fairly be described as pro-Israeli.
100 See The Middle East, April 1989, p.20, for details of the Condor II programme. 101 New York Times, 18 April 1989. Abdelkader Hilmy later aleged that Abu Ghazala
S ta te s .102 N evertheless, it was fundam entally tru e th a t, in stea d of enjoying purely b ilateral relations w ith the U nited S tates,
Egypt found itself enm eshed in a superim posed, asym m etrical tria n g u la r relationship. This m eant, in effect, th a t Egypt was in p a rt judged by W ashington on how it conducted itse lf tow ard Israel. W henever th e E gyptian-Israeli link d eteriorated for w hatever reasons, U .S.-Egyptian ties were reflexively strain ed . Israel could alw ays influence U.S. policy on Egypt; Cairo lacked any com parable capability. Israel had powerful public and congressional constituencies in the U nited S tates; Egypt h ad no such assets, only a certain am o u n t of goodwill as long as it adhered to th e peace tre a ty .103
From the vantage point of Cairo, Israel's p referen tial tre a tm e n t was galling, and E gypt sought sim ilar privileges. To observers in W ashington, it appeared th a t E gypt was attem p tin g to have its cake an d eat it, too. On the one hand, it successfully exploited the stre n g th of th e Israeli lobby in order to press for m atching increases in aid levels; on th e other, it dem anded a strictly b ilateral relationship. Egypt could not realistically hope to be tre a te d in the sam e way as Isra el.104
T his in no way stopped com plaints. It was a basic E gyptian grievance th a t A m erican economic aid to Israel was far m ore generous - in absolute, let alone in proportional term s - th a n th a t given to Egypt. Israel received its paym ents w ith o u t conditions and w ithout th e irrita tin g AID interm ediary; and from FY1985 onw ards, aid to Israel came in the form of a sim ple cash tra n s fe r.105 The difference in tre a tm e n t did indeed extend to relatively sm all m atters. F or exam ple, a C ongressional subcom mittee
102 See 'Ali al-Din Hilal in al-Gumhuriyya, 7 March 1985. American views from Michael van Dusen interview, 1 August 1988.
103 Eilts, 'The United States and Egypt', p.127.
104 Interview, Dr. Michael van Dusen, 1 August 1988. Matti Golan records a conversation between Mubarak and Shimon Peres, the then Israel prime minister, during their summit in September 1986: Mubarak asked Peres to support Egypt's case for interest rate reduction in Washington, and to put in a good word with the Israeli lobby there. See M. Golan, The Road to Peace: A Biography of Shimon Peres (New York: Warner Books, 1989), pp.319-20.
105 The Egyptian case is neatly summed up in H. Nafi'a, 'Egyptian Policy towards the United States: The Difficult Search for a Balance', Paper presented to Second Political Studies Conference, Cairo, 3-5 Dec. 1988, pp. 19-20.
established in late 1987 that Israel had the right to use its ESF cash grant to pay off military debts, whereas Egypt - which had done so that year - legally had no such freedom.106
Another source of resentment in Cairo was American pressure to encourage the normalisation’107 process between Egypt and Israel. It was seen in Washington as unhelpful that Egypt had withdrawn its ambassador from Israel in September 1982, in protest against apparent Israeli complicity in the Sabra and Shatilla massacres in Lebanon. In the face of American efforts to have the ambassador returned, President Mubarak made it clear that this would depend on Israel’s meeting three conditions: progress on talks concerning the Taba enclave, which (it was claimed) Israel had illegally retained when it vacated the Sinai in April 1982; the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Lebanon; and an end to the settlement policy in the West Bank. Mubarak was irritated by the presentation of a letter from 52 senators, shortly after his return from Washington in October 1983, requesting Egypt to end its 'cold war’ against Israel and unfreeze the normalisation process.108 Prime Minister Fuad Mohieddin explained to the semi-official journal Mayo th at it was wrong to attribute the poor state of Egyptian-Israeli relations to the absence of the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv, whilst ignoring the three issues raised by the President. Mubarak was further stung by the signing of a American-Israeli strategic co-operation agreement in November 1983, calling it a new obstacle’ to peace, and declaring th at if the United States persisted in its attem pts to have the ambassador returned, he would contemplate calling a referendum on the issue. In Washington, a proposed amendment to the
106 See US Congress. House. C'ttee. on Foreign Affairs. S'cttee. on Europe and the Middle East. Agency for International Development on the Use of Cash Transfer: The
Case of Egypt 10 Dec. 1987, p.14, 93
107 See below, Chapter 2, for details of Egyptian-Israeli relations.
108 On the letter and subsequent events detailed here, see MEED, 7 Oct. 1983, p.8; 14 Oct. 1983, p.16; 21 Oct 1983, p.24; and 16 Dec. 1983, p.8.
