BOLETIN D- 5 ARRRENDAMIENTOS OBJETIVO

Facts: The complainant here is Gloria Benitez in representation of her mother, Amparo Osla. The Mother was the defendant in a civil case (Leon Basas vs Amparo Osilas) filed with the MCTC. It would appear that judgment was rendered against the Mother for a sum of money.

Benitez alleges that in implementing the writ of execution and conducting the execution sale, respondent Medel Acosta who is the sheriff committed the following: a) ignored the bid of Gloria Benitez and Edna Samson; b) sold the jeepney to the highest bidder, Mario Timbol, who was absent and only sent his bid through a Joe Castillo who was also absent; c) sold the jeepney for an unconscionably low price; d) Mario Timbol and Joe Castillo were merely fronts since it was Sheriff Acosta who really wanted the jeepney;

e) failed to the deliver the jeepney; f) did not make a return of the writ of execution; and g) did not comply with the notice requirements. Sheriff Acosta is then being charged with grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service.

Issue: Whether there was irregularity in the execution of the judgment? YES

Held: Sec14, rule39 of the ROC requires the sheriff to:

1) make a return and submit it to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the judgment; and 2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a report to the court within 30days after his receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction could not be made. The sheriff shall continue making a report every 30 days on proceedings being taken thereon until the judgment is full satisfied. The reason for this requirement is to update the court as to the status of the execution and give it an idea why the judgment has not been satisfied. It also provides the court an idea as to how efficient court processes are after the judgment has been promulgated. The over-all purpose of the

requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.

Records show that Sheriff Acosta received the writ of execution on December 11, 1997. Following Sec14, Rule 39, Sheriff Acosta was supposed to make a return to the court 30 days after or by January 10, 1998, and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment has been satisfied. However, to date, no return has been made. It is well settled that the sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ if purely ministerial.

Read Sec9, Rule 39 on Execution of Judgments for money, how enforced. Under this provision, the fees collected by the sheriff are required to be paid over the judgment oblige or the latter’s authorized representative. In the absence of both, Sheriff is obligated to pay them over to the clerk of court who issued the writ, or if this is not possible, to deposit the amount in the nearest government depository bank.

In this case, when Mario Timbol paid the bid price, Sheriff Acosta did not turn over the amount to Atty. Delfin Gruspe as counsel of Leon Basas or the clerk of court. Rather, Sheriff Acosta turned it over to Cesar Gruspe, the brother of Atty. Delfin. The minutes of the public auction show that Leon Basas (the one who won against the Mother and in whose favor the auction sale is being conducted) and Cesar Gruspe were absent. As such, under the rules, Sheriff Acosta was under obligation to turn over the money to Atty.

Delfin who is the authorized representative of Leon Basas.

ST. AVIATION SERVICES V. GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS

FACTS: St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. (Petitioner) is a foreign corporation based in Singapore. It is engaged in the manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand International Airways, Inc. (Respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in airline operations.

In 1996, petitioner and respondent executed an “Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus A 300 B4-103 Aircraft Registration No. RP-C8882” where petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and modification works on respondent’s aircraft. (Note: They also agreed that the

“construction, validity and performance thereof” shall be governed by the laws of Singapore and further agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.)

Petitioner undertook the contracted works and billed respondent the total amount of US$303,731.67 or S$452,560.18. But despite petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent failed to pay. Petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore for the sum S$452,560.18 including interest and costs, against respondent. Court issued Writ of Summons to be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court also sought assistance of the

sheriff of Pasay City. However, despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim.

On motion of petitioner, the Singapore High Court rendered a judgment by default against respondent. Petitioner then filed with RTC, Pasay City, a “Petition for Enforcement of Judgment,” to which respondent filed a MTD on 2 grounds: 1) Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person;

and 2) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in violation of its right to due process. RTC denied respondent’s MTD and MR.

Respondent filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari to set aside RTC decision, which was granted

“without prejudice to the right to initiate another proceeding before the proper court to enforce its claim.” Petitioner filed a MR which was denied. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

- Whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the service of summons upon its office in the Philippines -YES

- Whether the judgment by default by the Singapore High Court is enforceable in the Philippines -YES RULING: (Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of a foreign country. However, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.) Under Rule 39, Sec. 48, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

Respondent contends that the service of summons is void and that the Singapore Court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the law of Singapore. In this case, the petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writs of Summons outside Singapore, which was granted. This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 1996 of Singapore: “xxx c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country for service of any originating process issued by that country.”

In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer either personally

or by substituted service. In this case, the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent at its office.

The sheriff’s return shows that it was received by the Secretary of the General Manager of respondent company. But respondent completely ignored the summons.

Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment by default is valid.

FERNANDO V. SANTAMARIA

FACTS: Fernando filed a complaint against Uy, Chua, and Borres. She alleged that she obtained 3 loans from Chua (P5.5M) where she issued a REM over a lot.

Before the 3^rd loan was released, she was asked by Borres (agent of Chua) to sign a Deed of Sale conveying the lot to Chua for P3M but said that the deed was merely a formality.

Later, Fernando learned that a new TCT was issued in the name of Chua. Chua offered to sell back the property to Fernando for P10M and she agreed but she came to know that the same lot was sold to Uy for P7M.

Fernando sought to annul the deeds of sale and the recovery from Borres P200K which she allegedly gave as payment of the real property taxes of the lot as well as the amount of P120,000.00 which Borres unlawfully deducted from her third loan.

