EDUCATION?
Taking stock of Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, it seems clear that there are multiple interpretations of what is inherent to this concept: the most common, shared understanding of its basics can be summed up in terms of the “simple theory presented in Irwin’s article (1980).213 The “simple
theory” interpretation, however, leaves out the effects of character discussed in NE III.5.
Character, as it was discussed in Aristotle’s context, consists of virtues, which have an effect on people’s moral choices, which means that Aristotle considers character important for moral responsibility. There is, however, some disagreement on the last point, which is discussed further in this chapter. For example, some authors argue against this (Irwin, Meyer, and Curren) in that by talking about character in NE III.5, Aristotle did not mean that past events could decisively alter responsibilities, or that character is not an inseparable component of Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility. but that it is discussed because it is important for moral education (Meyer 2011, 145) and Athenian legal thought (Curren 1989, 259) instead.
One interpretation (see Schoeman 1987, 6 & Pritchard 1991, chapter 2) considered be plausible here, is that Aristotle may not have distinguished between ethics and moral development, and thus saw no problem incorporating the notions of moral education and development into his theory of moral responsibility as well as the more extensive political connotations of the concept. Nevertheless, the important conclusion of the naturalistic interpretation, which is ultimately preferred here, is that blame is the key element of responsibility and as such the dynamics of the social relationships between agents are also relevant in Aristotle’s context. (EE II.7 1223a9-13.)
Both of Irwin’s theories involve an agent doing an act based upon the response that constitutes responsibility. For example, if A drives under the influence of alcohol and injures B, A is blamed for the deed and thus considered responsible. The main difference between the simple and complex interpretations is the added condition of “capable decision”. Therefore where in the case of the simple theory the mere voluntariness of consuming alcohol sufficed under the complex theory, for A to be responsible for the act A would additionally require the capacity to decide whether to consume alcohol before driving or not. In most cases, the situations certainly do not differ, but Irwin’s complex theory provides additional detail for Aristotle’s theory of responsibility for action, which is missing from the common one.
In his seminal article, Irwin (1980) (1.) disagrees with Aristotle that mere voluntariness is sufficient for responsibility. As stated in his complex theory, he expects the capacity for decisions from the agent as well. Irwin also writes that (2.) Aristotle emphasizes that, once acquired, character is lasting and not easy to change, character is composed not only of beliefs but also emotions as “the result[s] of training nonrational desires”; and noted that: (3.) “Aristotle’s discussion of responsibility for character begins by considering how character is formed by decision and action on it”. Finally, Irwin claims that (4.) his complex theory helps to explain the problems of Aristotle’s topic of responsibility for character or “why Aristotle speaks in these two ways”. He claims that Aristotle seems to think that by deciding the agent can become responsible for more than just the act. (Irwin 1980, 140-141).
The “responsibility for character” aspect of Aristotle’s theory is discussed by Irwin in “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle” (1980) as well. Irwin interprets the thoughts on responsibility for character present in NE III.5 (i.e., “the complex theory”) as not representing a contradiction in terms with the rest of Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility. Irwin demonstrates this by using Hume’s theory, which itself is directly influenced by Aristotle’s theory, as a point of comparison.214 According to Irwin, Aristotle’s appended
theory succeeds where Hume’s theory fails in that Hume claims that only in- character acts are blameworthy, and all out-of-character acts are excused.215
This is averted in Aristotle’s theory as, again following Irwin’s interpretation, a capacity for making reasoned decisions is required as a pre-requisite for being held responsible.
The difference between the two classic thinkers is in how they conceive the mental states of the agent, which have an effect on the act and accountability concerning the act. Both of them agree that the condition of causal responsibility has to be true in order for the agent to be a valid recipient of praise and blame. According to Irwin, however, Hume understands this condition in two separate ways: in terms of his or her character and some elements of his person that are durable. (Irwin 1980, 134-135.)
214
While Hume’s theory of responsibility is not described in great detail in here, it is used as an example of a theory that uses both concepts of excuse and character in its discussion of blame mitigation. Blame mitigation as a term is discussed in the analysis section in chapter 7. Hume’s theory is also an important precedent to Strawson’s naturalism, as Hume shares the outlook of naturalism (see Wilson 2003).
