5.1. Presentación de resultados de la investigación
5.1.2. Características de los factores limitantes del desarrollo
The evaluative segment is the second segment of this thesis and has an explanatory approach, relating to subquestion 5, which is aimed at assessing to what extent the Netherlands government its intentions with regard to the contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan is connected to its capabilities. Kingdon (2011) already noted the importance of feedback for the executive branch of a government to signal certain problems in policy areas.
The main angle here is to assess to what extent the existing policy of the Netherlands government is addressing the problem it was designed to address. This segment is based on the evaluation and guideline set for evaluations of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department and contains additional remarks from Peter Swanborn who was written extensively on evaluation research. This paragraph will first discuss how the terms of reference were used as research methodology, before noting some remarks on the evaluation research that has been conducted as well as the importance of the limitations. Important herein are Swanborn’s his remarks on evaluation research. Subsequently this paragraph will discuss the findings and outcome of the interviewing process and the evaluative segment will end with a general conclusion and discussion on to what extent the Netherlands government its intentions with regard to the contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan is connected to its capabilities.
Terms of reference as research methodology
The questions from the terms of reference have been redrafted, and focused on the issue of assessing the contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan in relation to the outlined objectives. The questions focus on the role of the interviewee and if the individual has visited South Sudan. The questions further focus on the relations with other Ministries or departments, including the United Nations, the effect of the instruments on the formulated objectives, the aspect of problem recognition, certain focusing events during the engagement of the Netherlands in South Sudan between 2011 and 2016, the aspect of budget determination, if there are feedback or other evaluative moments during the policymaking and after the implementation phase, relations with non-governmental actors and their involvement in the policy proces and if a changing role and/or contribution is required in relation to the situation in South Sudan. The list of interviewees, as well as the transcripts of the conducted interviews, can be found in the appendix.
The interviewing process adopted the remarks from Swanborn, especially with regard to the fact that when researching government interventions, the researcher is operating in a political
context (Swanborn, 1999:331). This has already been discussed in the research design, as well as remarks on the selection of interviewees, limitations and the justification for the outlined approach.
Preliminary remarks
As noted in the research methodology, The selection of the interviewees was determined through the appropriate balanced representation of involved stakeholders surrounding the Netherlands government its contribution to the mission. Three main semi-structured interviews have been conducted, with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Defence and PAX for Peace, which is a non-governmental organization involved in the policy process. There have also been a number of off-the-record background discussions, most notably with a senior evaluator from the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department as well a senior analyst from the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service. These have been used to structurally complement the on-the- record interviews as well as enriching the analysis segment of this thesis.
The research methodology also notes that there are a number of limitations with regard to this evaluative segment and interviewing process. The most important one is the timeframe for this thesis. The pre-determined timeframe does not allow to conduct interviews with every involved stakeholder. Another limitation that was observed during the thesis process was the fact that a number of individuals that were approached for an interview indicated that they were not interested or familiair with the policymaking or agenda setting process. Others provided contact details of colleagues that had more involvement in the dossier and would be approachable to be interviewed. The interviewing process showed another limitation that had been described by Swanborn (1999), concerning transparency in evaluation research. Especially interviewee X3 made clear that full disclosure on all aspects of the policy strategy is in nonconformity with the outlined policy objectives for the Mission in South Sudan. Therefore, access to critical strategy documents is limited due to their confidential nature, which is a limitation for the evaluative segment.
During the interviewing process, some semi-structured follow-up questions have been used to gain more insight and to ensure the validity of the observed data for this research. The questions were derived from both the terms of reference, as well some questions that are derived from remarks from Swanborn (1999). The questions focus on the relations with other stakeholders, including the United Nations, the effect of the instruments on the formulated objectives, the aspect of problem recognition, focusing events between 2011 and 2016, budget determination, if evaluations are conducted after the implementation, relations with non-governmental actors and if a changing role and/or contribution is required in relation to the situation in South Sudan.
Findings
This paragraph will discuss the findings that appeal to the outcome of the interviewing process. The findings are divided into sub-paragraphs which highlight the most important segments of assessing to what extent the Netherlands government its intentions with regard to the contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan is connected to its capabilities. It will conclude with a small conclusion and answer of this subquestion, as well as some important takeaways for the discussion.
Findings with regard to the role of evaluations / Swanborn’s remarks on evaluation research
One of the most important outcomes of the background discussions and semi-structured interviews is the fact that there is no single form of independent or autonomous evaluation of the Netherlands government its contribution to the Mission in South Sudan.