foreign aid bill for FY1984 expressed concern 'about the lack of progress in the norm alisation of relations betw een Egypt and Isra el'.109
The E gyptian governm ent believed a lastin g settlem en t to the Arab- Israeli dispute was a precondition for genuine regional stability. B ut the R eagan a d m in istratio n had a ra th e r different view of th e m eans by which a broader peace could be achieved. Given the ad m in istratio n 's attitu d es tow ards in te rn atio n al terro rism and its generally pro-Israeli stance, it is not su rp risin g th a t Egypt had little success in a ttem p tin g to persuade W ashington to deal w ith the PLO, in the absence of the la tte r's explicitly recognising Israel's rig h t to exist. W ashington would not, despite M ubarak's u rg in g s110, e n te r into talk s w ith the PLO.
M ubarak h a d supported P resid en t R eagan's peace initiative of 1 S eptem ber 1982, because he pragm atically recognised the need to keep the U n ited S tates involved.* * 111 He also realised th a t, since Israel would not recognise the PLO, the b est strateg y probably lay in the creation of a joint Jo rd a n ian -P a lestin ian negotiating team . Egypt helped bring about the H ussein-A rafat accord of F eb ru ary 1985112, w hereby the two sides adopted a common position on the creation of a Jo rd a n ian -P a lestin ian delegation to an in te rn atio n al peace conference. T h at said, Cairo lacked leverage not only in W ashington and Jeru salem , b u t in th e Arab world as well. M ubarak's sta te m e n t, in late F eb ru ary 1985, th a t he would accept a joint delegation which did not include PLO m em bers, h ad little im pact: King H ussein flatly refused P resid en t R eagan's offer, th a t th e U nited S tates
109 J. Beinin, 'The Cold Peace', MERIP Reports No. 129 (January 1985), p.8. 110 See, for example, MEED, 17 Feb. 1984, p.14 and 16 March 1984, p.15.
111 MEED, 17 Sept. 1982, p.24. The Reagan plan differed from the Arab plan endorsed
at Fez eight days later, in that it rejected the idea of an independent Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories; nevertheless, it did not recognise Israel's claim to the Territories, and called for a five-year transitional period of autonomy after which the Territories might be associated with Jordan.
112 G. Krämer, 'Ägyptische Aussenpolitik unter Mubarak', Europa Archiv, Folge 12/1985, p.365, citing Jerusalem Post, 14 Feb. 1985.
would m eet such a delegation if it were subsequently to e n te r into direct ta lk s w ith Isra e l.113 W hen the H ussein-A rafat accord broke down one year la te r, th ere was disappointm ent in Cairo and satisfaction in W ashington.114
T here was a degree of confusion in the official E gyptian stance. As G u d ru n K räm er h a s n o ted 115, Cairo seem ed to fluctuate betw een m in im alist and m axim alist positions. A t the m inim um , Cairo hoped for the creation of a jo in t Jo rd a n ian -P a lestin ian delegation, which m ight contain personalities associated w ith - b u t not senior m em bers of - th e PLO, and the achievem ent of 'full autonom y' for a P a lestin ian en tity in association w ith Jo rd an . Cairo's m axim alist position, by contrast, envisaged the im m ediate inclusion of the PLO an d the creation of an independent P alestin ian state. It is w orth th a t the ru lin g N D P's 1984 election program m e did not explicitly endorse the PLO's sta tu s as sole legitim ate rep resen tativ e of the P alestin ian s; it also referred to a P alestin ian 'hom eland' as opposed to a 's ta te '.116
By the end of 1985, Cairo h ad begun in 1985 publicly to endorse the idea of convening a n in te rn atio n al peace conference on th e Middle E a s t.117 Such a conference enjoyed little support in eith er W ashington or Jeru salem , an d the chances of bringing it to fruition were correspondingly slim; b u t W ashington's in tran sig en ce on the P alestin ian question, especially when combined w ith the Israeli raid on the PLO h e ad q u a rte rs on 1 October 1985 an d the hum iliation of th e A chille Lauro affair, left Cairo w ith few options.