215
“It is worth comparing Aristotle’s doctrine with another […] [of] Hume’s attempt[s]. Hume agrees with Aristotle’s condition (1a) in insisting that someone is open to praise or blame only if he is himself the cause of his actions.” […] “But Hume understands this requirement in two nonequivalent ways: responsible action must proceed (a) from person’s character and (b) from something durable in him.” (Irwin 1980, 134-135.) See also “animals and children satisfy the second condition but not the first” (Irwin 1980, 135). See also Bayles (1976) for a comprehensive account of Hume’s excuses.
As Aristotle mentions, the reason why children and animals are exempted from responsibility is that prohairesis choice is unavailable to them, and thus their characters are considered incomplete (See NE III.2 1111b8-9). Hume claims however that the durable qualities of the mind and the character are identical with each other. Irwin claims that Hume is wrong in equating the two, and as a result is incapable of correctly evaluating the situations in which the agent is acting out-of-character. Irwin writes that Hume’s theory, compared with Aristotle, fails in cases demonstrated in the article. A person previously known to be honest embezzles some money. Because the act of embezzlement is done out-of-character, this act cannot be used as basis for holding the agent responsible in the context of Hume’s theory. In Aristotle’s case, using the complex theory the agent would clearly be responsible for the act, as he would have had the capability to decide to act fraudulently in any case. (Irwin 1980, 135.)
Irwin also writes: “The first condition is too restrictive. Hume may be right to say – and Aristotle agrees – that someone will be blamed less for what he does ‘hastily and unpremeditatedly’ than for what proceeds from his character. But he is wrong to identify every durable element in a person with his character.” (Irwin 1980, 135.) Aristotle’s deliberation and decision provide a better grounding for judgments than Hume’s idea of the durability of the principles of mind does. Aristotle has a larger variety of constant features of the mind, which Hume does not distinguish; he equates every durable element of the mind with character. Irwin gives an example in which the agent clearly does wrong, but in a way that the action does not originate from the character. Hume’s theory cannot hold him responsible, while Aristotle’s appended with Irwin’s “complex theory” can. (Ibid.)
The classic example of compulsion is the ship’s captain abandoning his cargo in a storm.216 The example puts the mental state of the captain under
the magnifying glass. The situation is interesting because it assumes that the captain is fully causally responsible in losing the cargo, as well as is acting voluntarily on the level of action. Thus, in terms of blameworthiness the only redeeming factor can come through the impersonal coercion that the environment causes. Resulting from this, the stressed state of mind of the captain can also come into question in how it affects the ultimate decision. According to Irwin, his formulation of Aristotle’s “complex theory” can solve a lot of problems associated with the situation. By focusing on the diminished capabilities of the agent, which, assuming that the captain is not able to save the cargo, can lead to the conclusion that the captain is indeed not blameworthy on account of the loss. (See Irwin 1980, 137.)
Irwin concludes that “on this theory [the complex theory] of responsibility, someone can be responsible for an action without being
216 Fischer & Ravizza follow up with this example. They describe the situation as an intentional, but
responsible for his character or for the traits of personality that cause him to deliberate and act as he does” (ibid. 139).
Children are a group that receives special treatment right from NE book III onwards.217 Aristotle’s reasoning on why children are discussed relates
directly to the question of character in moral responsibility. Whether only adults can be held morally responsible is the probable origin of this clarification.218 Irwin discusses Aristotle’s treatment of the moral
responsibility of children: “And indeed Aristotle seems to be thinking of adults rather than children when he argues that we are responsible for our characters. […] Only an adult could be expected to know that his actions will form his states of character.” (Ibid. 1980, 140.)
In endnote 43, Irwin also writes that experience and judgment are required from students of politics, both of which children lack (NE 1095a2- 11). Those who are lectured on political science must have a good upbringing in Aristotle’s theory (NE 1095b4-6). People become good naturally, through practice or by education; however, to become virtuous is unlikely for the impulsive children without guidance, to secure which Aristotle suggest laws (1179b21-34).
