CAPÍTULO II: MARCO TEÓRICO
2.4. Literatura infantil
B
ecause the iranian regime is widely disliked by many iranians, the most obvious and pal- atable method of bringing about its demise would be to help foster a popular revolution along the lines of the “velvet revolutions” that toppled many communist governments in eastern europe be- ginning in 1989. For many proponents of regime change, it seems self-evident that the United states should encourage the iranian people to take pow- er in their own name, and that this would be the most legitimate method of regime change. after all, what iranian or foreigner could object to help- ing the iranian people fulfill their own desires? Moreover, iran’s own history would seem to sug- gest that such an event is plausible. During the 1906 constitutional Movement, during the late 1930s, arguably during the 1950s, and again dur- ing the 1978 iranian revolution, coalitions of intellectuals, students, peasants, bazaari mer- chants, Marxists, constitutionalists, and clerics mobilized against an unpopular regime. in both 1906 and 1978, the revolutionaries secured the support of much of the populace and, in so do- ing, prevailed. There is evidence that the islamic regime has antagonized many (perhaps all) of these same factions to the point where they again might be willing to support a change if they feel that it could succeed. This is the foundational belief of those americans who support regime change, and their hope is that the United statescan provide whatever the iranian people need to believe that another revolution is feasible.
of course, popular revolutions are incredibly complex and rare events. There is little scholarly consensus on what causes a popular revolution, or even the conditions that facilitate them. even factors often associated with revolutions, such as military defeat, neglect of the military, economic crises, and splits within the elite have all been reg- ular events across the world and throughout his- tory, but only a very few have resulted in a popu- lar revolution. consequently, all of the literature on how best to promote a popular revolution— in iran or anywhere else—is highly speculative. Nevertheless, it is the one policy option that holds out the prospect that the United states might eliminate all of the problems it faces from iran, do so at a bearable cost, and do so in a manner that is acceptable to the iranian people and most of the rest of the world.
Goal
The true objective of this policy option is to over- throw the clerical regime in tehran and see it replaced, hopefully, by one whose views would be more compatible with U.s. interests in the region. The policy does, in its own way, seek a change in iranian behavior, but by eliminating the government that is responsible for that behavior
guards against any popular revolt, it is impossible to know how long it would take for the United states to promote a revolution in tehran. it may be that, as many proponents contend, the iranian people are desperate to overthrow the regime and the emphatic commitment of the United states to the cause would be sufficient to trigger the irani- an people to move against their government. But this claim has been made many times in the past, both about iran and other countries, and has only occasionally proven true. Moreover, even if the people were willing, they may not be able; they may need help organizing and finding leaders, or they may need to wait until the regime suffers some major setback that provides an opportunity to act. in short, it could take years to decades to engineer a popular revolution in iran, and any american administration that adopts this option should do so understanding that it could happen very quickly (in a matter of months), very slowly (in a matter of years or decades), or not at all.
overview of the Policy
Popular revolutions, especially successful popular revolutions, are so complex and uncommon that it is difficult to outline a specific course of action that would have a high likelihood of sparking one. Many outside observers, however, are nonethe- less optimistic that some form of “people power” could topple the clerical regime. They point to the following favorable factors:
The regime is unpopular with many irani- ans due to graft and economic mismanage- ment;
The regime’s religious legitimacy has de- clined considerably, and many senior cler- ics now reject the velayat-e faqih system; and
without the use of american military forces. in- deed, inherent in this option is the assumption that the current iranian regime is uniquely prob- lematic for the United states—that a successor would not attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, nor seek to overturn the regional status quo by stoking instability. it is worth noting that if a future democratic iranian regime did continue these policies, that might prove more of a prob- lem for the United states than their pursuit by what is clearly an autocratic regime.
While the ultimate goal is to remove the regime, working with the internal opposition also could be a form of coercive pressure on the iranian regime, giving the United states leverage on other issues. iran under the shah, for example, backed a Kurd- ish insurgency in iraq and helped make the rebels quite potent. The shah then abruptly sold out the Kurds in exchange for iraqi concessions on demar- cating the iran-iraq border. in theory, the United states could create coercive leverage by threaten- ing the regime with instability or even overthrow and, after having done so, use this leverage to force concessions on other issues such as iran’s nuclear program or support for militants in iraq.
