CATEGORÍA: CURRÍCULO Instrumento: Entrevista

According to Gasper (2012) development ethics is a discipline, a form of inquiry and a means of analysis that is concerned with the value choices that inform human action undertaken in the name of development. When broadly applied as a research lens, development ethics recognises that all people matter in development. It also looks beyond the matter of utility, or the enhancement of a common good, to realise that the process of development is itself a significant development consideration (Goulet, 1995). Relatedly, it prompts questions about the meaning of development; what good or ‘real’ development means; what it is that development policy should facilitate; and how the costs and benefits of development should be distributed (Gasper, 2012, p. 120). As such, development ethics provokes the consideration of the ethical or value basis underpinning development practices (ibid.). As applied within this research, development ethics also has the role of:

“[P]roviding analytical tools and ethical clarification to formulate alternative knowledge for development centred on the equal moral worth of all human beings, and shifting development from a charity issue to a matter related to questions of global and social justice” (2010, p. 360).

Development ethics was advanced as a form of academic inquiry by Denis Goulet in the 1970s. Goulet argued that ‘antidevelopment’ was occurring as a result of human action being

undertaken in the name of profit and efficiency, and that this was producing undue sacrifices for human wellbeing (Goulet, 1997, p. 1169). The precepts of Goulet’s work stemmed from the work of Louis Lebret (1897–1966)8_{, a socio-economist who had worked in France in the} early 1940s leading a group known as Economie et Humanisme (Gasper, 2012). This group

deliberated on issues of human wellbeing and human deprivation occurring under the banner of social advancement (Gasper, 2012). Its objective was to develop an economic system that was more humane, being one that enabled people ‘to be more’ (Gasper, 2012; Goulet, 1997, p. 1167). This line of development theorising was later advanced by Mahbub ul Haq in the 1990s, who established the concept of human development adopted by the United Nations within their Human Development Reports, and more recently by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum through their capabilities approach. Similar to Lebret, Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2003) broadly conceptualise issues of wellbeing in terms of the human capacity to do, be and achieve more.

Although approaches in development ethics may vary in design, methodologically they are commonly underpinned by a process that requires: (1) The selection of the relevant development ethic/s to inform analysis guided by an awareness of the ethical dimensions of development issues; (2) The systemisation of ethical development values into an analytical framework, and; (3) The application of this framework to draw conclusions about a development situation (Gasper, 2004; St. Clair, 2010). Yet moving beyond the ethical theorising of development toward the practical implementation of development ethics has been recognised to be a major challenge for the advancement of development ethics in research practice (Crocker, 2008). Choosing which ethical categories to adopt within analysis is a critical part of this practical implementation challenge (ibid.). When it is not feasible for impacted societal groups to themselves select what values are appropriate to use as the basis of development analysis, on what basis should development ethics be selected?

Facing this challenge, Penz, Drydyk and Bose successfully adopt a multi-criteria evaluation approach for considering the complexity of human development concerns associated with displacement (2011, p. 11). In their examination of displacement and development issues, Penz, Drydyk and Bose (2011) draw on human well-being, empowerment, equity, environmental sustainability, human rights, cultural freedom and integrity regarding corruption

8 _{Lebret drew from the work of European philosophers, John Locke (1632-1704), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832),}

as core tenets of socially meaningful development. Following suit, within this research I have developed a multi-criteria research lens to consider the effectiveness of mining company development intervention on Simberi and Lihir islands (see Figure 4 for an overview of the conceptual research lens). This research lens is informed by the development values emanating from human wellbeing, human rights and inclusive development as development ethics. The ethic of wellbeing exists as an essential starting point for this research because it mandates the consideration of locally relevant human wellbeing values within research data analysis, and must be drawn on to establish the meaningfulness of development intervention at the local level. Human rights and inclusive development each additionally provide an alternative ethical lens through which to consider the effectiveness of mining company development intervention, which when applied analytically, are informed by established local wellbeing values and development experiences. However, to understand why human rights and inclusive development have been selected as appropriate development values relevant to this research, it is necessary to consider how they connect to the notion of social justice.

