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BOLETIN C-15 DETERIORO EN EL VALOR DE LOS ACTIVOS DE LARGA DURACION Y

BALANCE GENERAL

4.1 SERIE NIF C

4.1.14 BOLETIN C-15 DETERIORO EN EL VALOR DE LOS ACTIVOS DE LARGA DURACION Y

FERNANDEZ V. CA

Facts: Olivares filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Fernandez in the MeTC. This was dismissed for a lack of a sufficient cause of action. Olivares appealed to the RTC and the court reversed the ruling of the MeTC.

The copy of the decision was received by Fernandez on June 28, 1994. On July 12 (14 days after receipt), he filed an MR. He received copy of its denial on Nov. 29. After this, he filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the CA on Dec.

1. This was granted by the CA but Fernandez only received the decision on Dec. 12.

In the meantime, he filed a motion for new trial (newly discovered evidence) with the RTC on Dec.

9 (way past the 15-day period). This was denied by the RTC on the ground that when Fernandez went to the CA and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, and the Court of Appeals accordingly acted on the same by granting the extension sought, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the parties and the subject matter had already attached.

Issue: Was the motion for new trial filed on time? – NO.

Decision: It is without question that Fernandez received a copy of the RTC Decision on 28 June 1994.

Fourteen (14) days after the receipt of the decision, he filed an MR. This motion was denied by the RTC and the Order of denial was received by Fernandez on 29 November 1994. Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court2, he had only one (1) day left to

2 Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set

file a motion for new trial since a motion for new trial should be filed within the period to appeal, that is, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment.

The motion for new trial suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which an appeal must be perfected. Hence if denied, a movant, like Fernandez in this case has only the balance of the reglementary period within which to appeal.

Since 30 Nov. 30 was a holiday, Fernandez had up to 01 December 1994 to file the motion for new trial. Instead of a motion for new trial, he filed before the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion for extension of time to file petition for review.

Thereafter, and pending the resolution of his motion before the Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to the RTC and filed on 09 December 1994 a motion for new trial.

Applying the foregoing, Fernandez's motion for new trial was filed out of time. The fifteen (15)-day period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be extended. Motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed only in connection with cases pending before the Supreme Court, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. No such motion may be filed before any lower courts.

Side Issue: Does a motion for an extension of time to file a petition for review divest the RTC of its jurisdiction?

No. Jurisdiction is lost once an appeal is perfected. An appeal is perfected when there is a timely filing of the petition (such as petition for review) and the payment of docket and other lawful fees.

In this case, the CA has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review but not the petition for review itself.

RP VS. PERALTA, ET AL. (sorry magulo talaga ang daming dates)

Facts: The private respondents (there are several of them), filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership of real property against the republic and the DENR (petitioners). They alleged that the land in litigation originally belonged to their father, Benedicto Alonday, who applied and was issued a homestead patent and the corresponding OCT. They also alleged that they had bought the land from their father, for which they were issued the corresponding TCT. Later on however, the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) asked from, and was given permission by Benedicto to use a portion of the land.

The BFD then constructed a building on the land. The

aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party.

private respondents asked the BFD to vacate but the latter refused, hence the complaint.

The RTC ruled for the private respondents.

Here are the events that followed:

 May 6, 1997 – RTC ruled for private respondents

 May 20, 1997 – petitioners received the RTC decision

 May 30, 1997 – petitioners filed MR, this was 5 days before the expiration of the period to appeal

 June 11, 1997 – RTC issued an order expunging the MR, because it was a mere scrap of paper considering that the petitioners did not file any notice of hearing as required by the ROC. Note that under Rule 15, notice of hearing on motions should be sent to the opposing party at least 3 days before the hearing.

