CAPÍTULO IV DISCUSIÓN Y RESULTADOS
4.1. Resultados de los instrumentos
4.1.2. Características de la educación en el Perú
one of the few elements that scholars do believe is a constant in successful popular revolutions is that the regime must lose the will or the ability to employ violence effectively to crush the revo- lution.58 it seems unlikely that the islamic re-
gime will lose the will to crush internal threats to its rule. it is widely rumored among iranians that iran’s current leaders believe that the only reason that they succeeded in overthrowing the shah in 1978 was because he lost his nerve and refused to let the army crush the revolution (as many of his generals wanted)—and they have no intention of falling as he did. since 1979, the
58 Theda skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (New York: cambridge University Press,
1979); Theda skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (New York: cambridge University Press, 1994).
steady, low-profile effort to bolster democ- racy in iran may pay dividends in years or decades to come.
some elements of the policy, such as trying to increase intelligence penetration of iran’s military and security services, should be implemented even if Washington chooses not to adopt the whole approach. Many of these programs can be continued with much less fanfare and, if anything, become more effective in the long term for other policy options.
By adopting regime change as its policy, the United states can demonstrate a com- mitment to its democratic ideals that has been sadly lacking in past decades, a situ- ation that has greatly damaged the status of the United states in the Muslim world. claims of double standards in democracy and “arab exceptionalism”—by which Mid- dle easterners mean that the United states promotes democracy everywhere else in the world except the Middle east, where it is comfortable with autocracies that guaran- tee the oil flow—are key elements of the an- ti-americanism that dominates the Middle eastern street. if the iranian regime contin- ues to foment instability across the Middle east, and the United states and the interna- tional community are unwilling to stop it, at the very least, the United states would al- ways be able to say that it never enabled or appeased that trend. Washington may not succeed in stopping tehran, but it would not have been complicit in assisting it.
Disadvantages:
The biggest challenge to regime change would be its feasibility. For all its many shortcomings, the iranian government is well entrenched. as suzanne Maloney The point is that the iranian regime may not be
willing to go gently into that good night; instead, and unlike so many eastern european regimes, it may choose to fight to the death. in those circum- stances, if there is not external military assistance to the revolutionaries, they might not just fail but be massacred.
consequently, if the United states is to pursue this policy, Washington must take this possibility into consideration. it adds some very important requirements to the list: either the policy must include ways to weaken the iranian military or weaken the willingness of the regime’s leaders to call on the military, or else the United states must be ready to intervene to defeat it.
Pros and Cons
The following are the advantages and disadvantag- es of supporting a popular uprising.
advantages:
at least on paper, more than any other op- tion, regime change offers the greatest poten- tial benefits for the least cost. if it is success- ful, regime change could alter iran from one of america’s biggest enemies to a potential friend while at the same time changing an op- pressive regime to a democratic one (in some variations), or at least one that is probably more friendly. in addition, this change could occur at a fraction of the cost of overthrowing the regime by mounting an invasion.
even if triggering a popular revolution proves impossible, supporting iranian op- position groups could still weaken and dis- tract the regime and possibly limit its abil- ity to make mischief elsewhere.
even if a revolution does not occur during the tenure of the current administration, a
are overwhelming), and may continue to pursue its nuclear program (support for a nuclear program is robust among most iranian elites). however, it is possible that new leaders might be more open to cooper- ating with Washington on these issues and generally would be more sensitive to inter- national opinion and economic pressures than the current regime.
U.s. support may backfire. in the past, and especially since the 1978 revolution, american backing has typically been the kiss of death for internal iranian opposi- tion groups (for instance, very modest U.s. efforts to support regime change in the 1990s helped discredit reformers in iran). so many iranians instinctively bristle at american meddling in their country’s af- fairs that even groups favorably disposed to the United states typically refuse to accept any american support for fear of being dis- credited among the people as foreign lack- eys, and being arrested and charged with treason by the government. as such, many leading reformers in iran have spoken out
against U.s. funding for democracy promo-
tion or other efforts to encourage regime change in iran. today, as abbas Milani of stanford University notes, “anyone who wants american money in iran is going to be tainted in the eyes of iranians.”62 Not
surprisingly, the state Department has of- ten found it difficult to spend the money it has allocated to promote democracy.63 it is
thus possible that an aggressive U.s. regime change policy may lead to a weaker demo- cratic movement.
