Preceding the split of an organisation the group will factionalise through different forms of intra-organisational conflict as has been described in Chapter 2. Some researchers regard the intra-organisational conflicts and wider societal changes as being the primary causal variables of organisational split.188 The factionalism of the group predominantly grows from the call from certain sections of the organisation for a change in policies and/or practices.189 However, these factions may have their roots in previously long- standing cleavages between sub-groups.190 For this reason analysts of splits must have clear understanding of the historical precursors, as they may prove informative in the search for a viable explanation. Similarly they must not stop their analysis at the point of split as the far-reaching effects may prove more significant than the action itself. As was observed in the analysis of the 1969 split in the Indian National Congress the effects of the split can be significantly observed for a decade and beyond in subsequent political trends and forces.191 It may be found in this historical analysis that the organisation has endured a number of different splits throughout its existence. One can then assess whether or not there is any recurring theme which can provide an insight to the organisational split under examination.
Balser describes factionalism as concerning groups belonging to the same organisation ‘that come into conflicts as they pursue different goals, strategies and tactics, stemming from their diverging interests.’192 This description can prove to be significantly
misleading as in the course of organisational factionalism the divided groups do not always differ on all three of the factors detailed by Balser. For example it is common that divided factions will be in agreement on the purposive goals they wish to pursue,
however, have become factionalised in their views as to how best to achieve these goals. A clear example of this is evident in Khadka’s analysis of factionalism in the Nepalese Communist movement where the movement was divided into two factions, both of which wished to abolish the existing monarchy, however, one wished to do so through
188 Singh (1981), p.22.
189
Burke Rochford Jr, (1989), p.163 190
Ibid; Stark and Banbridge (1985), p.101. 191 Singh (1981), p.2.
democratic means and the other through people’s agitation.193 This example illustrates the presence of agreement on goals but a split occurring due to a disagreement on how best to achieve these goals.
While the existence of factions and internal organisational disagreement may prove difficult for an organisation their presence do not always lead to organisational split. A split only occurs when one of these factions deems it necessary to leave the organisation to form a new group, and the two major predictors of the development of factionalism, and ultimately split, have been noted as being the ‘heterogeneity of the social base and the doctrinal basis of authority.’194 Consequently larger organisations may be deemed more susceptible to organisational factionalism and split as the larger the organisation the more heterogeneous it is likely to be. Khadka’s example of the Nepalese Communist movement once again illustrates this as it was observed that the larger the movement got the more internal feuds and factionalism proliferated.195 However, this should be only regarded as a prologue to our understanding of factionalism and splits, and we must question whether it is in fact the heterogeneity of a group’s social base that can be the cause of a large group’s factionalism. There may be other factors at play within a split which may at first have been explained by heterogeneity. Each case of factionalism196 or split must be taken on its own merits and they must be analysed as to why and how each individual case occurred. For example what may be regarded as the result of
heterogeneity in one case may be the result of a clash of personalities in another.197 Therefore while the theoretical proposals of Zald and Ash and others may prove useful as guidelines, a guideline on what can be expected is all that they can really be. They must not be treated as true for each split until it has been applied and tested against the
individual case.
193 Khadka (1995), p.67
194 Zald and Ash (1966), pp.336-337. 195 Khadka (1995), p.57.
196
The very nature of an organisation dividing into factions displays a certain form of heterogeneity and therefore this notion of heterogeneous groups being more susceptible to splits is a tautology.
197 Kaur, K. (1999). Akali Dal in Punjab Politics: Splits and Mergers. New Dehli: Deep and Deep Publications. p.3.
With respect to the issue of doctrinal authority Zald and Ash noted that those
organisations concerned with questions of an ultimate ideological truth and theoretical matters are more susceptible to splits than those affected by less theoretical matters. Within this proposal it is not the actual ideology but the ideological concerns leading to the questioning of organisational authority and the behaviour of the leadership which will eventually split the organisation.198 Therefore if one is to ascribe to this claim it would follow that if the leadership can adequately deal with this questioning and convince the doubting membership of their authority and behaviour they can lessen the magnitude of a split, or completely fend it off. Again this does not posit that those organisations less fixated with theoretical and ideological truths will not split, it is merely saying that they are less likely to do so.
