states still adhering to the diplomatic boycott.
66 Cited and questioned by M. al-Sayyid Salim [in Arabicl, 'Planning Egyptian Foreign Policy in a Changing World', al-Siyasa al-Duwaliyya, No.98 (Oct. 1989), p.51.
no o th er sta te could provide $2.2 billion an n u ally in economic and m ilitary g ran ts. And none could replace th e U nited S ta te s as q u an titativ e and q u alitativ e lead er in m ilitary supplies.
D ilu tin g D e p e n d e n c e ? T he C ase o f F ra n ce
This is not to im ply th a t Cairo m ade no efforts to find supplem entary funds. On th e contrary, M ubarak an d his m in isters diligently visited W est E u ro p ean capitals every year, seeking financial assistance - p articu larly as E gypt's debt crisis w orsened - and broad political backing. According to U sam a al-Baz, Cairo regarded B ritain as being well-placed to persuade the U n ited S ta te s to play a more forceful role in the peace process.67 B ritain w as, however, th e lea st generous of th e m ajor E uropean sta te s in term s of aid.68
The E u ro p ean lead er w ith whom M ubarak h ad the closest rap p o rt was P re sid e n t Francois M itteran d of France. As M itteran d said d uring his visit to Cairo in Novem ber 1982, M ubarak h ad been th e first foreign head of s ta te to v isit F rance d uring his presidency, an d he h im self was the first E u ro p ean h ead of sta te to visit E gypt since M ubarak's tak in g office.69 F ran ce an d E gypt sh ared a common position on th e Libyan th re a t to C had70, and also agreed on the m eans of re s ta rtin g th e Middle E ast peace process. In J u n e 1982, the two countries prep ared a d ra ft resolution for subm ission to th e Security Council, proposing g rea ter P alestin ian p articip atio n in th e stalled peace negotiations. W ithin two m onths, however, P resid en t R eagan h ad launched an in itiativ e of his own, which
67 MENA, 3 Feb. 1983, in FBIS-MEA, 3 Feb. 1983. 68 ASR, 1987, p.411.
Cairo Domestic Service, 24 Nov. 1982, in FBIS-MEA, 29 Nov. 1982. (By Oct. 1985, they had met no fewer than eleven times; MENA, 20 Sept. 1985, in FBIS-MEA, 3 Oct. 1985.)
E gypt felt bound to support. M ubarak said th a t th e F ranco-E gyptian plan h a d been shelved by m u tu al agreem ent, to give the R eagan p lan a chance of success; b u t as B outros-G hali la te r acknowledged, W ashington had m ade it clear th a t it would veto the Franco-E gyptian p lan .71
D uring th e 1970s, F rance h ad m ade significant inroads into the E g y p tian w eapons m ark et, selling M irage-F l, M irage-III and Mirage-5 aircraft, as well as helicopters and m issiles.72 This w as prim arily a consequence of S ad at's desire to re-equip th e E gyptian arm ed forces w ith advanced w estern m ateriel in th e wake of the 1973 w ar, to b reak w h at he felt w as an in ad eq u ate supply relationship w ith the Soviet Union. It will be rem em bered th a t A m erican weapons did not begin to flow in appreciable q u a n titie s u n til afte r the conclusion of th e E gyptian-Israeli peace treaty. M u b arak continued the policy of diversification; in J a n u a ry 1982, Egypt signed a n ag reem en t to purchase tw enty advanced M irage-2000 fighters.73 By 1982, Egypt h ad become F rance's larg e st arm s custom er, and France E gypt's second-largest supplier after th e U nited S ta te s.74 F rench aircraft rem ain ed a significant elem ent in the E gyptian a ir force's inventory.
F rench equipm ent w as not especially cheap. W hen Egypt agreed to p u rch ase its in itial batch of Mirage-2000^,, it w as suggested th a t the n u m b ers were low because th e governm ent-arranged loan carried an in te re s t ra te of 9 per cent, repayable from th e date of th e first delivery onw ards.75 The first aicraft were not, in fact, delivered u n til m id-1986.76 In 1987, th ere w as a sudden holdup in th e delivery of the M irage-2000s,
71 MENA, 23 Nov. 1982, in FBIS-MEA, 24 Nov. 1982, and Le Monde, 31 July 1984, in
FBIS-MEA, 1 Aug. 1984, respectively..
72 SIPRI Yearbook, 1980, p.104.