In their long and difficult history the Serbs have had to face several tragic situations, but their choice, since the days of the medieval Serbian kingdom, has always been the same: not to make any compromise when the independ ence of their country and their personal liberties were at stake.
In 1389 the Serbian ruler, Tsar Lazar, was forced to de cide whether to accept a hopeless battle with the mighty Turkish Arm y or to compromise with the Turks at the price of national liberty and dignity. A t a memorable din ner, Tsar Lazar gathered the noblemen and military leaders of the kingdom around him. When he put the problem be fore them, they all chose to face the Turks in battle, know ing that their defeat was certain. Their decision was exalted by national tradition as the choice of a “ heavenly kingdom” in preference to an inglorious “ earthly kingdom.”
The Battle of Kossovo, which followed on June 28, 1389, brought to the Serbs almost five centuries of slavery, but the tradition of the “ heavenly kingdom” inspired them with unbroken faith in the destiny of their nation through out this long period of subjugation. It was the moving spiritual force that sustained the Serbs in the struggle for liberation which began with their insurrection in 1804.
In 1939, however, the Regent and his government, in their attempt to appease Hitler, reversed the centuries-old tradition and chose the “ earthly kingdom.”
But Hitler’s diplomatic victory proved to be short-lived, as the Serbs refused to accept the deal made by the Yugo slav government in Vienna. On March 27 the British Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, told the cheering House of Commons with undisguised joy and pride: “ Early this morning Yugoslavia found her soul.”
The Prime Minister of Yugoslavia and her Foreign Min ister had scarcely returned to Belgrade after their trip to Vienna when, at dawn on March 27, less than forty-eight hours after the signatures had been affixed to the Tripar tite Pact, a popular uprising overthrew the government and installed a new regime.in which the leaders of all political parties, except that of Mr. Tsvetkovich, were represented. The coup d'etat was executed by a group of younger officers belonging mostly to the air force and to the Royal Guard. The bloodless revolution encountered no opposition and was completely successful. The success was due not only to the careful preparation and bold execution of the plan, but also, and perhaps even more, to the fact that it corre sponded with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Serbian people. It was not a military putscky in spite of the fact that it was carried out by a group of army officers. It was a national uprising in which the organizers acted only in response to the irresistible demands of the Serbs, the strongest element in Yugoslavia. The leaders of the movement knew from their daily contact with people in Belgrade as well as from reports from the Serbian part of Yugoslavia that the Serbs were decidedly opposed to any collaboration with the Axis. The demonstrations which broke out spontaneously throughout the Serbian part of Yugoslavia when the news of the signing of the pact became known was the best evidence of the almost unanimous op position to the decison of the government.
The centuries-old tradition of Kossovo, of the “ heavenly kingdom,” had expressed itself once again and became the guiding spirit in the people’s revolt against the government.
It manifested itself in a naive but eloquent slogan, “ Bolje rat nego pakt” (“ Better war than the pact” ), and it was with this slogan that the regency and the Tsvetkovich gov ernment were swept from power and young King Peter II ascended the throne of Yugoslavia, less than six months be fore his official coming of age.
The Regent, who was on the w ay to his residence at Brdo, Slovenia, where he had planned to rest after the exhausting negotiations with the Axis, was brought back to the capital. The following day Prince Paul and his family were sent into exile, first to Greece, then to Kenya in South Africa.1
Mr. Tsvetkovich, Mr. Tsintsar-Markovich, and the Min ister of the Royal Court, Mr. Antich, closest collaborators of the Regent, were taken unharmed into protective cus tody. Dr. Machek and the Croat ministers of the over thrown government, members of the Croat Peasant party, were taken, in spite of their approval of the Tripartite Pact, into the new revolutionary government headed by General Dushan Simovich, Chief of the Yugoslav Air Force. The new Premier took also into his Cabinet the members of the Slovene People’s party and assigned to them the same posts they had held in the former Tsvetkovich government. The Chief of that party, Monsignor Fran Kulovec, was one of the first victims of the German bom bardment of Belgrade on April 6, 1941.
The Serbian political leaders, as well as the military lead ers, who had helped carry out the coup d'etat, considered that in view of the seriousness of the situation it was essen tial that the new government should include Croats and Slovenes representative of their largest political parties in order that the government be fully representative of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Therefore they had to insist that Dr. Machek, as the indisputable leader of the Croats, and
1 During the greater part of the war and up until the present time the Regent has lived in South Africa.
Monsignor Kulovec, as the head of the most important Slovenian party, join the new revolutionary government. T hey believed that if Yugoslavia presented a strong and united iafKt Hitler might be induced to make new arrange ments with her and not resort to war. But it was a whole week after the coup d'etat, on April 3, that Dr. Machek finally agreed to join the new government.
