BOLETIN D -7

Facts: Cardona filed a case of ejectment against Amansec over a parcel of agricultural land in Pangasinan. Amansec claimed that the land was

actually owned by a 3 party named Isabel Raroque, from whom he was leasing the land. The ejectment case over the land spawned another case filed in the DARAB. This DARAB case is the relevant case for this, um, case.

Anyway, Amansec filed in the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) claiming that the deed of sale entered into by Raroque and Cardona was void and that an emancipation patent be issued to him (Amansec). The provincial agrarian reform adjudicator ruled for Amansec, declaring the deed of sale void and giving him the emancipation patent. Cardona, instead of filing her appeal with the DARAB, she decided to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

Cardona asked for an extension to file her petition for review. She claimed she got the PARAD decision on August 7 and thus had until August 30 to file it. However, she asked for a 15 day extension to file her petition for review. According to her calculation, she had until September 15 to file it.

Hence, she filed her petition for review on September 15. Interestingly, the CA granted the extension, following the calculation of Cardona.

Issue: Was the petition for review filed with the CA

filed on time?

Held: No. It wasn’t. The last day was supposed to be on September 14. Cardona was negligent in forgetting that August lasted until August 31, not merely August 30. So they counted wrong. The Court however ruled that they usually don’t dismiss outright for a one-day delay. The problem is, Cardona did NOT follow the appeal process as described by law.

The proper remedy of a decision of the PARAD was an appeal (within 15 days) to the DARAB and not a petition for review with the CA, as per the DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Under the said rules, the petitioner should have appealed the decision of the PARAD to the DARAB orally or in writing, and perfected the said appeal within the requisite period and in the manner provided therefor. Cardona failed to do so.

The well-entrenched rule is that appeal is merely a statutory right and must be availed of within the period and in the manner provided for by law; otherwise, upon the lapse of the period to appeal from a decision or final order and no appeal has been perfected by the aggrieved party, such final order or decision ipso facto becomes final and executory. The appellate court does not acquire appellate jurisdiction over a belated appeal from the said order or decision.

CONEJOS V CA

Facts: Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. (“Estate”) owns a lot in Cebu, being bought by petitioner Teresita Conejos. Private respondent Eutiquio Plania then entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) with Conejos whereby they agreed that each of them would pay half of the purchase price of the 134 sq. m

lot, and that upon full payment they would equally divide the lot and register it in their individual names.

Plania averred that after paying P23k (value of his ½ share) to the Estate, Conejos, despite repeated demands, refused to divide the subject lot and register it in their individual names conformably with their agreement.

Plania referred the matter to the Lupon (Office of the Barangay Captain of Tisa, Cebu). In the Minutes of Hearing, it is shown that Plania did shell out P23k as payment, and that he authorized Conejos to sell his portion of the property. Conejos admitted having sold the property to Nenita Gavan without remiting the proceeds of the sale to Plania. Conejos then promised to pay the P23k to Plania, but she reneged on her promise, so Plania instituted a complaint for specific performance/rescission with damages before the MTCC.

In her Answer, Conejos alleged that (1) the MOA was mutually abandoned by the parties, (2) the stipulations contained in the Minutes of the Hearing were mere proposals by Plania for an amicable settlement which she rejected, and (3) she never admitted the veracity of the contents of the Minutes of the Hearing. All she admitted was the confrontation between her and Plania before the Lupon.

MTCC dismissed the complaint, ruling that Plania had failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegations because the official receipts proving payment were issued in Cornejo’s name and not Plania’s. The court also said that the MOA had been mutually abandoned by the parties considering that Plania did not even inform the Estate about the aforesaid Agreement. Further, MTCC did not give any probative value to the Minutes of the Hearing, as it was only signed by the Pangkat Secretary and the Barangay Chairman but not by Plania and Conejos. The RTC, however, reversed the MTCC. It ruled that (1) no evidence was proffered to prove the cancellation of the MOA, and that a written agreement could not be considered abandoned by the mere say-so of one of the parties thereto. Further, RTC reasoned that the Estate need not even be informed of the Agreement for its validity because the Estate was not a party to this, and as such, the Agreement remained binding as between Plania and Conejos.