 July 14, 1997 – petitioners, unaware of the June 11 order, filed a manifestation with notice of hearing on MR, appending thereto a notice of hearing of their May 30 MR

 July 18, 1997 – petitioners received a copy of the June 11 order

 July 22, 1997 – petitioner filed their notice of appeal from the June 11 decision. The private respondents opposed on the ground that the MR filed in May 30 was a mere scrap of paper, hence it did not toll the reglementary period for appeal

 August 11, 1997 – RTC received the notice of appeal filed by the petitioners last July 22

 January 29, 1999 – RTC issued an order giving due course to the appeal. It ruled that the petitioners still had 5 days from June 18, 1997 (the date when they received the June 11 order) within which to perfect their appeal (FYI: it took this long because the RTC remained vacant for some time)

 February 5, 1999 – the RTC nevertheless dismissed the appeal based on recent jurisprudence (which was not mentioned) that they failed to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period.

February 26, 1999 – petitioners filed a MR

May 6, 1999 – MR denied

So after all of this shit, the petitioners filed certiorari with CA which dismissed ruling that because the May 30 MR filed by the petitioners did not comply with the ROC, it was a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the period to file an appeal.

Issue: W/N the MR filed by the petitioners in May 30 was defective? YES!

Held/Ratio:

Motion for Reconsideration

Sec. 2, Rule 37 – a MR or a MNT shall be: (1) made in writing; (2) stating the ground(s) therefore;

(3) with written notice served by the movant on the adverse party.

Need for notice

The written notice is prescribed by Rule 15 (sections 4 and 5). The notice requirement, are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma; a worthless piece of paper. It is vital for due process. The notice for hearing is required in order for the opposing party to voice out its opinion on the motion. In cases of MR or MNT, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of said motion, notice is needed.

In this case, the OSG (the one who filed the MR on behalf of the RP) merely stated that the failure to file the notice was due to inadvertence. No sufficient justification was given for the lack of notice.

NONETHELESS, the SC directed the reopening of the case considering that it is one of public interest.

The land in dispute is part of the forest reserve, as found by the SC. So the State should not be prejudiced by the negligence of the OSG to follow procedural rules.

PEOPLE vs. ODILAO

FACTS: Odilao was charged with estafa. Information was filed with the RTC and a warrant of arrest was issued. Odilao moved for reinvestigation. Thus the RTC deferred the service of the warrant of arrest to give way for the reinvestigation. After the reinvestigation was conducted, the prosecutor found no probable cause and moved to dismiss the case. The private complainant filed a petition for review before the DOJ seeking the reversal of the reinvestigation report. The RTC deferred ruling on the Motion to Dismiss filed by the prosecutor pending determination of the DOJ.

However, more than a year after, RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss rationalizing that pursuant to the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect in 2001, the court is now vested with the power to determine probable cause. The RTC thereafter, reinstated the warrant.

Odilao went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA granted the petition and ordered the RTC to defer proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ.

The People through the OSG seasonably filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. However, without knowledge of the SC, private complainant (without the conformity of the OSG) filed before the CA a Motion for Reconsideration which was favorably acted upon (i.e. on reconsideration, CA reversed itself and ruled to implement the warrant).

ISSUE: Whether or not CA may take cognizance of the MR even if a petition for review on certiorari had already been filed with the SC – NO

HELD: Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals3 (effective August 22, 2002), explicitly provides that when the movant has filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari, any MR filed with the CA is considered abandoned. Prudence dictates that the Court of Appeals should have first required private complainant to secure the conformity of the OSG; or required the latter to comment on the motion for reconsideration of the private complainant.

NEYPES V CA

Facts: Neypes, along with other petitioners, filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction against Bureau of Lands, Land Bank, and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. The heirs of del Mundo filed an MR claiming that the action had already prescribed. The RTC Judge ruled agreed with the heirs and dismissed the case because of prescription.

On Feb 12, 1998, the TC rendered the decision that the action had prescribed.

On March 3, 1998, Neypes received the copy of the decision.

On March 18, 1998 (15 days after receipt), Neypes filed an MR.

On July 1, 1998, the TC denied the MR.

On July 22, 1998, Neypes received the order denying the MR.

