Blame has been a popular topic in Anglophone moral philosophy for quite a while, and the revival of naturalistic philosophy, led by Strawson’s example, has inspired some of the most prominent philosophers, such as T. M. Scanlon and George Sher, to take part in the discussion. As has been mentioned previously, Coates & Tognazzini present an essential selection of articles on the topic in Blame: It’s Nature and Norms. (2013).108 Emphasis
on these authors is reinforced by Coleen Macnamara’s 2013 article in the same book. According to her, there are “multiple accounts of blame”, the currently influential ones including:
1. Sher’s blame: “blame is a set of behavioral and attitudinal dispositions that have their source in a belief-desire pair: the belief that someone has acted badly and the desire that the one blamed not have done what she did or not have the character traits she has.”
2. Scanlon’s blame: “to blame is to change one’s comportment toward another in acknowledgement of the fact that she has done something to impair your relationship with her.”
3. Strawsonian blame (incl. Wallace, Wolf and Darwall): “I blame another when I respond to her conduct with resentment, indignation or disapprobation, that is I blame another when I respond to her wrong-doing with a negative reactive emotion.”
(Macnamara 2013, 141.)
Further refinement is found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article “Blame”, also by Coates and Tognazzini (2014). For example, the authors distinguish the conception of blame as discussed in the context of theories of moral responsibility from “causal or explanatory blame”, which is not interesting as a philosophical question.109 Both of these sources (2013 &
2014) give an overview of the currently on-going discussion about blame. In
108
Coates & Tognazzini’s 2013 compilation Blame is a collection of high-quality articles, written by the most important thinkers on the subject. It includes texts by Wallace, Scanlon and Sher, to name a few. Darwall’s work is in the curious position of being usually grouped together with the Strawsonsian approach (see Macnamara 2013, 141), but in terms of blame mitigation he advocates the use of character. George Sher, T. S. Scanlon and Angela Smith, also listed in the latter group, are referenced below. Based on this book, the editors have also produced the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article “Blame” (2014).
109
The example used to describe causal blame goes as follows: “It is this notion of blame that is at stake when we say that Hurricane Hugo is to blame for the destruction of Charleston's harbor, or that the cat is to blame for knocking over the vase.” (Coates & Tognazzini 2014.)
the book (Coates & Tognazzini 2013), the authors go through various interpretations of what the concept is actually about and where it matters. They have noted that, indeed, most researchers working on blame approach the concept from some larger perspective such as theories of moral responsibility, as is the case with Wallace (1994). The article makes more general claims such as that blame is taken to be as “a common feature of our shared moral experience” (Coates & Tognazzini 2014). In both publications by Coates and Tognazzini, a division of the theories of blame into three categories is based on the common three-part separation of the mind in psychology.110 These groups that distinguish the dominant features of each of
the theories best are called “cognitive”, “emotional” and “conative” theories of blame. Cognitive theories of blame emphasize blame’s primary role as a judgment or an evaluation. Emotional theories on the other hand see blame as primarily having an affective quality. Finally, the conative group of blame- theories view blame more as a directing force such as desires or expectations that people hold. (Coates & Tognazzini 2014 & 2013, 8-15.)
Strawson, who defines the group of emotional theories of blame, is the starting-point, but alongside him, the important theories of other philosophers are discussed, especially those mentioned above. This aside, it would be a mistake to claim that this is the first time in history that the concept of blame has been discussed within Anglophone analytic philosophy. In fact, as early as 1956 Austin noted (literally, in a footnote) that the topic of blame has been examined thoroughly in a way that does not call for continuity. His exact words referred to blame as a “well-flogged horse” (Austin 1956/57, 7, n2). Of course, Austin’s notice comes from a different age, when the main concern of the professional philosophers was to determine the relations between natural and formal languages, and it is thus taken in that context. In this instance, Austin contrasted the conflating use of blame at once as causal blame and other times as the key component of responsibility, as is discussed here.