In this way, according to Irwin, “Aristotle thinks it is possible to be so badly brought up that he is incapable of becoming good even if he wants to be” (Irwin 1980, 154). However, Sarah Broadie (1991) is against this, arguing that Aristotle is well aware of children and considers cases with undeveloped characters, such as those of children. Just because they lack the capability for deliberation, including prohairesis, does not mean that they would not strive to be and do good. Just at the end of the responsibility assessments, blame on children can be withdrawn, but not without consideration of their capacity for moral thought. (Broadie 1991, 169-170.)
Marion Smiley in Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community (1992) notes that while action can be committed by adults, children and animals alike, the last two groups are excluded from responsibility on the basis of their lacking status in terms of voluntariness. She criticizes Irwin’s interpretation of Aristotle’s responsibility in that Irwin confuses Aristotle’s concept of responsibility with that of Kant. Voluntariness is something for Aristotle that is mediated by political and social norms, not something that depends on “rational control” or free will. (Smiley 1992, 50.)
217
NE III.2 1111b8-9. See also Bobzien’s notes about children (Bobzien 2014, 20).
218
Sarah Broadie writes in Ethics with Aristotle (1991):
“It is sometimes suggested that what motivates NE book III.5 is the following reasoning: (1) a person of formed character is not free to act otherwise than in accordance with it; (2) one cannot be held answerable for doing X when one is not free not to, except on the condition that (3) one freely and knowingly entered into the situation in which one is not free not to do it. With this in mind, it is suggested, Aristotle makes the acquisition of character ‘depend on us.’ For then the fully formed agent cannot escape responsibility for his actions.” (Broadie 1991, 170.)
Aristotle’s advantage, Smiley continues, comes from how the practice of blaming children and animals (as well as the mentally impaired) is independent of the status of the voluntariness of the actor. If voluntariness is held as an absolute prerequisite for blame, we lose the details of different levels of voluntariness, and how it is related to the ultimate sanctioning. According to Smiley, Nussbaum’s description of the “mysterious shift” between childhood and maturity is something Aristotle’s theory is better equipped to deal with precisely because of the separateness of voluntariness and blameworthiness (Smiley 1992, 51.)
Susan S. Meyer considers Aristotle’s theory of responsibility and its relationship with the concept of character in her book Aristotle on Moral Responsibility (2011). Meyer, whose conception of responsibility is adopted from Strawson, writes that Aristotle’s responsibility for character is not a part of his view of moral responsibility, but of his ideas of moral education. She does however note that the modern writers often consider Aristotle’s responsibility for character essential to moral responsibility. (Meyer 2011, 145.)
The initial idea of Aristotle on Moral Responsibility (Meyer 2011) is to describe the part of Aristotle’s work that corresponds to the Strawsonian conception of moral responsibility and argue for a coherent Aristotelian concept of moral responsibility. Meyer (2011) is thus optimal in identifying the similarities and the differences between the different conceptions. She relies on the passages devoted to exploring the notions of voluntariness and responsibility for character. Her inquiry goes to considerable lengths in examining the relationship between voluntariness and responsibility, even so far as responsibility not being a direct concern of moral agency. Her main target is Roberts' article (1989), as she objects to Roberts’s stance as one where the voluntariness aspect gets neglected, while the particular effects of character are agreed upon (see Meyer 2011, 14).
Meyer describes accounts of moral responsibility in terms of the scope of their definition: moral responsibility in Meyer's narrow construal is the “concern of criminal law […] It concerns the conditions in which an agent merits praise and blame, or reward or punishment, for an action. An agent merits blame or punishment for an action if and only if she is morally responsible for it […] On this narrow construal, moral responsibility is a relation between an agent and her action”. (Meyer 2011, 17-18.) The narrow construal thus concerns only the retributive side of the concept. Compared to this, Meyer, presents moral responsibility at its broadest construal as “issues of central importance to our conception of morality and to our conception of ourselves as moral agents”. (Ibid. 18.) Meyer’s special interest is aimed at “agents who are subject to the demands of morality”, while she makes the usual exceptions of “non-human animals, small children, and the mentally defective”. She states that while concern about these groups is important, “we don’t consider these claims to be reciprocal”, which corresponds to
Strawson's distinction between the objective attitudes and reactive attitudes (ibid. 18).