It was stated by interviewee X1, interviewee X3 as well as in background conversations with a senior evaluator from the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, that there is no single comprehensive evaluation exercise into the effects and objectives on both the Netherlands government its engagement in South Sudan as well as its contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. There are however thematic policy reviews of broader instruments, such as a review of the Netherlands government its policy on fragile states as well as the Netherlands its policy with regard to humanitarian assistance. Both evaluations focus on 5-year periods.
There is however a small process of feedback according to interviewee X1, X2, and X3, but this is not embedded in a grounded structural process. This is for most part based on informal exchanges and relations between the involved stakeholders. According to interviewee X1, there was a feedback session during the 6-month rotational deployment in South Sudan with policymakers from several departments of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but most of this proces delegated to the Senior National Representative on the Netherlands Embassy in Juba. The session that was planned with the staff-officers of the Dutch Ministry of Defence was first postponed for a couple of hours and was, according to interviewee X1, due to the short timeframe, in no way an extensive attempt to gain comprehensive insight. There was also no formal individual debriefing or any other form of feedback or contactmoment after interviewee X1 returned from deployment.
The Dutch Ministry of Defence publishes an evaluation of the Dutch contribution to missions and operations on an annual interim basis, and assesses every contribution to the Toetsingskader, which is described in chapter 5. The paragraph concerning UNMISS (Tweede Kamer, 2017b), in this evaluation report, cannot be regarded as an evaluation exercise. It is in no
way insightful or a comprehensive analysis into the Netherlands government its engagement with regard to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. The evaluation report devotes less then one page on the topic of the mission, and is largely composed of a broad, non-descriptive situational report of the developments in South Sudan as well as the scale and broad range of tasks the current contingent is engaging in.
The above mentioned description of the role of evaluations in the Netherlands government relates to one of Swanborn’s (1999:28) remarks that relate to the fact that evaluation exercises take insufficiently place. This is a prime example of a government intervention with no functioning instrumentarium during its engagement into gathering comprehensive, structured evidence-bases insight into its intended effects and objectives. It can be stated from the analysis section of this thesis that the policy of the Netherlands government and its contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan is in constant development since its inception. According to Swanborn (1999:28) autonomous evaluation is in this regard vital to understand more about both the effectivity and efficiency of a government intervention or policy.
Swanborn (1999:64) speculates on the reason why a government as a client of an evaluation is interested in the results, especially if it neglects the policy objectives that are being pursued. It should be taken into account that when an actor invests heavily into a certain policy, both in financial terms as well as in prestige — a negative outcome of an evaluation will be perceived with reluctancy by the general public. This aspect could not be independently verified through the interviewing process or through the analysis segment of this thesis, which relates to the second remark from Swanborn (1999:31) on transparency, that full disclosure of policy strategies, and therefore evaluative choices, is often in nonconformity with underlying policy objectives.
Although Swanborn (1999:331) remark that an evaluation researcher should account for the political context in which they are operating, was noted by interviewee X2, who notes that both the decision making process leading up to the contribution in the House of Representatives as well as the international context in relation to the Netherlands government its commitments to the United Nations, are heavily politicized.
Concluding can be stated that most of Swanborn’s remarks are of added value for the methodological approach ,and highlight important deficiencies in the explanatory power of the terms of reference in conducting evaluation research. The next paragraph will discuss the findings with regard to the contribution, as well as the relationships with other Ministries and other involved stakeholders, the effects of the instruments on the objectives, problem recognition and focusing events as well as if the current contribution should be changed.
Findings with regard to the contribution
This paragraph will discuss the findings with regard to the relationship between the different stakeholders, namely the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PAX for Peace. It will further focus on the effects of the instruments on the formulated objective, problem recognition, focusing events, and if a changing role is required in relation to the current situation.
Relationships with other Ministries and other involved stakeholders
Interviewee X1 notes that most of the contacts between several Ministries were relayed through the Senior National Representative, who is one of the deployed staff officers at UNMISS headquarters in Juba. There were however contacts on a local level with members of the Netherlands Embassy, especially with the Defence attache. In terms of contacts with UNMISS, interviewee X1 noted that these were often strained, due to difficulties in the functioning of the mission its leadership as well as the Joint Monitoring & Evaluation Committee, or JMEC in Juba.
Interviewee X2 noted to have an extensive relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to its designated strategic partnership, as well as multiple local and national partners in South Sudan. There was no direct contact with the Ministry of Defence, although he remained in contact, both on a formal and informal basis, with the designated military advisor for the mission, who works for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interviewee X2 also notes that communication with UNMISS was relatively good, but was mostly based on informal relationships. Contacts with military personnel was strained, due their restraint in communicating with non-military personnel.