This mix of goals can be seen as a spectrum: if the policies achieve relatively limited gains, they can be expanded to try to achieve ambitious results. as scott carpenter, who served as a U.s. deputy assistant secretary of state and focused on de- mocracy promotion, contends, “if the U.s. plays its hand effectively, we can weaken the tyrant of tehran substantially—and ideally empower his own people to effect peaceful change.”50
Time Frame
Because popular revolutions are so rare and unpre- dictable, and because the iranian regime vigilantly
form of widespread popular demonstrations and unrest that eventually discredit the government and lead it to exit the scene. Past examples range from the bloody overthrow of the ceausescu government in romania to the more peaceful re- moval of the Marcos regime from power in the Philippines.
The United states could play multiple roles in facil- itating a revolution. By funding and helping orga- nize domestic rivals of the regime, the United states could create an alternative leadership to seize pow- er. as raymond tanter of the iran Policy commit- tee argues, students and other groups “need covert backing for their demonstrations. They need fax machines. They need internet access, funds to du- plicate materials, and funds to keep vigilantes from beating them up.”52 Beyond this, U.s.-backed me-
dia outlets could highlight regime shortcomings and make otherwise obscure critics more promi- nent. The United states already supports Persian- language satellite television (Voice of america Per- sian) and radio (radio Farda) that bring unfiltered news to iranians (in recent years, these have taken the lion’s share of overt U.s. funding for promoting democracy in iran).53 U.s. economic pressure (and
perhaps military pressure as well) can discredit the regime, making the population hungry for a rival leadership.
to a limited extent, the congress and the Bush ad- ministration took steps to support regime change by encouraging democracy in iran. Under the iran Freedom support act of 2006 (and subsequent renewals), the United states is authorized to pro- vide financial and political aid to organizations reformers have at times done well in elec-
tions, and while the current elected leader- ship is extremely conservative, it won pow- er in part by excluding more liberal rivals from the process and because turnout was often low. 51
in addition, these observers note that some irani- ans opposed to the clerical regime are pro-amer- ican, and even those who are more skeptical of the United states are not as aggressively hostile as the current clerical regime, which is one of the most anti-american governments in the world. iran is one of the rare Muslim countries where much of the population wants closer ties to the United states, so promoting a democratic change might make more sense there than it would in a country like saudi arabia, where popular hostil- ity to the United states is high. This suggests that at least a few of those willing or desirous of mov- ing against the current regime might look to the United states for support in their effort.
Beyond this, however, it is often difficult to be specific about how a popular revolution might start, let alone be carried through to completion, especially when considered in the context of a fragmented and opaque iranian political system. it could begin with more pragmatic leaders recog- nizing the problems and illegitimacy of the cur- rent system and trying to reform it to the point where the system itself breaks under the weight of the contradictions and tensions that emerge (for example, the process by which Gorbachev’s
perestroika and glasnost led to the collapse of the
soviet Union). alternatively, it could take the
51 Velayat-e faqih means “rule of the jurisprudent” and is the shorthand term used to describe the philosophical underpinnings of the iranian
regime. Briefly, according to Khomeini’s theories about politics, the government should be presided over by the person most learned in islam and islamic legal theory, the supreme jurisprudent. This is how Khomeini justified the creation of a theocratic regime in iran, and his own predominance within it.
52 as quoted in Jeffrey Donovan, “iran: Pressure Builds on Washington to Promote ‘regime change,’” radio Free europe, June 17, 2003. 53 eli Lake, “This Pretty Much Kills the iran Democracy Program,” New York Sun, November 8, 2007. Lake reports that $49 million of the $75
million authorized in 2006 went to Voice of america Persian and radio Farda. Lake’s article also discusses the allegation that U.s. funding of democracy programs is detrimental for reformers, addressed in more detail below.
work. a popular revolution certainly requires homegrown leaders, even if they are brought in by sealed train, as Lenin supposedly was by Wil- helmine Germany. in addition, the United states would need to ensure that its support does more good than harm. it is also necessary that iran’s ex- isting security services, which have proven them- selves quite capable, either are unable to act or choose not to. Finally, all of this, in turn, requires excellent intelligence and, for some options, con- siderable funding.