notes, “The islamic republic has sur- vived every calamity short of the plague: war, isolation, instability, terrorist attacks, leadership transition, drought and epic earthquakes.”60 The regime is absolutely
paranoid about the slightest hint of inter- nal revolt and has successfully repressed, co-opted, or isolated potential sources of resistance.
as a result, the regime has made it ex- tremely difficult for opposition movements to survive, let alone thrive and gain popular support. Ultimately, those oppositionists who are most organized have at best mar- ginal prospects, and many are risky bets. The results of regime change may be less
to Washington’s liking than expected. as richard haass points out, ousting a regime is hard enough, but replacing a regime with a government that serves U.s. interests and governs well is far harder yet.61
even democratic regime change would not necessarily bring to power a pro-american government. Despite the desire on the part of many iranians for closer relations with the United states, U.s. policies in the region remain unpopular with most iranians, and past U.s. meddling and current U.s. efforts to isolate iran also may be viewed with hostil- ity. That said, most alternatives to the current regime would probably be less supportive of terrorism and, in general, less reflexively anti-american in their policies. iran would still be likely to try to maintain a strong posi- tion in iraq (where its geopolitical interests
60 suzanne Maloney, “Fear and Loathing in tehran,” National Interest (september/october 2007). 61 richard haass, “regime change and its Limits,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (July/august 2005): pp. 66-78.
62 as quoted in tom Barry, “iran Freedom and regime change Politics,” May 19, 2006. available at <http://rightweb.irc-online.org/rw/3277.
html>. The quote is taken from the New York Times.
not need to have the support of the iranian people for its actions, as long as it can jus- tify them according to the regime’s ruling islamic credo. it appears more likely than not that loyal military units would fire into crowds, and the regime would not hesitate to carry out mass trials to stay in power. regardless of the policy’s ultimate outcome,
iran is likely to retaliate almost immediate- ly against the United states just for having supported reformers and other opposition- ists. tehran is exceptionally sensitive to the security of the regime, and its current lead- ers are loyal to their vision of the legacy of the islamic revolution. if the United states directly threatened its power with a mas- sive campaign, tehran would likely take several steps. First, it would step up its sup- port for guerrilla and terrorist groups. iraq would be a particularly likely venue given iran’s extensive paramilitary and intelli- gence presence there, as well as the avail- ability of many U.s. targets. afghanistan, too, would be a likely theater for an iranian response. attacks elsewhere in the Middle east and europe would also be quite possi- ble. second, because U.s. efforts to promote regime change would affirm iran’s paranoia about its own security, tehran would re- inforce its already high commitment to its nuclear program. Third, iran might step up its military buildup, though even a sig- nificant investment would have only a mar- ginal impact on the U.s.-iran conventional military balance.
Greater efforts to promote democracy and work with opposition figures may prompt the regime to crack down harder. increased (and very high-profile) U.s. funding for democracy promotion in iran in the past five years led to a crackdown on iranians involved in track ii dialogue and on those trying to develop civil society organiza- tions. The attention given to the Bush ad- ministration’s program to promote democ- racy in iran suggests the problems with this approach. although the overall amount of money is a fraction of what a sustained democracy program would require, the iranian government has proven exception- ally paranoid about it. iranian intelligence officials regularly bring up this appropria- tion when they interrogate activists.64 as
a result, many iranians are wary of activi- ties that could even indirectly be linked to the United states.65 as Fariba Davoodi
Mohajer, who has campaigned for women’s rights in iran, contends, U.s. support for civil society “becomes a ready tool for the iranian government to use against totally independent activists. it’s been very coun- terproductive.”66
should efforts take off and a mass move- ment develop, the clerical regime is unlike- ly to go without a fight. The regime might resort to a brutal crackdown that leads to the death and imprisonment of thousands. its rhetoric and actions against the reform movement in the past indicate that it be- lieves violence is legitimate and that it does
64 robin Wright, “on Guard over U.s. Funds, Pro-Democracy Program Leads tehran to scrutinize activists,” Washington Post, april 28, 2007. 65 azimi, “hard realities.”