A Background to Social Justice

Greek philosophers Plato [429–347 BC] and Aristotle [384–322 BC] were key contributors to the philosophical foundations of justice, which is implicitly relevant to the contemporary theorisation of justice (Raphael, 2001). This early philosophical thinking solidified the notion of justice as fairness, and signalled the significance of the distribution of burdens, benefits and responsibilities in connection to issues of justice (Johnston, 2011). The concept of reciprocity related to distributive justice was advanced by Aristotle, who advocated for the ‘principle of desert’ (Johnston, 2011, p. 88). According to Aristotle “…it is just for people to reap rewards

from a common enterprise that are proportional in value to the contributions they have made

to that enterprise” (Johnston, 2011, p. 71). The concept of distributive justice has since commonly become considered central to contemporary interpretations of social justice (Miller, 1999). As described by Wan, “…distributive justice fundamentally questions how society distributes benefits (freedoms, opportunities, resources) and burdens (risk, costs)” (2014, p. 39). This in turn necessitates the consideration of the distribution of societal goods that affect

a person’s life prospects. For distribution to be considered just, Marti (2013) argues that it must mandate the societal acceptance of the distribution of goods and burdens within a society. While Marti does not refute the potential for unequal distribution to be considered just, he argues that for just inequality, it must be a result “…of free decisions and not the outcome of circumstances beyond the control of the person” (2013, p416). Nevertheless, distributional outcomes are often influenced by a range of factors that are beyond the control of a person (Koller, 2013). For example, social status may lead to varying forms of social exclusion that may in turn skew the starting point for distribution (Fraser, 2008; I. M. Young, 1990). For this reason Young (1990) and Fraser (2008) argue that in order to consider the matter of justice related to distribution, it is necessary to understand the structural basis of maldistribution.

As a consequence of the complexity of the concept of justice, definitive theories of justice are often contested. Whilst having a sense of what may be fair or unfair does not necessarily require knowledge of political philosophy, the theoretical interpretations of justice posited by Rawls (1971), Nozick (1974), Sen (1992; 1999) and Nussbaum (2003) have made a substantive contribution to the theorisation of social justice and are therefore worthy of consideration here. In Rawls’ seminal theory of justice (1971), he advocates that for a just society, it is necessary to establish either distributional equality or distributional inequality that

advantages society’s worst-off (ibid.). According to Rawls, “… the way in which the major

social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social co-operation” is central to issues of justice (1971, p. 7). He posits that

there are three key principles of justice: (1) The liberty principle, that “…each person is entitled

to the most extensive set of basic liberties compatible with the same liberty for all”; (2) The fair opportunity principle, that “…any positions of public responsibility or private advantage should be open to all on the basis of fair (not merely formal) equality of opportunity”; and (3) The

difference principle, that “…any inequality in the distribution of ‘primary goods’9 _{is permissible} only in so far as it is to the advantage of the worst-off group in society” (Burchardt & Craig, 2008, p. 4; Rawls, 1971, pp. 302-303). Rawls argues that, for justice, the liberty principle must have priority over the principle of fair opportunity, and the principle of fair opportunity priority over the difference principle (ibid.).

Robert Nozick (1974) similarly postulated a theory of justice premised on distributive grounds.

Nozick’s ‘entitlement theory’ is based on the notion of ‘justice in holdings’, which asserts that

there are three necessary components of a ‘wholly just’ world, including the need for: (1) the personal acquisition of a holding to be in line with the principle of justice as the basis of entitlement; (2) the personal acquisition of a holding to be in line with the principle of justice in relation to the transfer of that holding from a person who was entitled to that holding; and (3) that the entitlement to a holding can only be wholly just if it is secured through the application of (1) and (2) (Nozick, 1974). According to Nozick, a distribution is considered just if it is a result of another form of just distribution, and more broadly, “[t]he complete principle of

distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the

holdings they possess under the distribution” (Nozick, 1974, p. 151).