In organisational splits internal and external factors interact differently from case to case and therefore the way in which factionalism and schism occurs varies from organisation to organisation, and even in an organisation which experiences multiple splits each individual case may take place for differing reasons. While organisational split may be regarded as the dependent variable each individual split may be best explained by a distinct set of factors or by the same set of factors with varying degrees of importance.199 These factors must be considered alongside the effects of the external environment, as if one only considers the internal factors their analysis will be incomplete. Similarly no analysis should view one specific factor, be it internal or external, as being fully responsible for an organisational split.200 In their 2009 examination of schism in the Czech environmental movement Shriver and Messer noted that multiple factors
contributed to the factionalism and splits within the movement.201 While the movement’s ideology proved to be a major contentious issue within the Rainbow Movement202 the authors also noted the important roles which the changing political situation and debates on organisational tactics and strategy similarly factored in to the explanation of the
198 Zald and Ash (1966), p.337. 199 Balser (1997), p.207.
200Ibid, pp.224-225; This can be seen as one of the criticisms of Khadka’s (1995) analysis of factionalism in the Communist movement in Nepal. While a number of different splits are analysed the explanation of each individual split is attributed to one individual factor.
201 Shriver and Messer (2009), p.163. 202 A Czech environmental organisation.
organisation’s splintering.203 Therefore what is portrayed here can only be regarded as a framework of different circumstances in which an organisation may factionalise and ultimately split.
All forms of human organisations go through a variety of different disagreements and conflicts, yet not all of these conflicts result in split. The question must be then asked as to what forms of conflict result in organisational schism. Sani and Reicher propose that splits will only develop from those conflicts which the sub-groups, or at least one of the sub-groups, deem to be potentially threatening to what they consider to be the very essence of organisational identity. This is reflected in the inability of the conflicting groups to compromise on tactics, strategies and/or goals as this would result in a
compromise of identity. The authors therefore concluded that identity should not just be perceived as correlating with schism but as being a causal antecedent.204 Not all
members will classify the same issues as being a defining element of identity and therefore may regard organisational split as unnecessary when others deem it
unavoidable. This depends on how important each issue is perceived by the individual actors and sub-groups. Similarly it relies on the opportunities individual members believe they will have to change the organisation internally through the application of voice as described in the previous chapter. It is proposed that those who believe they will have significant opportunities will forego the chance to split and will stay with the parent organisation and attempt to influence internally.
Throughout the literature looking at organisational splits the act of schism is often times referred to as being a result of the decline or failure of the organisation.205 However, this is too narrow a viewpoint to take and could lead researchers to discontinue their analysis of the parent organisation in the aftermath of the split. While it may be true that the split may be illustrative of a declining organisation Balser has shown through her analysis of
203 Shriver and Messer (2009), pp.168-170
204 Sani and Reicher (1999), p.296; See also Sani, F. and Reciher, S. (1998). When Consensus Fails: An Analysis of the Schism Within the Italian Communist Party (1991). European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, pp.623-645.
205 This is true also within the realms of terrorism research. As a later section of the chapter illustrates the issue of splits in terrorist groups invariably resides in the end of terrorism literature.
four separate social movement organisations that the organisation can prosper in spite of split. She cites the examples of Earth First! and the American Federation of Labour as being two cases of organisations who succeeded and developed positively in the aftermath of a split.206 This finding is in line with the proposal that organisational split can provide a positive impact on an organisation and can prove a vital step in the group’s survival and prosperity. Balser cites these findings as being supportive of Simmel’s view that schism can be utilised by an organisation in order to deal with internal conflict and external threats.207