On March 24, 1941, it was m y painful duty to inform the United States government that Yugoslavia had decided to sign the Tripartite Pact and that the Prime Minister, Mr. Tsvetkovich, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Tsintsar- Markovich, would leave Belgrade that same evening for Vienna to affix their signatures to the pact.
In a lengthy telegram, Mr. Tsintsar-Markovich informed me of the impending event. Late in the afternoon of March 24, I conveyed this message to Mr. Sumner Welles. The Undersecretary expressed his disappointment and gravely informed me that once the pact was signed the United States government would change its attitude toward Yugoslavia.
Being in complete opposition to the new policy of the Yugoslav government myself, I told the Undersecretary that he would have to carry out this new policy with some other representative of Yugoslavia, as I had decided to re sign from my post. Mr. Welles, appreciating the difficulties of my position, asked me to delay my resignation until the signature of the pact became final. I then informed the U n dersecretary that I had already had conversations with some leading Yugoslavs in this country with a view to forming a Committee for Free Yugoslavia which would rally other groups in other parts of the world who might leave the
country to fight on the Allied side for the liberation of Yugoslavia. I pointed out to the Undersecretary that some detachments of the army in the south might cross to Greece to join in the battle against the enemy and that, further more, we could place more than two hundred thousand tons of our merchant marine at the disposal of the Allies. T h e Undersecretary expressed his appreciation of the ef forts I had made to influence my government to remain faithful to our traditional policy of defending national independence, and stated that he valued all further efforts which I could make in the Allied cause. But, he repeated, we would discuss this after the pact had been signed.
H e then asked me to convey to my government a com munication from the President saying that: “ In case the Yugoslav Government signs an agreement with Germany detrimental to the interests of Great Britain and Greece, who are fighting for the freedom of all, the President will be bound to freeze all Yugoslav assets and to revise entirely the American policy towards Yugoslavia.”
T he next day, March 25, Yugoslavia, with the usual cere mony, signed the Tripartite Pact at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna.
In the morning I asked the Minister Counselor of the British Embassy, Mr. Neville Butler, to be good enough to transmit a message to my colleague in Moscow, Mr. Milan Gavrilovich, as I did not have a code with which to com municate with him directly at our legation in the Soviet capital. Mr. Gavrilovich, leader of the Serbian Agrarian party, had sent in his resignation, a fact which the morning papers in Washington had just reported. I informed Mr. Gavrilovich that I also was about to hand in my resignation and wanted to coordinate our actions with a view to form ing a Committee for Free Yugoslavia. I had not yet done so, I informed my colleague in Moscow, on the advice of my friends in the State Department, who had expressed the
opinion that it would be more useful if I remained in my post until the situation had been completely clarified. Then they would discuss with me the formation of such a com mittee and their relations with me would be simpler than if I had resigned. I requested Mr. Gavrilovich to transmit to me, through the same channel, his views on the matter so that we could act in unison.
In my attitude I was also encouraged by the friendly support which I received from the members of my legation, who almost without exception shared my views and were ready to follow my example. W e were all greatly heartened by reports from American correspondents in Yugoslavia that the news of the signing of the Tripartite Pact had been received with great dissatisfaction by the people. T h ey re ported demonstrations in Belgrade and most of the princi pal Serbian cities, which clearly indicated popular disap proval of the government’s policy, and gave promise of serious events in the near future.
The decision of the Yugoslav government to sign the Tripartite Pact closed an important chapter of Yugoslavia’s policy during W orld W ar II. Hitler had scored an impor tant diplomatic success by achieving his objective of dom ination of Southeastern Europe and the Balkans without fighting. B y bringing Yugoslavia into the Axis camp, Hitler had made safe the right flank of his army from further pos sible attack. The German army concentrated in Southeast ern Europe and the Balkans could now proceed toward new objectives—Russia, Turkey, Greece, and the Middle East. It took Hitler more rime than it had in the case of any other country to bring Yugoslavia into the ranks of the Axis, but his efforts were crowned with a success which he thought would assure him of a bloodless conquest.
Nazi control in the Balkans was a heavy blow to Soviet prestige and a serious setback for the Allies and President Roosevelt. The President realized the key position and
strategic importance of Yugoslavia in connection with the control of the eastern Mediterranean and further penetra tion toward the Middle East. Hitler’s domination of the Balkans would open new bases for further German military operations toward the East. He might decide to strike either against the Soviets or against the British Empire, at its most vulnerable point, the Suez Canal, thus opening the w ay to the oil fields in the Middle East, and further to the Persian G u lf and India.
The British made a last attempt, on March 25, to influ ence Yugoslavia and arouse the people against the policy of their government by a passionate appeal broadcast by the Secretary for India, the Honorable Leopold S. Amery, an old friend of the Serbs. In his broadcast Mr. Amery told the people of Yugoslavia that “ it’s still not too late to save your country from Hitler's clutches. Your government cannot claim the right to sign away the honor and the in dependence of sixteen million people against their w ill." Addressing himself to the Serbs, Mr. Amery said: “ Your heroism in the First W orld W ar won the admiration of the world; do you want now to be classed along with Rumanians and Bulgarians as second-class men who followed the G er mans because they dared not face them in the field?”
Having secured the final acceptance of Yugoslavia, H it ler proceed to Vienna to sign the pact with the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Dragisha Tsvetkovich, and the Foreign Minister, Alexander Tsintsar-Markovich. B y his presence the Fiihrer wanted to emphasize the importance he attached to Yugoslavia’s signing the pact.
The diplomatic struggle in Belgrade was followed in tently throughout Europe and gave hope, especially to the peoples of occupied countries, that Hitler had encountered resistance which he could not dispose of so easily. But now all those hopes had vanished and Hitler emerged as the un disputed master of the European continent. Great Britain
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was left with only one ally in Europe, valiant, but little, Greece. This last foothold was doomed to collapse.
President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had to abandon hope, despite all their efforts, of influencing Yugoslavia, strategically and militarily the most important Balkan coun try, to join the Allies in their fight against the Axis.