In contrast to Rawls and Nozick, the capabilities approach advanced by Sen (1992, 1999) and Nussbaum (2003) communicates a less utilitarian approach to justice (Piachaud, 2008). Instead of being resource-orientated, the capabilities approach is concerned about an

individual’s capability to function and the associated freedom one has to achieve their aspirations in life (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2003). Sen contends that Rawls’s theory pertaining to the fair distribution of primary goods fails to account for the fact that the needs of people will vary as a result of varying life circumstances (Wolff, 2008). Thus, as a result of such diverse needs, the equal distribution of primary goods may not result in justice. Related to this he argues that social injustice may be exacerbated by the fact that “[t]wo persons holding the same bundle of primary goods can have very different freedoms to pursue their respective conception of the good (whether or not these conceptions coincide)” (1992, p. 8). Sen therefore advocates that, as opposed to the distribution of primary goods and related

9 _{According to Rawls primary goods are a set of resources which he presumes every person to need, including}

resources, an individual’s capabilities are more relevant to the promotion of human wellbeing

and associated concerns of justice. While Sen does not attempt to define the scope of such capabilities in order to allow for diversity, Nussbaum, in contrast, believes there is a minimum set of capabilities universally relevant to the wellbeing of every person and necessary for justice in any society (Burchardt, 2008; Nussbaum, 2003).10

Connecting Development Ethics to Social Justice

The purpose of outlining these accounts of justice here is to highlight the varied nature of social justice theory. As rationalised in the remainder of this chapter, it is unnecessary to provide a detailed account or critique of each of these theories of justice here, given that this research adopts a broader approach to the consideration of social justice. For example, where Nozick theorises issues of justice from a historical perspective, Rawls focuses on the anticipated need to promote justice through public policy, Sen concentrates on the immediate role of human agency in relation to justice (Piachaud, 2008) and Nussbaum argues for a set of basic human entitlements for social justice (Nussbaum, 2003). Yet whilst diverse, these theories nevertheless each have a distributional orientation and each implicitly recognise that, for the manifestation of justice, there needs to be fairness pertaining to an open, inclusive process of exchange (Piachaud, 2008). As such, each of these theories signal the relevance of structural equality/inequality related to distributional outcomes. The critical point here for the purposes of this discussion is to recognise that such distributional and structural considerations denote the dual domains of justice (Fraser, 2000, 2003; Hickey, Sen & Bukenya, 2015; Lister, 2008, Young, 1990), and that they are therefore relevant to the conceptual lens of development ethics that has applied to this research.

Within the development ethics research lens applied within this research, human rights and inclusive development have been selected as development ethics, in part because they can respectively provide for related distributional and structural justice considerations within the analysis of mining company development intervention. Specifically, the adoption of human rights as a development ethic facilitates the consideration of the distribution of human rights

10 _{These capabilities include the following: (1) To live to the end of a human life of a normal length; (2) To have}

good health, to be adequately nourished and to have adequate shelter; (3) To move freely from place to place, to be secure against violent assault, to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction; (4) To use the sense to imagine, think and reason –and to do these things in a ‘truly human way’ –

including political activities and religious freedom; (5) To experience emotions – love, grief, anger, etc. – unblighted

by fear and anxiety; (6) To form a concept of the good and to reflect on one’s life; (7) To live with concern for other

human beings and be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others; (8) To live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature; (9) To laugh, play and enjoy recreational activities; (10) Politically to participate in choice that govern one’s life. Materially, to hold property and to seek employment

benefit and burdens relevant to mining company development intervention, and the adoption of inclusive development allows for the associated consideration of the structural dimension of justice/injustice related to corporate action.

Putting aside philosophical disputes over theories of justice that have little practical bearing may provide a pragmatic way forward for justice theorising (Wolff, 2008). In line with this thinking, the adoption of a multi-criteria development ethics research lens, which encompasses the dual dimensions of social justice, being the distributional and structural dimensions of justice, can serve as a means for making comparative conclusions about social justice related to mining company development intervention. The ensuing ‘comparative

approach’ for considering matters of social justice (Sen, 2012) uses situational or contextual benchmarks to frame potential alternative courses of action, which can be described as being either more or less just (ibid.). While it is beyond the capacity of this approach to arrive at any one definitive assessment or measure of social justice, it can usefully reveal opportunities that exist to enhance justice beyond the status quo. Relevant to this research, the adoption of this conceptual lens may therefore reveal opportunities for mining companies to promote social justice through the delivery of mining company development intervention by revealing alternative courses of corporate action. The remainder of this discussion more comprehensively considers the use of wellbeing, human rights and inclusive development as development ethics informing the analysis of the research data. These three ethics then form the structural foundation for the remainder of this thesis.