The American Minister was gravely concerned about the prolonged absence of Dr. Machek from the new government in Belgrade. Mr. Lane told me that Machek’s attitude toward the pact with Germany was obviously shared by the Croatian people in general. This was illus trated by the lack of enthusiasm in Zagreb about the change of regime. During the absence of Dr. Machek from Belgrade Mr. Lane was told, on March 29, by an influential member of Machek’s party—the Assistant Sec retary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs—that Dr. Machek made several conditions before entering the new govern ment. Machek wanted to know who the leading factors in the new government were—the King, General Simovich, the party leaders, or the “ youthful chauvinistic” Serbian ele ments in the army. He also desired assurances from the new government of a policy of neutrality. Von Hassell, during his passage through Zagreb in the middle of March 1941, noted that “ all Croats with whom I spoke emphasized the great difference between Croatia and Serbia: in Croatia there is no opposition whatever to Germany—with a few exceptions—on the contrary a desire to cooperate. In Serbia, really bellicose sentiments against Germany and Italy.” 2 Dr. Machek finally entered the government on April 3. But the moral effect of confronting Hitler with a united country was diminished by this delay. The new govern ment lost a great deal of time in ironing out domestic diffi culties at a moment when the situation called for the con-
, Von Hassell, op. cit., p. 175.
centxadon of all its efforts to solve the problems of national defense.
In spite of the dangers to which the country now stood exposed, and of the uneasiness due to the unsettled domes tic situation, the coup d'etat was greeted by enthusiastic manifestations in Belgrade and throughout Serbia, as well as in all the Serbian cities of Yugoslavia. The Serbs were proud to have taken their destiny into their own hands at this historic moment, even if the decision should bring end less sacrifices to the country. The first spontaneous demon- tration by the population of Belgrade after the coup detat was in front of the American legation, where the people cheered the representative of the great republic which in their eyes symbolized all their ideals of freedom and democracy. In these manifestations, members of all classes of the people, as well as the representatives of great national organizations, took part, and the only dissenting voice came from the Communists.
Following the party line and the instructions from Mos cow, which was still trying to preserve the Ribbentrop- Molotov pact, the Communists flooded the capital with leaflets, warning the people of “ Serbian chauvinists, who were deliberately dragging the country into the war for the defense of the British Empire and dying capitalism.” The Communists also tried to stage counter-demonstrations making use of the freedom of assembly restored by the new government, but they were quickly repressed by the overwhelming majority of the patriotic masses. On March 30 the Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist party held a secret meeting and voted a resolution calling on the people to oppose those elements which wanted to bring the coun try into the war in defense of British imperialism, and pro claiming their solidarity with the Soviet Union. One of the pamphlets distributed by the Communist party on March
31 proclaimed: “ The nations of Yugoslavia are endangered
by the ferocious British war instigators and the Greater Serbian national extremists who, with their provocative be havior, drive the country into war. Do not allow these ir responsible elements and imperialists, especially in Serbia, to carry out their work. W e do not want an imperialistic war.”
Today the historic coup detat of March 27, 1941, is celebrated by Tito and the Communist party of Yugoslavia as their own achievement, regardless of the fact that at the time they did everything to sabotage it.
In the United States and Great Britain the news of the coup detat was received as a “ lightning flash illuminating a dark landscape.” 8 It was heralded as an event of historic importance, as an act of courage by a little people: “ T o stand up and fight and have their country exposed to war, very probably to being overrun and ravaged rather than to accept betrayal. But there is a country which has been overrun before and has lived because its people have dared to fight.” 4
“ Serbia asserts itself,” wrote the Christian Science Moni tor in its editorial of March 28. “ The same Balkan nation which first dared defy the Turkish Sultans and broke the yoke of centuries-old slavery has also been first to defy Axis dictators and to throw the yoke of a new enslaving treaty. One of the bravest peoples of Europe was driven to a crossroad where it had to make a quick and momentous choice and it chose what it firmly believed to be right.”
The British and American press, unanimous in their en thusiastic comments on the uprising in Belgrade, agreed that the consequences of this act would be of tremendous im portance to the outcome of the war. Without exception, all press and radio comments praised the “ spirit of Serbia” which had won for her the admiration of the whole world in World W ar I, and the Serbs as a nation which had set
3 The New York Times, March 28, 1941.
4 Nexo York Herald Tribune, March 18. 1941.
an example of how the independence of a country should be defended. T hey also all agreed that it was the first blow Hitler had received since the beginning of his spectacular conquest of Europe. This blow, the commentators added, would greatly affect Hitler’s prestige among the occupied nations and would give the people of these nations new courage to resist Nazi domination. “ In case of war Yugo slavia would cease to exist, at least for a rime,” wrote the N e w York Herald Tribune on March 29, adding almost prophetically, “ There would be Serbia once more with its wild passes, its difficult roads, its Chetniks and its fierce spirit.”
