The Department of Employment had ‘run out of steam’.860 The DE had exhausted a plethora of initiatives to address the accident problem. Officials were devoid of answers. The sense of bewilderment was present in Barbara Castle’s, First Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, address to Parliament. MPs were eager to hear specific details about a proposed Bill, but instead, they were met with more questions:
[We] ought to be asking some far-reaching questions about our safety legislation. Are we, for example,
putting enough emphasis on voluntary action and self-help by employers and unions? Do we need joint
safety machinery, regionally and nationally, run by industry itself—as the T.U.C. has been suggesting?
Industry changes very quickly and the law is apt to lag behind the changes. Is the present machinery
adequate to cope with major new hazards which are emerging from new technology coupled with the
increasing scale of industrial operations? Again, are we doing enough to protect the public from the risks
858 Harold Walker, ‘Is Robens Strong Enough?’ (1973) 10 JLP 1 p7; Theo Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial
Injury (Mansell 1997)
859 Alfred Robens, Safety and Health at Work: Report of the Committee, 1970-72, Volume 1 (HMSO Cmd 5034
1972); John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960)
860 David Eves, ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: A Brief History of the Origins, Development and
Implementation of Health and Safety Law in the United Kingdom, 1802–2014’ (History of Occupational Safety and
to them of industrial processes—whether large-scale risks through the blowing up of an industrial plant or
small-scale but still important risks such as those which may arise in a launderette?861
Barbara Castle’s address and her Department’s correspondence was typified by a lack of clarity on the way forward.862 Thus, an announcement was made on 2 March 1970 about setting up ‘a small, high-powered body to conduct a general inquiry across the whole field… It would examine how we can best extend protection over the whole field of employment.’863
It was intended that this committee would do three things. First, the committee would chart a new course. It would not repeat what had been done previously, as Castle stated, ‘We need to get away from the conventional approach… the mere consolidation and revision of existing legislation are not enough’.864 The DE wanted the committee to produce; ‘The abolition of the present statutory regulation – making procedure… this is highly desirable’.865 Just a few years prior, the DE had misspent a significant amount of time gathering the comments of hundreds of non–governmental organisations, only to have these comments ‘sucked’ into the government machinery, ‘disinfected’ of any originality, and ‘emitted’ out as unremarkable and conventional proposals.866 Second, the committee’s recommendations would echo what was already being said in industry, that is, responsibility should be disseminated to those that worked directly with the risks.867 Third, the committee would provide a blueprint of how to achieve this. Past experiences have shown that government had trouble ‘letting go’. Attempts to disseminate greater responsibilities to non – state actors had failed. Thus, this committee was to be filled with ‘independent’ members who could show the government how this could be done, as was reiterated in the House of Lords, ‘We are hoping to learn a great deal from this Committee of
861 ‘Employed Persons (Health and Safety Bill)’ HC vol 797 cc44-166 (2 March 1970)
862 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the
Management of Occupational Risk' (PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 2016)
863 ‘Employed Persons (Health and Safety Bill)’ HC vol 797 cc44-166 (2 March 1970) 864 ‘Employed Persons (Health and Safety Bill)’ HC vol 797 cc44-166 (2 March 1970)
865 Ministry of Labour, ‘DEP Evidence’ 1967 - 1971 (Archive no: Lab 96/366) TNA – Kew Gardens 866 Ministry of Labour, ‘Proposals for New Legislation on Safety and Health at Work (The First Consultative
Document)’ 1967 (Archive no: LAB 96/527) TNA – Kew Gardens
867 H.R. Payne, ‘Industrial Accidents’ (1952) 100 JRSA 4882 p740; Ministry of Labour and National Service,
Industrial Accident Prevention: A Report of the Industrial Safety Sub - Committee of the National Joint Advisory Council (HMSO 1956)
Inquiry… The Committee's report should provide us with a firm basis for the activities in this field for many years ahead’.868
It could be argued that the committee was not appointed for such lofty goals. Instead, it was just a ploy or a means to bide time. As Lord Wright alleged, ‘Committees of inquiry are well-known devices used by Governments to dodge an issue’.869 This argument is without merit. From their investigations of committees of inquiry, Mike Rowe and Laura McAllister found that, ‘More generally, commissions convey a genuine spirit of inquiry… The spirit of genuine inquiry was clearest where commissions were formed by non-governmental bodies’.870 Correspondingly, the DE’s correspondence and public addresses do not indicate anything other than a ‘genuine spirit of inquiry’. Moreover, if it was a ploy, then to whom? If it was a ploy to the Houses, it was not well – thought out because there was no appetite for the setting up of a committee.871 If the ploy were intended for a public audience, then Alfred Robens would not have been selected to head the committee.872 Professor McLean described Robens appointment as ‘beyond
satire’.873 Robens did not have the confidence of the public to lead a committee on workplace safety and health. Alfred Robens was the Chairman of the National Coal Board (NCB) at the time of the Aberfan disaster in 1966. He received considerable criticism for his evasive actions and apathetic attitude after the Aberfan disaster.874