The trial court validated the Minutes of the Hearing noting that it was an official document issued by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman and that its authenticity was never put in question. It ruled that the Minutes was admissible and should be given weight as it did not lose its evidentiary value as a record of what transpired during the meeting despite the lack of signatures of Plania and Conejos. In lending credence to the claim of Plania that he paid some amounts of money to the Estate, the RTC stressed that it was understandable that the official receipts were issued in the name of Conejos and not in the name of Plania, considering that Conejos was the original buyer of the

property. To require the Estate to issue official receipts in the names of both Plania and Conejos would have complicated the matter considering that Estate was not privy to the Memorandum of Agreement.

Conejos moved for MR but this was denied, hence she filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. Finding no merit in her arguments, the CA affirmed the RTC concluding that there was dearth of evidence that the Memorandum of Agreement had been mutually abandoned by the parties. It likewise debunked the thesis of Conejos that the Minutes of the Hearing was unenforceable for lack of signatures.

Conejos's MR having been denied, she filed the instant Petition for Certiorari.

Issue: Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion (a) in not ruling that there was mutual cancellation by both parties of the Memorandum of Agreement ; and, (b) in giving any probative value to the Minutes of Hearing and the official receipts presented in evidence by Plania? No; case dismissed based on procedural law. Court did not rule on the merits.

Held: Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED as a wrong remedy and for utter lack of merit.

Ratio: At first glance, Conejos’s Petition for Certiorari should be summarily dismissed for adopting the wrong mode of appeal. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing Conejos's petition for review on 9 January 2001 and received by Conejos on 22 January 2001. Conejos filed a motion for reconsideration on 29 January 2001 but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of 31 May 2001, notice of which was received by Conejos on 13 June 2001. Conejos's remedy would have been to file a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, and, counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration Conejos had until 28 June 2001 to file a petition for review on certiorari before this Court. However, instead of a petition for review on certiorari Conejos filed on 13 August 2001 a petition for certiorari or one (1) month and twenty-five (25) days after the lapse of the allotted period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.

Apparently, Conejos resorted to this special civil action after failing to appeal within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. This cannot be countenanced. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which Conejos already lost. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no reason why the question being raised by Conejos, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions, could not have been raised on appeal.

Concededly, there were occasions when this Court treated a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the circumstances prevailing in the instant case do not justify a deviation

from a general rule. Notably, the instant petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period allowed under Rule 45 without any justifiable reason therefor nor any reasonable explanation being proffered by Conejos. In addition, the arguments she cited are without merit and are in fact mere rehash of the issues raised before and judiciously resolved by the courts a quo. The issues require a review of the factual findings which, verily, could not be done because this Court is not a trier of facts. More importantly, a reading of the records of the case strengthens our disposition that both the trial and the appellate courts did not abuse their discretion in assessing their factual findings. We find their conclusions amply supported by the records of the case and grounded in law.

OAMINAL vs. CASTILLO

FACTS: Petitioner Henry Oaminal filed a complaint against Respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC for collection of sum of money. Summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of Mrs. Castillo, on May 30, 2000.

On June 6, 2000, the Castillos filed an “Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective”, alleging that the Sheriff’s Return has failed to comply with the Rules on substituted service of summons. The scheduled hearing of the Urgent Motion (July 14, 2000) did not take place as RTC Judge Zapatos took a leave of absence. On Oct. 19, 2000, Oaminal filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and to Render Judgment because no Answer was filed by the Castillos. On Nov.

9, 2000, the Castillos then filed the following: (a) Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim;

(b) Urgent Motion to Dismiss, anchored on the premise that Oaminal’s complaint was barred by improper venue and litis pendentia; and (c) Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On Nov. 16, 2000, the RTC Judge issued an Order denying the Castillos’ Motion but admitted their Answer. The Castillos then filed an

‘Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad Cautelam’ against Judge Zapatos, ‘in the higher interest of substantial justice and the rule of law’. Judge Zapatos denied the motion by issuing an Order dated Dec. 27, 2000. Again, on Jan 22, 2000, the Castillos filed another ‘Urgent Motion’, praying that the Honorable Court reconsider its Nov. 16, 2000 Order, by dismissing the case against them on the ground of improper venue. In the alternative, the Castillos ‘Urgent Motion’ prayed that the Judge Zapatos reconsider and set aside its Dec.