Those same feelings were shared by the common people of the United States and expressed in a most simple and moving manner. Our legation was besieged all day long on March 27 by countless callers, known and unknown, who had come to express their sympathies and best wishes for Yugoslavia and their admiration for the courage dis played by the Serbs. Floral tributes were in such great abundance at the legation in Washington that we sent most of them to the hospitals of the capital. Telegrams and tele phone messages poured in from all parts of the country, and those from American Serbs—particularly overjoyed and proud—were certainly not the least enthusiastic. The Yugo slav consulates in New York, Chicago, and Pittsburgh re ported to me the same warm approval in those cities.
The President and the administration were elated at the news from Belgrade. Mr. Roosevelt, who was on a Carib bean cruise, cabled immediately to King Peter II a message in which he said, among other things: “ A t this moment when Your Majesty assumes the full exercise of your royal rights and powers and the leadership of a brave and inde pendent people, I wish to share with the people of the United States in the expression of our sincere wishes for the health and well-being of Your Majesty and for the free dom and independence of Yugoslavia.” The President’s
message was sent even before an official notification was given to the United States government of the change of regime in Yugoslavia.
Mr. Sumner Welles, as Acting Secretary of State, at his press conference on March 27 stated that “ the information which has been received from Belgrade has been widely welcomed in the United States as a matter for self- congratulation to every liberty-loving man and woman.” He instructed the American Minister in Belgrade to call as soon as possible upon the new Prime Minister and the new Foreign Minister and to state in the name of the Amer ican government that the news of the establishment of the new government under the King and General Simovich had created immediate popular reaction in the United States. Mr. Lane was further authorized to inform the Yugoslav government that in accordance with the provi sions of the Lend-Lease Bill, the President, in the interest of the national defense of the United States, was enabled to provide assistance to Yugoslavia as he was to all other nations which were seeking to maintain their independence and integrity and to repel aggression.
Early in the morning of March 27 Mr. Welles called me by telephone to communicate to me the news of the upris ing in Belgrade and to ask me to come to his office without delay. He told me that he had learned with the greatest of pleasure the news of the formation of the new government in Belgrade, and that it seemed to represent the concentra tion of all democratic and national elements in Yugoslavia. He expressed the conviction that the policy of the new government would be dedicated to the defense of the inde pendence and sovereignty of the country. In these efforts the new Yugoslav government would be assured of sincere sympathy and material help from the United States. I re marked to the Acting Secretary that I had not yet been officially notified of the policy of the new government but I was sure that, while sparing no effort to preserve peace,
it would not acccpt any agreement with Germany which would affect the independence or the dignity of the coun try. Mr. Welles emphasized that the policy of the United States government had never been to press Yugoslavia to enter the war. The United States was only anxious to see her defend her independence and not surrender to Hitler. If she were now attacked by Germany, she could rely on food, as well as material and moral support from the United States. T o my question whether this support would be lim ited to the war period, Mr. Welles stated without hesita tion that when the time came for the restoration of peace Yugoslavia would receive the same moral and material sup port from the United States as that which the United States would extend to Great Britain.
T w o days later, on March 29, Mr. Welles called me in again to convey to me a message from President Roosevelt, who was still on his cruise in the Caribbean. The President wished me to inform the Yugoslav government that he was disposed to apply the provisions of the Lend-Lease Bill to Yugoslavia without delay. Consequently he was prepared to issue orders for immediate shipment of war material, equipment, medical supplies, and other commodities which we might need for our armed forces. These shipments would be made with the utmost speed and the President suggested that to this end we use the Yugoslav freighters now in American ports.
I told Mr. Welles that nine Yugoslav freighters, with an approximate tonnage of seventy thousand tons, were al ready at our disposal at the ports of Baltimore and New York. Those vessels had received orders from me on March 24 (the day when the official decision to sign the Tripartite Pact was announced) not to sail or accept any shipment without the authorization of the legation. Therefore they were immediately available. I informed the Undersecretary that I already had a list of war materials needed by Yugo slavia, but suggested that, in order to avoid any waste of
time, the American Military Attache in Belgrade request from the Yugoslav General Staff a complete list of the sup plies it would require.
Mr. Welles further informed me that the President had suggested that part of the cargo space on our vessels be re served for shipment of supplies to Greece and Turkey, and that, as soon as the first of those vessels was ready to sail, the shipment be announced publicly. Mr. Roosevelt fa vored such a course because he considered it would be a great moral stimulus to the people of Greece and Turkey. In this w ay they also would have evidence of American interest in and support of their policies of defending their national independence. O f course it was only a suggestion from the President, added Mr. Welles, and the final deci sion had to be made by the Yugoslav government. If it felt