Chua filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, and that her cause of action has been waived or abandoned. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of prescription, ratification and abandonment of cause of action. It held that Fernando ratified Chua’s act of selling the lot to Uy by acknowledging that the latter is now the owner of the lot in her letter offering to repurchase the same and to pay the incidental expenses of the sale. But later on, the lower court modified its order by reinstating the complaint insofar as the action for the recovery of sum of money against Borres is concerned.

Fernando filed a notice of appeal. Chua filed a motion to dismiss for failure to file a record on appeal within the required period. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.

Certiorari with CA: trial court affirmed - the trial court validly rendered several judgments because the liability of Borres in Fernando’s third cause of action is distinct from the liability of the other respondents. To perfect an appeal, the CA ruled that Fernando must file a record on appeal in addition to the notice of appeal within 30 days from notice of the assailed order pursuant to Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 41.

Issue: w/n she was able to perfect her appeal – NO SC: Fernando’s cause of action against Borres for collection of sum of money is clearly severable from her action against the other respondents. Thus, rendition of several judgments is proper. Under Sec.

2(a) of Rule 41, no record of appeal shall be required except in specil proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require.

The rationale for requiring the filing of a record on appeal in cases where several judgment is rendered is to enable the appellate court to decide the appeal without the original record which should remain with the court a quo pending disposal of the case with respect to the other defendants.

Under Section 2(a) in relation to Section 3, of

Rule 41, Fernando is required to file a record on appeal within 30 days from her date of receipt of the trial court order. Considering that no record on appeal was filed, the CA correctly sustained the order of the trial court dismissing her appeal for failure to perfect the same within the reglementary period. A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business. The strict compliance with such periods has more than once been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in respect to the perfection of appeals.

Upon expiration of the period without an appeal having been perfected, the assailed order or decision becomes final and executory and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case.

Finally, even if we brush aside the procedural flaws in the instant case, the appeal is still dismissible because Fernando’s conduct is inconsistent with her claim of fraud. Instead of impugning the validity of the sale of the lot to Chua, she accepted the latter’s offer to resell the property in the amount of P10M. After learning that Chua sold the same lot to Uy, she again offered the buy the lot for P13M and to shoulder the payment of all incidental expenses, thus, confirming that Uy has a valid title over the property. What is more, she filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondents only on October 6, 1998, or almost 3 years from the time she learned of the alleged fraudulent transfers of her property.

MADRIGAL TRANSPORT V. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS, MACONDRAY AND CO., LUIS LORENZO, JR.

Sorry, everything was important 

FACTS: Madrigal Transport filed a petition for Voluntary Insolvency at RTC Manila Br. 49. Later, it filed a complaint for damages against herein respondents at RTC Manila Br. 36. In the latter action, Madrigal Transport alleged that it entered into a joint venture agreement with Lapanday for operating vessels for the shipping needs of Del Monte Phils. and it did so on the strength of Lorenzo’s representations in his capacity as the chairman of the board of Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray. The complaint for damages was caused by Lapanday and Lorenzo’s failure to deliver Del Monte charter hire contracts which was their end of the bargain, and for which Madrigal Transport obtained a 10M bank loan.

The insolvency court (br. 49) declared Madrigal Transport insolvent. After this, the respondents filed motions to dismiss the case pending before br. 36. Br.

36 granted the MTD for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, because by Madrigal Transport’s filing a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, it lost the right to institute the complaint for damages, pursuant to the insolvency law. RTC br 36 held that the right to prosecute actions belonged to the

court-appointed assignee, not Madrigal. Madrigal thus filed an MR, which was denied.

Then, it filed a Petition for Certiorari with CA.

The CA issued a resolution requiring Madrigal to explain why its petition should not be dismissed on the ground that the questioned lower court orders should have been elevated by ordinary appeal. CA eventually ruled that since the main issue in the case was purely legal, it was an exception to the general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal was available.

Respondents filed an MR with the CA.

CA ruling: respondents’ MR granted. Petition for certiorari filed by Madrigal is dismissed. CA held that an order granting a motion to dismiss was final, hence, it is the proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari (CA was referring to RTC’s dismissal of Madrigal’s MR).

Madrigal now filed a petition for review under Rule 45 assailang the CA’s ruling. Madrigal claims it correctly questioned the RTC’s Order through Pet. for Certiorari, respondents claim an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.

Issue: what’s the proper remedy? Appeal!

Ruling: Under Rule 41, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is: (1) Ordinary appeal (2) Pet. for review;

(3) Appeal by certiorari.

On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65. It may only be issued for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or GADALEJ. Its function is limited to keeping the lower court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Certiorari’s requisites are:

(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction¹; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not the proper remedy if appeal is available. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.

Certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.

1 “Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is “excess of jurisdiction”

when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate

remedy. Where an appeal is

available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

SC distinguished Appeal and Certiorari:

As to purpose. Certiorari is for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, appeal for errors of judgment (meaning error of law/fact).

As to manner of filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action; Parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).

As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. An original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.

As to the Period of Filing. Generally 15 days for appeal (depends on kind of appeal), a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than 60 days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution.

As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.

Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment in its Petition for Certiorari filed with CA. The issue raised there was the trial court’s alleged error in

Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment in its Petition for Certiorari filed with CA. The issue raised there was the trial court’s alleged error in