27, 2000 Order by inhibiting himself from the case.

Judge Zapatos ruled that the Castillos’ ‘Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim’ was filed outside the period to file answer, thus he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared the Castillos in default; and (3) ordered Oaminal to present evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt

of the order, otherwise, the case will be dismissed. The RTC then rendered a decision on the merits in favor of Oaminal.

On Sept. 11, 2001, the Castillos filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, raising the issue of whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over them. The CA ruled in favor of the Castillos, saying that the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over them because summons had been improperly served on them.

ISSUE: W/N the Petition for certiorari was proper.

(NOTE: Oaminal contends that the certiorari Petition filed by the Castillos with the CA was improper because other remedies in the ordinary course of law were available to them.)

HELD/RATIO: YES.

Well-settled is the rule that certiorari will lie only when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. As a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari, Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court additionally requires that “no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” must be available. It is axiomatic that the availability of the right of appeal precludes recourse to the special civil action for certiorari. Here, the trial court’s judgment was a final Decision that disposed of the case. It was therefore a fit subject of an appeal. However, instead of appealing the Decision, respondents filed a Petition for certiorari.

Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari may be treated as a petition for review under Rule 45. Such move is in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, especially (1) if the petition was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.

Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought. As the SC explained in Delsan Transport vs CA, “It cannot x x x be claimed that this petition is being used as a substitute for appeal after that remedy has been lost through the fault of petitioner. Moreover, stripped of allegations of ‘grave abuse of discretion,’ the petition actually avers errors of judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which are the subject of a petition for review”

The present case satisfies all the above requisites. The Petition for certiorari before the CA was filed within the reglementary period of appeal. A review of the records shows that respondents filed their Petition on Sept. 11, 2001 -- four days after they had received the RTC Decision. Verily, there were still

11 days to go before the lapse of the period for filing an appeal. Aside from charging grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction, they likewise assigned as errors the order and the judgment of default as well as the RTC’s allegedly unconscionable and iniquitous award of liquidated damages. The SC finds the latter issue particularly significant, considering that the trial court awarded P1,500,000 as liquidated damages without the benefit of a hearing and out of an obligation impugned by respondents because of petitioner’s failure to pay. Hence, there are enough reasons to treat the Petition for certiorari as a petition for review. In view of the foregoing, the SC finds that the Petition effectively tolled the finality of the trial court Decision. Consequently, the CA had jurisdiction to pass upon the assigned errors.

SEBASTIAN v. Hon. MORALES and the SARENASes FACTS: Private respondents Sarenases are the heirs of the Guillermo Sarenas, who died intestate. Guillermo owned 3 agricultural landholdings in Cabanatuan City (covered by TCT Nos. NT-8607, 8608, and 8609) and another parcel of agricultural land in Nueva Ecija (TCT No. NT-143564).

The tenants tilling the farm lots in Cabanatuan were issued emancipation patents pursuant to P.D. No.

27.

The heirs of Sarenas filed an application with DAR Regional Office for retention of over 5 hectares of the Guillermo’s landholdings. Among the lots they sought to retain were those awarded to Sebastian (TCT Nos. 8608) in Cabanatuan.

DAR Regional Office granted private respondents’ application.

DAR Regional Director set aside the decision and issued a new order, awarding instead 4.9993 hectares in land covered by TCT NT- 143564 (Nueva Ecija).

DAR Secretary set aside the decision and issued a new order, awarding 2.8032 hectares in land covered by TCT Nos. 8608 (awarded to Sebastian).

The DAR Sec also found that Sebastian appeared to have allowed cultivation of the landholding by another person. He ruled that it was "unlawful/illegal to allow other persons than the tenant-farmers themselves to work on the land, except if they are only working as an aide of the latter otherwise, landowners shall have the recourse against the tenant-farmers”

Sebastian filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with the CA.

CA dismissed the case, without going into the merits after finding that "petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal." It found that the orders of the DAR Secretary sought to be reviewed were final orders for they finally disposed of the agrarian case and left nothing more to be decided on the merits.

Hence, the proper remedy available to petitioners was a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43,

Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not a