On July 27, 1998, Neypes filed a notice of appeal, paying the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

The court a quo denied the notice of appeal claiming it was 8 days late. Neypes claimed that they were not late and that the 15-day period only started when they received the order denying the MR. CA claimed that the 15-day period started way back in March 3 when Neypes received the copy of the decision.

Issue: When should the reglementary period start?

How many days are left, if any?

Held: An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,

3 SEC. 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. - No motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned.

considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. In this case, what should be deemed the final order – the Feb 12 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1 order denying the MR?

The July 1 order denying the MR. The order denying the motion for reconsideration is the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Hence, the reglementary period should start from the receipt of the order denying the MR.

On the issue of how many days are left to file a notice of appeal if the MR is denied, the Court said that parties are given a fresh period to file a notice of appeal. A fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court is given to appellants, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. This is also the rule for appeals this

“fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 (appeals from MTC to RTC); Rule 42 (petitions for review from the RTC to the CA); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA) and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. In sum, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (fresh period rule)

So, given that Neypes had a fresh 15 days to file a notice of appeal from the receipt of the order denying his MR (July 22), his filing a notice of appeal on July 27 was on time.

TAN V CA

Facts: Petitioner Annie Tan, owner of AJ & T Trading, leased a portion of the ground floor of her building in Binondo in favor of private respondent Bloomberry Export Manufacturing. The lease was for five years at a monthly rental of P20k for the first three years. Tan filed for ejectment against Bloomberry for several alleged violations of the lease contract (e.g. failure to pay rentals on time and encroachment on the adjacent premises without her consent). Then, Bloomberry tried to pay the rent, but it was refused by Tan, so Bloomberry filed a case for consignation. The two cases were consolidated. MTC Manila ruled that Tan failed to substantiate her case with that degree of proof required by law. It dismissed the complaint for ejectment. Meanwhile, the case for consignation became moot and academic for Tan’s failure to appeal the MTC decision, thus allowing Bloomberry to consign

all due rental payments to the court. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Tan then filed an MR of this decision. The MR, however, did not contain any notice of hearing. Thus, Bloombery filed an ex-parte Motion for Entry of Judgment upon the ground that said MR is a mere scrap of paper which should not merit the attention of the RTC. RTC, however, set the MR for hearing. CA reversed RTC’s Order.

Issue: Whether the omission of a notice of hearing of an MR is a fatal defect which does not stop the running of the period to appeal – Yes. Petition denied; CA decision affirmed.

Ruling: Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory.

“SEC. 4. Hearing of motion.—Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

“Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.(4a)

“SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.—The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.(5a)”

A motion which does not meet the requirements of Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act upon. Service of copy of a motion containing notice of the time and place of hearing of said motion is a mandatory requirement and the failure of the movant to comply with said requirements renders his motion fatally defective. This requirement of notice of hearing equally applies to a motion for reconsideration. Without such notice, the motion is pro forma. And a pro forma motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period to appeal.

For failing to attach a notice of hearing to the Motion for Reconsideration, Tan proffers the following excuses: (1) her former counsel’s messenger, due to an honest mistake, inadvertently omitted the fourth page of the motion containing the crucial Notice of Hearing; and (2) because of the pressure of work, her former counsel was unable to follow up such motion until the day said counsel requested the setting of a hearing. The Court is not convinced.

First, it is unfair to place the blame for such omission on the messenger. The burden of preparing

a complete pleading falls on counsel’s shoulders, not on the messenger’s. Second, it is incredible that the fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing was left behind due to honest mistake. In fact, there was no such page. On the third page, at the end of the pleading, a “copy-furnished” notation is found, indicating that the motion ended exactly there. Tan’s counsel simply failed to include a notice of hearing.

Finally, the fact that Tan filed for a Motion to set the time and date for hearing belies the excuse that an alleged fourth page had been left behind. What is clear from the evidence is that said counsel filed the MR only after Bloomsberry had submitted its Motion for Entry of Judgment.

A liberal construction of the rule has been allowed by this Court in the following cases: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Tan

A liberal construction of the rule has been allowed by this Court in the following cases: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Tan