Interviewee X3 notes to have both formal and informal contacts with the Dutch Ministry of Defence as well as PAX. Interviewee X3 notes that he works closely with other policy officers from the Ministry of Defence on a weekly basis with regard to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. He further notes that he has a broad network of contacts on an informal basis throughout the ministry. Interviewee X3 also endorses the role of PAX for Peace, due to their expertise and continuous involvement in the dossier. Interviewee X3 further notes the importance of PAX for Peace policy briefs, stating that they are of significant value to the policymaking process.
The effects of the instruments on the objectives and other remarks with regard to the contribution
According to interviewee X1, there is a large distance between both 'intent' and 'capabilities'. Interviewee X1 notes that the formulated objectives do not match with the situation in South Sudan. Interviewee X1 further notes that the contribution is not structural, and that, from the viewpoint of
the Ministry of Defence, it is not desirable to actually contribute to the formulated objectives. Interviewee X1 states that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has other ideas about the contribution.
It must be noted that Interviewee X1 stated that the commitments and contribution of the Netherlands government in South Sudan is very important, due to its engagement efforts in the past. The Netherlands government should however formulate realistically achievable objectives, and adjust and redraft its current contribution and scope in due course, thereby mostly focusing on core specialities, such as logistics and specialized intelligence personnel.
Interviewee X2 also acknowledged the importance of the Netherlands government its engagement in South Sudan and that the current contribution should be redrafted to achieve the formulated objectives. Interviewee X2 did not provide an actual answer to the current effect of the instruments on the objectives, but noted that is a gap between the current intentions and capabilities. Interviewee X1 further noted that, in order for the Netherlands government to provide a substantial contribution, it should focus and specialize in some core tasks within the framework of the mission, while still fulfilling the mandate. Examples that are given by interviewee X2 are the same as X1, which is the devotion of intelligence personnel as well as focusing on air operations and logistics.
Interviewee X3 noted that it is difficult to measure the effect of the instruments on the formulated objectives. According to their own feedback mechanisms, it was concluded that the limited contribution of the Netherlands government is of added value, due to the expertise of the personnel. Interviewee X1 reiterated that one should be realistic in terms of achieving objectives, since the contribution only consists of 6 individuals, and that the objective certainly is not aimed at broader objective of the mission in South Sudan and its mandate. Interviewee X1 further noted that by with the Netherlands government its limited contribution, it still is, in fact, contributing and thereby improves the workings and functioning of UNMISS.
Problem recognition and focusing events
Interviewee X1 notes that in 2011 the contribution was constructed and based on a feasible plan, but due to the circumstances in South Sudan, it proved to be in the end an unfeasible approach. Interviewee X1 notes that there should have been more flexibility, especially in terms of operational capacity, to account for circumstantial shifts. Interviewee X1 also noted that the Netherlands government acted fairly naively or ignorant with regard the initial recognition of problems on the ground in South Sudan, especially by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence its Military Intelligence and Security Service, the latter is, according to interviewee X1, completely out of reach in their attempt to gain appropriate operational intelligence in these peripheral nations.
With regard to focusing events, interviewee X1 noted the decisions to reduce the contingent due to the deteriorating medical conditions in South Sudan, but is critical of the fact that capabilities are available to be deployed to improve the conditions, but that it is decided against to do so.
According to interviewee X2, there were also problems with regard to the factual problem recognition in South Sudan. PAX for Peace had been very vocal that, in order to fulfill the requirements for a peacekeeping mission, you need a military approach which composes of 50.000 well trained, well organized and well equipped soldiers from a limited amount of nations of the coalition of the willing, or one would opt for a political approach. Something in between would fail from the outset according to interviewee X2, which is what happend according to him. He further notes that this approach to the mission, in terms of posture, is very susceptible to future instability.
With regard to focusing events, interviewee X2 notes that the decision to reduce the contribution is one of the focusing events on a national level, but that the decision to do so was driven by preconceived agendas from government officials, which is of relevance to Kingdon’s theory (2011). According to interviewee X2, the Netherlands government noted that the United Nations is responsible for the medical conditions, but that the Netherlands government itself also shares a common responsibility as member state of the United Nations. Interviewee further notes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared that it would be decided that the contribution to the mission would be discontinued in its entirety, but due to external pressure from the United Nations Security Council, the decision was made to proceed, mostly due to earlier commitments and obligations. He however expected that when the conditions change, the Netherlands government would resume their contribution to the mission in its earlier formulated format.
Interviewee X3 noted that it is difficult to formulate the problem in one sentence due to the complex situation in its entirety, but that the Netherlands government its contribution in the last year was mostly focused on improving humanitarian conditions. This is also in line with the broader