113 Golan, The Road to Peace, pp.302-4.
114 See Eilts, ’The United States and Egypt', p.125. King Hussein declared the accord unworkable on 19 Feb. 1986; the Palestine National Council completely dissociated itself from the accord in April 1987.
115 Krämer, 'Ägyptische Aussenpolitik', pp.364-5. 116 'Ilwi, 'Egyptian Political Parties', pp.17-8. 117 ASR, 1985, p.386.
Besides, Cairo could, by voicing its support for the idea, endear itself to o th er audiences.118
Im p lic a tio n s
In some ways, it is m isleading to concentrate, as th is ch ap ter has largely done, on the sources of friction w ithin th e E gyptian-A m erican relationship. A fter all, strong b u reau cratic ties were built up d uring th e 1980s, to say nothing of the m ilitary connection. Because Egypt rem ained th e only Arab s ta te to have m ade peace w ith Israel, the expensive Am erican aid com m itm ent w as never seriously questioned; th e an n u al aid request became predictable in its size and ease of passage th ro u g h Congress. And, how ever fractious relations w ith W ashington m ight occasionally become, M u b arak never seriously questioned the relationship as such.
Yet the often-overstated concerns of E gyptian opposition w riters cannot be ignored, because they highlighted som ething which the governm ent its e lf m u st have realised: it was no m ore th a n a polite fiction th a t the b ila tera l relationship w as one betw een sovereign equals. It became increasingly difficult to defend the notion th a t th e Egyptian-A m erican relatio n sh ip w as a p a rtn e rsh ip , based not m erely on economic support - th a t is, on E gyptian need - b u t on a sh ared strategic com m itm ent to peace in th e region.119
The basic problem of the E gyptian governm ent, succinctly stated by W illiam Q uandt, w as this:
It w an ts th e economic and m ilitary assistance th a t W ashington alone can provide, b u t it bridles a t co n strain ts on its independence, resen ts being tre a te d as a client, an d finds th e intrusiveness of the
118 See below, Chapters 3 and 3. At its July 1986 General Conference, the NDP endorsed the international conference as the sole solution; 'Ilwi, 'Egyptian Political Parties', pp.17-8.
119 To paraphrase Ibrahim Nafi’a in al-Ahram, 21 March 1986, in FBIS-MEA, 26 March 1986.
Israeli factor in the relationship both insulting and domestically unpopular.120
Injured national pride - perhaps the inevitable result of dependence - coupled with a widespread intellectual suspicion of the United States, had soured the atmosphere by the end of the 1980s. In fact, the government's own position had come to resemble that of moderate left-wing commentators like Gawda Abdel Khaleq. He wrote in February 1988 that the United States, which stubbornly refused to respond to Egypt's economic predicament, held many cards, including food, arms and aid. Egypt could not do without them, but would simply have to persist in its attem pts to secure better term s.121
Mubarak had relatively little room for manoeuvre. He might express his misgivings about the American intervention in Lebanon, and resent the American-Israeli strategic understanding of November 1983, but he knew th at Egypt needed American aid and Washington's continued involvement in the peace process. Few solutions offered themselves. Mubarak could, and did, attem pt to improve the terms of the relationship, whilst defending his government against charges of subservience and of compromising Egypt's dignity. But the effects of such pleading were limited.
On a different plane, he could endeavour to reduce the psychological salience of the United States in Egyptian diplomacy. In effect, this meant rebuilding those diplomatic bridges which Sadat's peace policy - and his subsequent behaviour - had severely damaged. The most important of these bridges was th a t to the Arab world. This is not to imply, of course, th at Cairo felt compelled to restore its Arab credentials, purely because of its embarrassment a t being closely linked to a pro-Israeli admininistration in Washington. The Arab world had a 'puli' of its own and, as will be seen,
120 Quandt, The United States and Egypt, p.10.
121 Al-Ahali, 3 Feb. 1988. In 1988, Egypt's straitened economic circumstances forced it
to rely almost entirely on American military aid for its military equipment purchases; see ASR, 1988, p.679.
Cairo p u rsu ed openings in the A rab world in p arallel w ith other stran d s of its diplomacy. N evertheless, diluting the im portance of the U nited States, and increasing th a t of Egypt's Arab role, were both facets of M ubarak's efforts to tran scen d the lim ited - and lim iting - vision of S ad at's regional diplomacy. The common denom inator, and common constraint, w as the peace tre a ty w ith Israel, whose consequences are the subject of th e next chapter.
Chapter 2