Something of the opposite is the case with the concept of praise. According to Wallace especially, praise is not genuinely related to blame, but is rather a disanalogous counterpart used in the same contexts. While traditionally paired with praise (since Aristotle), philosophers who have been previously working on moral responsibility have more recently concentrated on the concept of blame at the expense of the former. Wallace is the first writer examined here who explicitly claims that “praise does not seem to have the central, defining role that blame and moral sanction occupy on the practice of assigning moral responsibility.” (Wallace 1994, 62). This coincides with the general sentiment that the interest of the responsibility theorists has
110 Technically Coates and Tognazzini gather additional theorists under a fourth category of
“functional theories”, such as Hieronymi (2001), Matthew Talbert (2012), Victoria McGeer (2013) as well as Michael McKenna (2012, 2013). As these form quite a broad selection of theories from different angles, the study of these contributions is left to another occasion.
increasingly centered on the negative repercussions of wrong-doing, sanctioning and even retributive punishment in some cases.111 This is not to
say that praise has been satisfactorily explained away. On the contrary, Coates and Tognazzini predict that praise will be the next big topic of philosophical inquiries in the coming years.112
Today, however, the Strawsonian naturalistic revival and the developments that followed it have taken an interest in blame. The fresh perspectives on the subject, based on the writings of the notable philosophers working particularly in ethics rather than the linguistic analyses of past is pursued here. Some of these recent contributions are discussed, including Wallace, Scanlon113 and Sher. The contributions of these three seem to be
crucial to the current efforts to establish a common understanding about nature of blame.
111 See, for example, Gary Watson (2004/[1996], 283), who writes that “We seem to have a richer
vocabulary of blame than of praise”.
112
E.g., “[Macnamara’s article (2013)] suggests that a full understanding of praise will require an independent inquiry, which is something very few philosophers have undertaken.” (Coates & Tognazzini 2013, 26.) While Wallace excludes praise, the concept is present in at least the interpretations of Michael S. Pritchard, who emphasizes the ideas of moral development and education in his book On Becoming Responsible (1991). Similarly to the way Dennett classifies the “plateau” of moral agency, Pritchard quotes Thomas Reid, who held that there is a certain threshold of development that is reached at some point in life, after which the agent becomes a full-fledged moral agent. Blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are mentioned in this context as being important to the status of moral agency. (See Pritchard 1991, 33.) Another recent attempt at focusing attention on the praiseworthiness-aspect of responsibility is by Andrew Eshleman in his article “Worthy of Praise” (Eshleman 2014b). Praise is also part of Doris’s characterization of moral responsibility, also related to the context of moral education. His version is very critical, despite being about the whole idea of character-based moral education (Doris 2002, 121-127). Nevertheless, he includes consideration of moral education within his sketch of the subject, a context in which praise has an important role. Doris laments the lack of evidence regarding the benefits or efficacy of the character-based educational efforts, but one of the scarce actual findings of empirical research is Grusec and Redler (1980), according to whom attributional praise is more effective than unattributed praise when prosocial behavior is encouraged in children (Doris 2002, 126). Thus, at least in this way both Doris and Pritchard acknowledge praise as an element of accounts of moral responsibility. Granted that as Doris begins his evaluation of the character-based systems of moral education, he explicitly links the topic with a contemporary American “character education movement”, which is not known internationally, but does nevertheless sound unpleasant (see Doris 2002, 121). This movement might provide one reason or motivation for Doris to criticize character in the first place.
Wallace has recently been criticized by Paul Russell (2013) for framing his conception of responsibility too narrowly. This includes the overall emphasis of Wallace’s theory on the negative reactive attitudes.
See also Andrew Eshleman’s “Worthy of Praise” (2014b) as an example of a recent publication on the subject.
Coates and Tognazzini (2013 & 2014) present cognitive theories of blame as the point of comparison with all other types of theory that are discussed here. These relying on the idea that blame is primarily a judgment. They write of cognitive accounts that they “all capture something deep and important: blaming involves evaluating.[n22] When we blame others, we see them as having dropped below some standard that we accept (or perhaps that we think they should accept, whether of excellence, morality or respectful relationships.” (Coates & Tognazzini, 2013, 9.)
Some adherents of cognitive theories of blame go as far as to claim that the concept can be reduced solely to its cognitive aspects, as the mid 20th
century utilitarian J. J. C. Smart did (1961 & 1963). Blame would then fundamentally be conceived as “a judgment or evaluation that we make about an agent in light of her attitudes or her actions.” Smart, however, represents the “ledger view” type of responsibility theory which, according to Watson and Eshleman (discussed above in chapter 3), forgoes the social side of responsibility including notions of aretaic appraisal and reactive sentiments as constituents of responsibility. For this reason, his point of view is not considered as interesting in this case. (See Coates & Tognazzini 2014.)
