncompliant workers who failed to report accidents and ill – health contributed to a patchy and incoherent statistical base. The strides towards more efficient and productive use of statistics seemed to have plateaued in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Home Office officials, in official and unofficial discussions, appeared to be unconcerned about such things.503 Only through public criticism, argues Pellew, came a recognition of the weaknesses of the collection and use of factory statistics.504 As a result of this criticism, there was an attempt to improve the poor state of factory statistics.505 However, for several reasons, such efforts did not result in vast improvements. First, consistent low staffing levels weakened the information gathering capacity of the Factory Department. The Department’s wide remit and limited resources meant that the Inspectorate had insufficient time to develop, maintain and utilise a sound statistical base, ‘This was the province of the inspector - a man who was, typically, overworked’.506 Second, the status of the Factory Department and all the work associated with was diminished as a result of the prominence of the criminal justice.507 By the 1880s, the Criminal Department was the superior department, as a Home Office clerk explained, ‘All of the interesting work having been
gradually gathered in the Criminal Department’.508 Thus, the more able men and resources were redirected to the Criminal Department.509 Third, there was a general undervaluing of statistics in the Home Office. Unlike officials at the Board of Trade where valuable statistics were being collected, analysed and applied, Home Officials were remarkably vague and apathetic about their data gathering activities. This is evidenced by the low status of the Statistical Branch when
503 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p56 - 57 504 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p56 - 57 505 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p105
506 P.W.J. Bartrip, ‘British Government Inspection, 1832-1875: Some Observations’ (1982) 25 HJ 3 p605, p626 507 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982
508 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p57 509 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p57
compared to the Registry and Accounts branches.510 The Statistical Branch was side-lined as it was shuffled around from the General Department to the Criminal Department to the Industrial Department and Parliamentary Department.511
Since the Factory Department was housed and developed under the auspices of the Home Office, it may have been influenced by the same apathetic approach to data gathering.512 Whatever the influence, it is clear that many factory inspectors believed that ‘preparing statistics for official purposes and parliamentary returns, seriously interfere with their duties’.513 While housed in the Home Office, the Factory Inspectorate’s lack of information about workplaces and factory accidents were evidence of apathetic attitudes. Moreover, unlike other government departments, there was no central branch of the Factory Department which specifically handled statistical information. Thus, Pellew noted, ‘Information collected by the inspectorate… took little account of statistical developments’.514
Another issue with the information gathering capacity of the Factory Department was that it was hampered by the way in which OHS had developed. A mixture of piecemeal improvements and extensions of factory legislation and overlaps with other government departments made it
difficult for the Factory Department to identify trends or even gain an accurate picture of the modern workplace. The Home Office was aware of this and did try to find a more innovative way of recording accidents through examining returns from insurance companies in respect of workmens compensation claims. However, Williams noted ‘this was a haphazard and
incomplete arrangement’.515 Even at the Factory Department’s most developed state in the 1950s, it was sombre about the accuracy of its estimates.516 Williams did a masterful job of picking through the Factory Department’s annual reports of the 1950s to reveal the
510 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p108 511 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p108 512 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982 513 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p108 514 Jill Pellew, The Home Office: 1848 – 1914 (Heinemann Educational Books 1982) p108 515 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960) p11
inconsistencies, deflections and inadequacies of the information provided.517 Moreover, Williams noted that there was no explanation given for the elaborate estimates of the Factory Department. References to its ‘undisclosed ratio’ which were ‘obtained some time ago’ were simply too vague.518 Its calculation of accidents was largely an internal matter, none outside of the Factory Department could understand the basis of their calculations.519