Selección del Escenario

one of the hardest tasks in fomenting a revolu- tion, or even just unrest, is finding the right local partners. resisting an authoritarian regime like tehran’s is a dangerous game: failure can mean not only arrest or execution for the rebels, but also severe punishment for their families. in ad- dition, a regime has huge advantages in organiza- tion and unity in general: its forces work together (for the most part), magnifying their strength. The opposition, in contrast, often begins as disor- ganized idealists and has difficulty communicat- ing effectively. a quick look at some of the more plausible candidates for a revolution illustrates the difficulty of finding the proper local channels for effecting a revolution.

The reformists

iran’s reform movement would appear to be the most obvious vehicle for popular revolution. There is considerable evidence that many within the reform movement during the 1990s explic- itly sought to topple the islamic regime and re- place it with a secular democracy. Unfortunately, the reformist movement rose and fell with the fortunes of former president Muhammad Khatami, who proved unwilling to lead the revolution that promoting democracy in iran, and has spent tens

of millions of dollars to this end.54 _{This legisla-}

tion noted that promoting antiregime media and backing civil society and human rights organiza- tions were appropriate uses of the funding, but it stipulated that the funds were not to be used to support the use of force or for entities that are designated as foreign terrorist organizations. The press has also reported a host of covert programs designed to promote regime change or bolster an- tiregime officials.

requirements

in one sense, encouraging a popular revolution in iran might require very little—perhaps even nothing at all—from the United states. Very few true popular revolutions have been successfully abetted, let alone caused, by an external power. rather, most are propelled by forces indigenous to the country. even in the case of the velvet revolutions that followed the end of the cold War, it is hard to find one that the United states directly caused. certainly, there were some that the United states probably helped by encourag- ing them and pledging assistance once they got going, but it is impossible to know whether such revolutions would have succeeded or failed with- out that support—and many others succeeded or failed based on factors wholly unrelated to exter- nal assistance.

however, if the United states were determined to try to cause a revolution, this could be a very tall order because of the limited knowledge about how these phenomena begin and succeed. at the very least, it is clear that if the United states were going to have any chance at instigating a revolution, it would have to find effective and popular iranian oppositionists with whom to

54 _{The act itself authorizes the spending of $75 million, although only $66.1 million was ever appropriated. some additional monies were}

speak directly to regime legitimacy, which rests on religious credentials. Not surprisingly, the regime has tried to use both formal and infor- mal means to sideline these people. in addition, these clerics are limited in part by their own message: because they push for the clergy to be more apolitical, their own political involvement tends to be limited.

since the peak of reform in the late 1990s, intel- lectuals in iran, both clerical and lay, have suf- fered tremendous repression. Many have been beaten or threatened with force. others have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges, lost their jobs, or even killed or driven into exile. Less directly, but probably more effectively, ma- jor media outlets have denied them airtime, and the regime monitors them and prevents them from speaking to large groups. Dissent does get out, but because of this censorship and intimida- tion, it is less effective than it would otherwise be. even indirect contacts with foreign organi- zations, particularly ones linked to U.s. democ- racy promotion efforts such as the National en- dowment for Democracy, are grounds for severe punishment.

Student, Labor, and Civil Society organizations

students and workers are often the shock troops of revolutionary movements. students typically are willing to take considerable risks and, in so doing, expose holes in the regime’s coercive ap- paratus or create divisions within the existing elite. in the 1990s, students in particular were enthusiastic about Khatami and the promise of reform. indeed, during the summers of 1999 and 2003, thousands of students at tehran University attempted to start just such a revolution, as their forebears had in the revolution of 1978. But this time around, none of iran’s other popular fac- tions was willing to join them. Workers too have demonstrated from time to time against regime policies.

so many of his followers seemed to want. The tre- mendous disappointment of his presidency caused a fragmentation of the movement he led, and today the reformist parties are divided and weak. Many former reformists have abandoned the formal re- formist parties for others that are considered more effective. The reformists are suppressed, harassed, and often barred from office by the regime. al- though many iranians still share the same ideals (and probably goals) as the reformists, the parties and their leaders no longer have the ability to mo- bilize the populace the way they once did.

Moreover, although some reformists clearly sought a full-scale revolution, it is not clear that all did. Many probably only sought specific chang- es—an end to corruption, greater transparency and accountability, a weakening of the powerful unelected government entities that ultimately rule the islamic republic, more competent eco- nomic management, and an end to the stringent social codes that still govern iranian life. cer- tainly, these would represent dramatic changes in the nature of iranian governance, but they are not necessarily incompatible with the continuation of the islamic republic.

Intellectuals

The questioning of the underlying legitimacy of a regime by intellectuals is often and correctly seen as a serious threat: having the regime dis- credited among key “opinion shapers” is a critical precondition for its collapse. iran has a significant intellectual class, consisting not only of academ- ics and reformist journalists but also, and perhaps more important, dissident clerics. time and again these voices have criticized the regime, with some going so far as to question the legitimacy of the velayat-e faqih system itself. These criticisms ap- peared to reach a high point under the presidency of Khatami in the late 1990s.

Dissident clerics are a particularly important part of the elite opposition. Their criticisms

Less than the Sum of Its Parts

although the above list of candidates is impres- sive, many of the individuals rarely work togeth- er, and some offer little or could even discredit a broader movement. akbar Ganji, an iranian journalist whose articles exposed regime murders and who was imprisoned for six years as punish- ment, has said of the iranian opposition, “it’s not organized. . . . and we still don’t have a leader.”57

Many of these people, like Pahlavi, have little in common with the intellectuals and students who make up the core of the reform movement. so far, no charismatic leader has emerged to unite the different organizations and inspire other iranians to take up the banner of change.

Money

a significant program to promote democracy in iran would require far more money than Wash- ington has currently allocated. if the United states is to go beyond its current modest effort to pro- mote democracy, it would have to spend tens of millions of dollars a year, if not more. This re- quirement would grow if the programs are suc- cessful: more people would have to be support- ed, and they would require more equipment to communicate and travel. in addition, the United states would have to accept the reality of waste and fraud. some of the money would be siphoned off by schemers, while other money would go to back figures who turn out to have little support.