Necessarily, as Coates & Tognazzini state, supporting a cognitive theory of blame does not result in a position that advocates the “ledger view” (ibid.). Another cognitively aligned blame theory, which they offer as an example is that of Pamela Hieronymi (2004), whose approach is appealing in stating that blame is primarily a judgment. The other theory discussed, emphasizing the cognitive aspect, is T. M. Scanlon’s earlier work (1986)114. Both
Hieronymi’ article and Scanlon’s earlier theory locate blame within the realm of judgments, and more specifically judgments about the dispositions of others toward us; for example, the judgments that are made of another where that person is acting out malice toward us.
Hieronymi’s cognitive account of blame builds on Gary Watson’s attributability/accountability division.115 She does this by emphasizing the
attributability “face of responsibility” (in Watson’s words), according to which our moral assessments of each other, including those leading to blame, involve an evaluation of that person and the action he or she takes based on what we consider important. Watson calls this practice the aretaic appraisal (see Watson 2004/[1996], 271), and Hieronymi goes as far as to claim that the reactive attitudes cannot be separated from this notion of aretaic appraisal (Hieronymi 2004, 39).
114 It is interesting to note that Scanlon’s early theory differs from his latter work. According to
Coates and Tognazzini’s article, in his work Scanlon’s early view of blame (1986) is conceived as primarily being cognitive by nature and that in his later work (2008 & 2013), his views shift toward a conative position.
Some of Gary Watson’s criticism of the Strawsonian position is concerned with blame.116 Coates & Tognazzini take his writings to belong within the
cognitive theories. They highlight his use of the term “aretaic appraisal”117
which, in addition to the determination of the blameworthiness of the agent, is included in responsibility assessments: not only do people decide whether to blame one another or not, we compare our conduct in comparison with the ideals that we would wish to uphold. Watson is critical of the emotional theories of blame, such as those advanced by Strawson and Wallace, but he does not dismiss the importance of the reactive sentiments. Rather he seeks to expand the quite limited core of the Strawsonian outlook by calling out its deficits, which need appending.
In his well-known article “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil”, Watson mentions Gandhi and Martin Luther King as examples of people who act against harmful practices essentially by blaming these practices in order to eliminate them. The example shows that the basic functionality of blame as proposed by Strawson as “a retributive act[,] one that involves a withdrawal of good will”, is not the only way to utilize the concept. This demonstrates that blaming is not valuable for its own sake, but just as a negative attitude. (Schoeman (ed.) 1987, 22 quoting Watson 1987, 286.)
If these theories were applied to an actual case, each one would emphasize a different way to react to wrong-doing. Say that A runs over a dog, which is owned by B. The way that B would blame A for the incident would depend on the theory. If cognitive, the act of blame would be interpreted as a judgment, i.e., B would cognitively make the judgment or the evaluation that "A ran over my dog. That's reprehensible. The person, A, is to blame for this." The Strawsonian theories offer the emotional interpretation instead, according to which blame is primarily an emotional response to wrong- doing. Strawson’s additions, which have been discussed above, concern equally blame-focused theories (when compared with theories of responsibility). Coates & Tognazzini explicitly mention Strawson as the key figure of the emotional theories of blame as his ““Freedom and Resentment” is the founding document of contemporary work on blame” (Coates & Tognazzini 2013, 5). In fact, in the introduction to their book, the same group is labeled “The Strawsonian Account” (3, 13), while in Coates & Tognazzini (2014) it is designated “Emotional Theories of Blame”. In these theories, blame and the capacity to receive it are the main constitutive elements of responsibility in the Strawsonian sense.
Strawson is equally credited as a reviver of the discussion but, as was the case with responsibility, he did not provide a specific definition of blame in “Freedom and Resentment” (see Coates & Tognazzini 2014). In this work however, the main proponent of Strawsonian blame is considered to be R.
116
Watson’s contribution to discussion on responsibility is considered more closely below in chapter 4.3.4.