Meyer writes about these statements that recall Aristotle’s emphases on virtues and rationality. They fit Eshleman’s categories in chapter 3, and her work can be said to be influenced by the Strawsonian tradition.219 Going
through the criteria reveals an idea of responsibility, at least in stating the scale between the narrow and broad construal (ibid. 17-18): there is an agent220 (ibid. 28), there are conditions, which determine whether the agent
can be held responsible for an action in terms of the exceptions on p. 18, as well as the statement that voluntariness not a sufficient condition of responsibility (ibid. 28-29). Finally, there are the virtues, which act as objects of responsibility ascriptions (ibid. 19-24).
The focus on virtues lets Meyer concentrate on responsibility for character.221 Throughout the work she is interested in the relationship
between the notions of responsibility for action and character. 222 She makes
the effort to emphasize the role of moral education as a separate but related area with moral responsibility in general. She takes the risk of attempting to include the former within the latter clear, and is skeptical about such projects. She writes in the introduction:
Aristotle clearly has the concerns of the moral educator in mind when writing his ethical treatises and he thinks praising and blaming play an important formative role in moral education. But he nonetheless conceives the goal of moral education to be to produce a fully autonomous individual who merits praise or blame. The only agents who merit praise or blame are those who are properly subject to the demands, expectations, and evaluations of morality. The first task of a theory of moral responsibility is to identify the features that properly subject an agent to these demands, expectations and evaluations. An agent who has these features is a morally responsible agent. Aristotle’s account of moral character (the condition common to virtue and vice of character) accomplishes this first task of a theory of moral responsibility. (Meyer 2011, 3-4.)
219
Meyer refers directly to FR (Meyer 2011, 17-19, endnote 1 & 2.)
220
Meyer discusses Aristotle’s moral agency in the sixth chapter of her book: “the agent is not simply a causal factor in production of the action, but the causal factor to which primary causal responsibility is attributable” (Meyer 2011,149).
221
For example, Jean Roberts’ article (1989) is cited in the introduction (Meyer 2011, 2, endnotes 4 & 5.)
222 E.g., “The state of character concerning a given range of activity disposes the agent to display or
engage in that activity in a certain way in certain circumstances. The justice or injustice (e.g., flight or fear) depends essentially on these additional conditions “What, when, how, etc.” in Aristotle’s formula […] Hence the thing for which one is blamed or praised is not, for example, getting angry, but rather getting angry in these circumstances to this degree, etc” (Meyer 2011, 163, NE references excluded).
Meyer continues that Aristotle’s theory also leaves room for the exceptional cases, as while he “explicitly recognizes that not all voluntary agents are morally responsible for their voluntary actions, he nonetheless thinks that agents with moral character are morally responsible for their voluntary actions”. (Meyer 2011, 4.)
The emphasis on the voluntary is not uncritical in Aristotle according to Meyer. There are examples where Aristotle considers alternatives to the most commonly used schemas.223 Meyer applies Strawson’s view on compatibilism
to Aristotle too, as she states that the question of determinism is not a concern nor is definitive with the topic of moral responsibility (ibid. 4). According to Meyer, moral character means that a “set of dispositions together determine the full range of agent’s sentiments and interests” (ibid. 31). With a reference to Roberts (1989), she describes responsibility for character as a prospective type of responsibility (Meyer 2011, 40-41).
Aristotle, according to Meyer, “thinks the qualified sort of responsibility for character […] we have is significant for our moral education, not for our moral responsibility.” (Ibid. 145.) This is coherent with her main argument that Aristotle’s responsibility cannot be interpreted solely on the basis of voluntariness. Responsibility for character might not be required for responsibility for action, as Meyer notes: “Aristotle nowhere indicates that he thinks responsibility for character is significant because it is a necessary condition for responsibility for action, or because it is necessary for the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of states of characters […] in this context [arguing against the Socratic asymmetry thesis] he thinks the qualified sort of responsibility for character […] we have is significant for our moral education, not for our moral responsibility (n28)” (Meyer 2011, 145. See also Roberts 1989, 30-31 and Broadie 1991, 166-74.)
In an endnote Meyer compares Robert’s and Broadie’s position to her own: “Roberts [1989, 30-31], like Broadie [1991, pp. 166-74], agrees that the point of Aristotle’s argument for responsibility for character is to establish that nature leaves room for habituation and education. But she takes this to indicate that Aristotle is not concerned with moral responsibility in the