Jay Wallace, whose theory is focused on blame as an emotional response or a reactive emotion. This is a natural reaction to observed wrong-doing, wherein the acts do not carry a separate metaphysical (binary) condition,118
these responses, as well as the attitudes related to them defining or being interpreted as moral responsibility.
Macnamara’s article “Taking Demands out of Blame” describes the Strawsonian group as including Strawson, as well as Wallace, Wolf and Darwall (Macnamara 2013).119 Describing how blame works according to the
Strawsonians, she writes: “I blame another when I respond to her conduct with resentment, indignation or disapprobation, that is I blame another when I respond to her wrong-doing with a negative reactive emotion. (Macnamara 2013, 141.)
If based on an emotion-based theory of blame, such as Wallace’s for instance, A in the example above would instantly react instinctively, non- cognitively. For example, in a Strawsonian context the observation and the realization of what A 's action had brought about would fill B with resentment, making B proverbially “sick to his/her stomach”, and would provoke a reactive emotion toward the transgressor A in a forceful act of condemnation.
The conative accounts according to Coates and Tognazzini are those that “emphasize motivational elements, like desires and intentions, as essential to blame.” George Sher (2006) and Thomas M. Scanlon (2008, 2013) are mentioned in the article as showing the most developed conative theories of blame. Sher’s criticism is aimed at both of the other types of theory, in that he does not believe that emotion is required for blame. Instead, he agues, it should be equally based on a cognitive element as well as a conative element, resulting in an account by which blame is ultimately conceived as a belief- desire pair. Scanlon’s theory equally disposes of the emotional, and offers instead a cool, rational account of social relations and appraisals that occur. (Coates & Tognazzini 2014.)
Sher’s blame is interesting,120 as the concept in his theory necessarily
contains both a cognitive and a conative aspect. Blame, in his theory as
118 For the sake of the argument here, it is assumed that Wallace’s reliance on the normative level is
not considered as such. However the notion is questioned elsewhere in this work (ch. 4.1.3).
119
Victoria McGeer also argues for a psychologically informed account of blame in her article “Civilising Blame” (McGeer 2013).
120 The other recent contribution to the topic of blame is by George Sher as he discusses in In
Praise of Blame (2006) and “Wrongdoing and Relationships: The Problem of the Stranger” (2013). His version criticizes Scanlon’s blame, proposing instead that blame is actually a belief-desire pair, a concept that brings together cognitive and conative aspects of the phenomenon. However Sher’s account is accused by Victoria McGeer (in 2013’s “Civilizing Blame”) and Christopher Franklin of being too “sanitized” (Coates & Tognazzini 11). Whether or not these two accounts of blame gain a permanent place alongside Strawson’s version, these contributions have ensured that the topic is alive and well in the current academic discussions.
described in his book In Praise of Blame (2006), is conceived as a belief- desire pair. Blame in his account consists of both an understanding that a wrongdoer has committed an offence and how, as well as an idea of how this person has failed to live up to the moral expectations. This was the cognitive side. The conative side of blame consists of a retrospective desire that the blamer has. This desire is aimed at the wrongdoer such that the blamer wishes that the wrongdoer had decided otherwise, or avoided the act. Based on these two aspects, Sher claims we can better understand the moral relations between us.
One of Sher’s theory’s proponents is Angela Smith, who describes Sher’s blame as follows:
Blame should be understood as a set of dispositions to have certain attitudinal and behavioral reactions, and these dispositions should be understood as traceable to a single desire-belief pair that includes (1) a belief that the person in question has acted badly or has a bad character, and (2) a corresponding desire that the person not have acted badly or not have a bad character (Sher 2006, p.112). (Smith 2013, 33.)
Thomas M. Scanlon’s more recent writings have seen him modeling a theory of blame121 that has had a mixed reception. The intricacies of his theory are
impossible to discuss satisfactorily here, but it is possible to briefly demonstrate how his conception of blame is unique: Scanlon’s blame is distinctly social; it always involves the act of evaluating fellow human beings and the alteration of expectations toward them based on the former. Thus, if person A offends B with an improper act, B can evaluate what has taken place and she can lower her further expectations toward A as a result. In the context of Scanlon’s theory, Coates and Tognazzini maintain that: “to blame